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When is political power legitimate? Public reasons liberals argue that political 
power is legitimate only when it is supported by reasons drawn from principles of justice 
that each citizen could endorse. The most well known model for identifying whether a 
principle satisfies this requirement is John Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus.  
Typical interpretations of the idea of overlapping consensus hold that it expresses 
a necessary conceptual condition of any reasonable conception of justice. Against this 
ahistorical view, my analysis shows that Rawls’ mature account of overlapping consensus 
rests on a particular historicist thesis that liberal institutions are necessary for social 
cooperation given the presumption of moral and religious pluralism. The authority of 
public reasoning ultimately rests on the widespread consensus about the necessity of 
liberal institutions, rather than on a consensus on any particular conception of justice. The 
limits of public reason, on my analysis, are fixed first and foremost by liberal institutions.  
Given the prominent historical role of classical liberalism in specifying and 
defending liberal institutions, one might suppose that classical liberal conceptions of 
justice would have a central place in any consensus that defines the boundaries of public 
reasoning. I argue that this appearance is misleading. The work of scholars in disability 
studies show that conceptions of justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the unique needs 
and interests of citizens with disabilities. I argue that applying these insights to the idea of 
public reason shows that classical liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason 
only by unjustly ignoring the perspective of disabled citizens 
My dissertation shows that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on a nuanced and 
historically grounded view of the consensus circumscribing public reason. Further, it 
shows that a historically conditioned concept of public reason and political legitimacy 
need not imply a drastic retreat from central egalitarian commitments, despite initial 
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The Idea of Public Reason 
 
 
Public reasons liberals, like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerald Gaus, hold 
that the moral authority or legitimacy of the most fundamental rules of political society 
depends on whether those rules are justified by reasons that all reasonable citizens 
(could) share. Though each endorses some version of this general claim about legitimacy, 
they draw conflicting conclusions about the range of conceptions of justice that belong to 
public reason, and the legal rules, political policies, and institutions that are justified by 
public reasons. So for instance, John Rawls holds that public reasons will tend to justify 
robust social democratic states in which economic resources are highly regulated and 
regularly redistributed. Gerald Gaus, on the other hand, believes that public reasons will 
tend to justify only a political order marked by private enterprise and limited economic 
regulation. Habermas envisions the content of public reason to be substantial enough to 
justify a cosmopolitan federation of constitutional democracies, while Rawls and Gaus 
remain quietly skeptical of extending public reason beyond the borders of the nation-
state. Whether the central commitments of public reasons liberalism are broad enough to 
encompass the different conclusions drawn by each of these philosophers remains a 
largely unexamined question in the literature on public reason. This dissertation makes 
some progress towards a resolution of this question. 
Through a close examination of Rawls’ version of public reasons liberalism, this 
dissertation aims to show that Rawls’ account of public reasons is consistent with a much 
wider range of disagreement about the principles of basic justice than either he, or many 
of his interpreters acknowledge. I focus on Rawls version of public reasons liberalism 
 
 2 
because it is the most well known account of public reasons liberalism, but also because I 
believe it is provides the most compelling account of source of the moral requirement 
connected to the idea of public reason.  
At the center of this dissertation is the following question, can strong private 
property rights and broad protections for liberty of contract be justified by reasons that 
meet the Rawlsian definition of a public reason. I show that strong protections for private 
property rights and broad protections for liberty of contract likely can be justified by 
reasons satisfying the formal definition of public reason developed in Rawls’ mature 
view of public reason. This conclusion undermines Rawls’ claim that the values of public 
reason can only be realized against a background of the egalitarian economic and 
political institutions typically associated with deliberative democracy.  
I conclude by proposing a way of recapturing some of the force of Rawls claim 
that public reason can be expressed only in a deliberative democracy characterized by 
broad and significant regulation of property. I draw on recent work on justice and 
disability to argue that the perspective of citizens with disabilities provides a basis for 
drawing specific conclusions about the limits of property rights and liberty of contract 
that can be justified by reasons that all citizens could agree to. Conceptions of justice that 
do not imply or cannot support these limits fall short of the threshold of reasonability that 
establishes the range of public reasons. I argue that the logic of core classical liberal 
commitments make it unlikely that very many classical liberal conceptions will meet this 
threshold test. It follows that classical liberal conceptions generally fail to provide public 
reasons. This argument succeeds in showing that classical liberal conceptions of justice 
may satisfy one set of Rawlsian criteria for public reasons, but they generally fall below 
 
 3 
the threshold of reasonability that follows from the specific requirements of reciprocity 
derived the perspective of citizens with disabilities. 
In this introduction I want to distinguish the two most basic claims of public 
reasons liberalism in order to further clarify which aspect of public reason this 
dissertation addresses, and additionally to provide a more detailed description of the 
problem this dissertation addresses. 
The idea of public reason rests on two logically independent claims.1 The first 
claim is that when exercising, or advocating for the exercise, of coercive political power, 
citizens are under a moral requirement to provide reasons of a certain kind to other 
citizens.2 The second claim is that properly public reasons can be sufficiently 
distinguished from non-public reasons. Call the first claim the moral requirement claim, 
and the second the criterion claim. Some version of each of these claims is essential to 
any account of public reason, even those developed in opposition to the dominant 
Rawlsian paradigm. 
                                                
1 In what follows, I will refer to the ‘idea of public reason’ in an ecumenical way. While 
the term is certainly associated with Rawls, and he has done more than other recent 
philosophers to popularize it, the basic features of the ‘idea of public reason’ are broadly 
shared by many political philosophers in the broad liberal tradition. I see no reason to use 
the term exclusively in reference to the formulation of this idea given by Rawls. 
2 Individuals are under such an obligation, in my view, because legal norms are stable 
only insofar as citizens can adopt what Hart calls the internal point of view towards them 
(citizens must, in other words, regard legal norms as justified requirements, and not 
simply commands). In order for the internal point of view to encompass all citizens in a 
society, the justification must take a particular form, i.e. the justification must be in terms 
of reasons that are shared by all citizens insofar as they are reasonable. On Hart’s view, 
the content of this shared set of reasons in the rule of recognition, which may or may not 
have a moral content. Public reasons liberals, by contrast hold that the shared reasons that 
define the internal point of view of the law must be at least partially moral. The internal 
point of view is the view that good citizens adopt toward the law.  
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The moral requirement claim holds that individuals are, at least sometimes, 
morally required to use public reasons.3 More narrowly, plausible views of public reason 
must at least establish that individuals are morally required to offer public reasons to 
others when proposing an exercise of coercive political power. At least three questions 
need to be answered in connection with explaining the moral requirement claim. Each 
pertains to how to categorize and understand the moral requirement connected to the idea 
of public reason. First, what kind of moral requirement is the requirement to use public 
reasons? Second, who exactly is bound by this requirement and in what circumstances? 
Third, what moral value grounds the existence of this moral requirement? The brief 
discussion that follows refers primarily to features of the paradigms of public reason 
proposed by Gerald Gaus and John Rawls that illustrate some of the different answers 
public reasons liberals have given to these questions. 
First, the moral requirement may be characterized as either a virtue or a duty. 
Though not a common view, some have characterized the moral requirement to use 
public reasons in terms of a virtue.4 On this view, public reason is an excellence of 
character pertaining to the social role of citizen in a constitutional democracy. Failure to 
use public reasons may justify some degree of moral criticism insofar as individuals are 
better citizens when they justify political decisions in terms public reasons, but failure to 
be a good citizen may not be a moral failure all things considered. The distinguishing 
                                                
3 There is, of course, a sense in which this could be a relatively narrow moral 
requirement. Hobbes identified public reason with the reason of the sovereign, but a 
Hobbesian account of public reason is not conceptually independent from the obligation 
to obey the sovereign. 
4 Weithman 2002  
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feature of this sort of view is the claim that individuals who fail to use public reasons 
may violate no moral duty.5  
A much more common view is that the moral requirement to use public reasons is 
a moral duty, strictly conceived. Among those who hold that the moral requirement to use 
public reason is a duty, there is widespread disagreement as to the ground of the duty. 
Rawls sometimes suggests that the duty arises from certain social roles that individuals 
adopt more or less freely, for example the role of a judge or politician, and perhaps also 
the role of an active citizen (as opposed to a passive citizen, who is subject to a country’s 
laws but never adopts the internal point of view of its laws). Many however hold the duty 
to use public reasons is derived from a prior moral duty or principle that binds individuals 
regardless of their particular social roles. Common candidates include moral principles of 
justice, respect, or autonomy, as well as more narrowly, principles forbidding unjustified 
coercion.6  
Second, the set of persons who are morally required to use public reasons can be 
conceived in a several different ways. A common view is that the requirement applies to 
all participants engaged in a normative practice marked by mutual accountability and 
sanction. As indicated above, all view of public reason hold that that individuals are 
required to use public reasons when justifying legal norms, though often, the scope of the 
requirement is held to be much broader. Gaus, for instance, holds that the requirement to 
use public reasons encompasses the justification of society’s entire system of 
                                                
5 For a good critical discussion of whether public reason should be conceived as a virtue 
or a duty see Rawls and Freeman 1999 
6 Jonathan Quong provides an excellent summary of the types of duties and principles 
that have been invoked to explain the moral requirement to use public reasons, see Quong 
2011. Charles Larmore attributes this view to Rawls, see Larmore 2008. Gerald Gaus also 
seems to endorse something like this view see Gaus 2011 
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conventional moral norms. Additionally, Rawls sometimes suggests that the moral 
requirement may apply more strictly to some individuals. So for example, Rawls holds 
that judges have a stronger moral requirement than other citizens to use public reasons 
when they decide cases. Such remarks seem to imply that perhaps the vast majority of 
citizens might be under a fairly weak requirement to use public reasons. In my view, 
Rawls does not adequately examine the implications of his brief remarks about stronger 
or weaker requirements to use public reasons.7  
A further important point is that this moral requirement is explained in terms of 
individuals described in more or less idealized ways. ‘Reasonable persons’ who 
recognize and honor the moral requirement to offer public reasons may be described in 
ways that emphasize certain moral motives, attitudes, and beliefs, while downplaying 
others. The different ways of conceiving the beliefs and attitudes of reasonable citizens 
has led to a long-running debate among public reasons liberal about the how best to 
characterize ‘reasonable pluralism’.  
Finally, I already indicated the range of different moral values and principles can 
be invoked to support the existence of the moral requirement to use public reason. Given 
the scope of this dissertation there is no need provide more than a brief summary of the 
most commonly referenced values. Jonathan Quong provides an excellent summary of 
                                                
7 Interpreting Rawls’ view of the duty of civility as a role-specific duty finds further 
support in his introduction of the ‘proviso’ allowing private citizens to introduce non-
public reasons into political debate, as long as properly public reasons are introduced in 
due time. It is unclear whether private citizens themselves bear the obligation of the 
proviso, since the examples he gives, MLK and Cardinal Bernardin, did not themselves 
reframe their arguments in term of properly public reasons. Weithman provides an 
excellent discussion of this point, see Weithman 2002 pp58. 
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some of the most common possibilities: (a) political autonomy, (b) respect, (c) justified 
coercion, and (d) justice. 8  
One key objection to theories of public reason liberalism is rooted in general 
skepticism about the moral requirement to use public reasons.9 Unlike other moral 
requirements commonly discussed in political theory, such as the obligation to obey the 
law, there is no widely held pre-theoretical intuition to support the existence of a moral 
requirement to use public reasons.10 Rather the existence of such a moral requirement is 
generally posited from within a political theory that attempts to reconcile some of the key 
normative features of a democratic constitutional order with the assumption that religious 
and moral pluralism is a permanent feature of social life in a constitutional democracy. 
Consequently, a major theme in the literature on public reason is proposing plausible 
candidates to a moral requirement that is, in the sense described above, theory-dependent. 
The need to explain and defend the moral requirement claim however tends to 
overshadow an equally important set of question about how public reasons are to be 
identified, or in other words, questions about the content of public reason itself. 
There is a distinction between two different approaches that public reasons 
liberals follow in formulating the criterion claim. One approach holds that a reason is 
public because it is (or is reasonably believed to be) an implication of a shared set of 
evaluative premises. The other approach holds that a reason is public because it expresses 
a normative conclusion that is (or is reasonably believed to be) supported by each 
individual’s non-shared evaluative premises. Rawls’ paradigm of public reason is an 
                                                
8 See Freeman 2007b, chapter 15, “On the Idea of Public Reason”. 
9 See Enoch 2013. 
10 I only mean by this that it is not a widely held belief that individuals have a moral 
requirement to offer public reasons to one another. 
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example of the shared evaluative premises version of the criterion claim.11 Gerald Gaus’ 
justificatory liberalism and, in a different way, Jurgen Habermas’ discourse theory are 
examples of the shared normative conclusion version of the criterion claim.12 
Assuming that individuals are, in some way, morally required to justify the 
normative demands they make to other citizens in terms of public reasons, neither the 
shared evaluative premises paradigm nor the shared normative conclusion paradigm are 
sufficient to identify the content of public reason. The choice between these paradigms is 
a choice between two intuitively plausible views of how to identify the reasons that 
citizens share. Each of these paradigms proposes something like a necessary condition for 
identifying which reasons are public reasons, but the work of determining the content of 
public reason can only begin with the choice between these two paradigms.13  
Despite conflicting approaches to formulating the criterion claim, theorists of 
public reasons nevertheless broadly agree that the paradigmatic examples of public 
reasons are the principles of equal political liberty and equal rights of conscience (the 
liberties of speech, association, and religion). Any plausible formulation of the criterion 
claim must identify these two principles as public reasons.14 The agreement among 
theorists of public reasons on these paradigmatic examples of public reasons should, I 
think, be relatively unsurprising. Contemporary theories of public reason, after all, aim to 
                                                
11 Though Rawls shares key aspects of the shared normative conclusion version as well. 
12 More than anyone else, Gerald Gaus has clarified the distinction between these two 
paradigms. For an extended discussion of the differences between these paradigms, see 
Gaus 2003  
13 The contrast between these two paradigms may be slightly overstated, since Rawls 
anyways, makes use of both ideas in describing the content of public reason. 
Nevertheless, at the theoretical level one must decide how best to characterize the notion 
of a shared reason.  
14 There is also an important agreement about what is not a public reason, namely, 
perfectionist ethical and religious principles. 
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show that liberal rights and liberties can be justified to all reasonable citizens without 
necessarily drawing on controversial enlightenment notions of moral autonomy. The idea 
of public reason is supposed to show, in part, how individuals who seek to live in a 
cooperative society on a basis that all can endorse will support the core protections of a 
liberal constitution, though not necessarily because those protections express a thick ideal 
of personal moral autonomy. Given that the primary aim of theories of public reason is to 
construct a less comprehensive justification for liberal theories of justice, one should 
expect that familiar liberal principles of justice would be the paradigm examples of 
public reasons. 15  
These examples provide a common ground on which different versions of the 
criterion claim are to be formulated. They provide a fixed point in different theories of 
public reason. A satisfactory formulation of the criterion claim will identify not only the 
principles expressed in paradigm cases, but also a wider set of principles. The criterion 
claim enables theorists to identify a wider set of principles to fill out the shared 
vocabulary that citizens have a morally requirement to use when discussing and debating 
other claims that can be made about the basic structure.16 Identifying public reasons 
                                                
15 The selection of these principles as paradigmatic public reasons provide all that public 
reasons liberals need to argue that an important set of liberal rights and liberties, those 
that are essential to any democratic constitutional order, can be endorsed from within the 
evaluative standpoints of citizens who hold reasonable, though non-liberal, beliefs about 
the broader horizon of moral life. I don’t mean to suggest that the selection of the 
principles of equal political liberty and equal rights of conscience is in any way arbitrary 
or circular, at least not in any way that would undermine the basic thesis of public 
reasons liberalism. I only mean to claim that different versions of the criterion claim are 
elaborated with these paradigmatic examples in mind, as opposed to other possible liberal 
(or even non-liberal) principles, like self-ownership. 
16 There is disagreement in the literature about whether the political philosopher can 
plausibly specify the set of public reasons on the basis of a theory of public reason. 
Habermas, for instance, holds that the set of shared reasons must, by and large, be 
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beyond the paradigm cases is necessary if a theory of public reason is to achieve its goal 
of showing that institutions of the basic structure can be supported by reasons that all 
citizens share. Beyond the paradigm cases provided by familiar constitutional protections, 
political decisions about the most fundamental conventions for property, taxation, and 
distributive entitlements need to be supported by shared reasons. It is no less urgent that 
the political rules governing citizens’ conventional entitlements to property, and the 
scope of institutions of taxation and redistribution be resolved in ways that all citizens 
recognize as, at least, reasonable.  
The two paradigmatic public reasons above provide no clear basis for deciding 
questions of property, taxation, and other distributive entitlements. These questions must 
be decided on the basis of other principles. These principles are identified by the criterion 
claim formulated to account for the paradigm cases. A theoretically adequate formulation 
of the criterion claim may not need to identify only one principle or set of ranked 
principles as public reasons. Rawls suggests in his mature view of public reason that 
perhaps the criterion claim identifies a family of such principles. Nevertheless, the 
criterion claim must rule out some principles in order to function as a criterion for public 
reason. A question that theories of public reason need to answer then is which principles 
of distributive justice are ruled out of public reason by the criterion for identifying public 
reasons? 
                                                                                                                                            
determined through a process of actual discussion among citizens. I assume that Rawls is 
roughly correct to hold that the general boundaries of public reason can be specified in 
some detail from the standpoint of political theory, even if the complete set of public 




I give a close examination of the range of public reasons identified by Rawls 
version of the criterion claim in order to arrive at a clearer picture of the institutional 
schemes of property, taxation and distributive entitlements that can be supported by 
public reasons. My analysis shows that classical liberal principles of property satisfy 
Rawls account of the criterion claim, and as a consequence, the set of public reasons it 
identifies will not uniquely support high liberal views about social justice. I conclude that 
Rawls’ mature view of the idea of public reason undermines the claim that the ideal of 
public reason is connected to egalitarian ideals of social justice in any essential way. This 
represents a sober assessment of the project of public reasons liberalism, as well as a 
more honest description of the limits that the liberal principle of legitimacy places on 
both egalitarian and libertarian social ideals.  
The idea of overlapping consensus provides something of a necessary condition 
for public reasons in Rawls’ formulation of the criterion claim. This idea, however, is 
easily misunderstood. In chapter one, I argue on the basis of a comparison of several key 
passages from Rawls that he develops two distinct ideas of overlapping consensus. I 
argue that his mature view of public reason is better understood in terms of an 
overlapping consensus whose focus is on a family of political conceptions. Further, I 
argue that the distinct features of this version of the idea of overlapping consensus have 
not be widely appreciated. I argue that this idea of an overlapping consensus supports the 
claim that reasonable agreement is better understood in terms of a threshold of minimal 
reasonability rather than through a hypothetical converging consensus. 
In the second chapter, I argue the mature idea of overlapping consensus examined 
in chapter one implies a two dimensional judgment determines whether a conception of 
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justice belongs to public reason or not. In the first dimension, a conception of justice 
belongs to public reason only if that conception supports two principles of liberty: equal 
political liberty and equal rights of conscience. In the second dimension, a conception of 
justice belongs to public reason only if it supports social minimum as a matter of basic 
justice. All conceptions in public reason converge in the first dimension, but may diverge 
widely in the second. I answer two questions to clarify the conceptual space opened by 
the two dimensional analysis that characterizes Rawls’ mature view of public reason. 
First, do the requirements of first dimension on the two principles of basic liberty 
preclude conceptions that hold that property is a basic liberty from belonging to public 
reason? Second, how wide a range of disagreement is allowed in the second dimension? 
Does it include both egalitarian and sufficientarian conceptions of the requirements of 
basic justice? I conclude that the main implication of Rawls mature view of public reason 
is that classical liberal views of property are likely to belong public reasons. As a 
consequence, Rawls’ mature view of public reason implies that citizens do not violate 
their duty of civility by publicly advocating and enacting through the legislative process 
strong protections for economic liberty.17 
In chapter three, I propose a way of recapturing some of the egalitarian 
commitments of the early Rawls. I argue that the criterion of reciprocity provides the 
ultimate criterion for public reasons, but that Rawls expression of the criterion is far too 
general to provide guidance on its own about the content of public reason. My suggestion 
                                                
17 An important qualification is that this claim contradicts other passages in which Rawls 
rather explicitly rejects classical liberal and libertarian conceptions of justice on grounds 
connected to public reason. This conflict can be eliminated by observing that his rejection 
does not apply to forms of classical liberalism that contain a principle requiring public 
provision of a sufficientarian social minimum. 
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is that some distinct requirements of the criterion of reciprocity can be ascertained by 
considering the perspective of citizens with physical disabilities. Recently, a number of 
contractualists have argued that reasonable agreement needs be understood in terms of 
the perspective of individuals with disabilities. I develop this suggestion into a threshold 
test for reasonability. This test, I argue, shows that the logic of classical liberal 
commitments seems to commit such conceptions to principles of basic justice that cannot 
be reasonably accepted from the perspective of citizens with disabilities. The conclusion 
to draw from this proposal is that in their simplest, most compelling form, classical 
liberal conceptions of justice will generally fail to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. 
Rawls mature view of public reason will therefore tend not to support classical liberal 








Two Ways of Modeling Public Reasons through Overlapping Consensus 
 
 
There is considerable agreement in the literature on political liberalism that the idea 
of an overlapping consensus denotes the possibility that a single conception of justice is, 
or at least could be, supported by reasons drawn from distinct moral theories that citizens 
of a constitutional democracy can be expected to endorse.18  I will refer to this 
interpretation as the model case interpretation of overlapping consensus (MOC). 
I do not deny that a number of passages in Rawls’ work support this interpretation.19  
He often seems to have something like this view in mind.  My concern is that the 
literature on political liberalism has largely focused on this particular interpretation and 
this obscures the fact that Rawls offers a second very different account of the idea of an 
overlapping consensus.20  Though rarely examined in any depth, Rawls describes the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus on a family of liberal political conceptions.  I will 
call this the family of conceptions interpretation of overlapping consensus (FOC).  The 
                                                
18 “The idea of overlapping consensus represents an extraordinary development within 
traditional social contract theory.  It suggests the kind of general agreement on society’s 
principles of justice need not be a modus vivendi… Nor does the social contract require 
that all reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society agree on principles of justice for the 
same comprehensive reasons.” See, Rawls and Freeman 1999, 370  
19 My reference to the model case interpretation of overlapping consensus (MOC) should 
be taken as representing a tendency among Rawls scholars to focus almost exclusively on 
only the most simple case of overlapping consensus.  This tendency is not without certain 
advantages, specifically: simplicity and consistency.  My use of the term (MOC) need not 
rest on attributing this precise view to any one person. 
20 This may strike many as overly strong, insofar as the better examples in the Rawls 
literature mention the alternate account of overlapping consensus in one way or another.  
This doesn’t refute my claim however, since most of the critical analysis of overlapping 
consensus still rests on what I am calling the model case interpretation (MOC) 
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existence of these two distinct ideas of overlapping consensus implies two ways of 
characterizing public reason, the first emphasizing the value of political consensus and 
the second emphasizing the value of mutual respect. 
 My aim in this chapter is to provide a close analysis of the distinction between 
these two accounts in order to show that the FOC view cannot be derived from the MOC.  
This irreducibility thesis raises several important questions that I will try to answer 
toward the end of the chapter, most importantly, whether each of the separate views is 
capable of grounding the idea of public reason, and second, are there grounds to prefer 
one account of overlapping consensus over the other?  
 The investigation in this chapter attempts to answer these questions through the 
following two goals: (1) to explain and justify the distinction between two accounts of the 
idea of an overlapping consensus and (2) to present the implications of the FOC for the 
idea of public reason.  The major portion of the chapter will be to investigate first goal, 
while the second goal introduces several ideas investigated in more detail in later 
chapters. 
 
1. The Idea of Overlapping Consensus   
 
In order to lay the groundwork for the following argument, it is necessary first to 
explain how the idea of an overlapping consensus might specify the content of public 
reason.21  Only then is it possible to see how the two interpretations of overlapping 
                                                
21 This connection can largely be examined independently of the problem of ‘stability’ to 
which the idea of an overlapping consensus is also connected.  Though important, the 
issue of ‘stability’ is tangential to the primary concern of this chapter.   
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consensus outlined in this chapter each imply different ways of characterizing what a 
public reason is.  Later I will try to show that each of these ways of characterizing the 
content of public reason gives rise to a different way of connecting the egalitarian 
concerns expressed by justice as fairness to the idea of public justification.  
A brief description of the connection between public reason and overlapping 
consensus is elusive because of the characteristically complicated way in which both of 
these ideas are developed by Rawls.22  But this complicated presentation belies the 
relatively simple intuition underlying the idea of public reason, namely, that each person 
is owed a justification for the exercise of coercive political power in terms of 
considerations she recognizes as reasons for her.23  One of the central claims of Rawlsian 
political liberalism is that this kind of justification entails a prior normative framework 
supported by a consensus among reasonable citizens. A public reason on this account is a 
consideration belonging to, implied by, or otherwise connected with, a normative 
standpoint affirmed by every reasonable citizen.  
 Being able to clearly identify public reasons is thus a crucial element of satisfying 
the duty of civility.24  In a well-ordered society in which an overlapping consensus 
obtains, it would seem that reasonable citizens identify public reasons, and also recognize 
                                                
22 There are, for instance, three different perspectives from which these ideas are 
elaborated: (a) individuals behind the veil of ignorance, (b) reasonable citizens in a well-
ordered society, and (c) we, here and now. 
23 See Rawls and Freeman 1999, pp 216-217.  Charles Larmore convincingly argue that 
the moral obligation to offer such justifications is connected to a more general principle 
of respect for persons, see Larmore 2008.  Gerald Gaus’s account of justificatory 
liberalism rejects this connection between publicity and justification, see Gaus 2011.  
24 The explanation of why citizens might have such a duty to offer such reasons to each 
other is another matter.  This discussion is concerned only with specifying the range of 
reasons available to citizens who wish to act in accordance with the requirements of the 
duty of civility.   
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them when offered by other citizens, by referring to a single political conception of 
justice that is the object of an overlapping consensus.25  In a well-ordered society an 
overlapping consensus specifies the shared normative grounds on which citizens can 
justify their claims of basic justice to each other consistent with their duty of civility.26  
Thus the connection between these two ideas is part of a complex idealization involving a 
number of abstractions.   
 Given this hopefully uncontroversial, if overly simply, characterization of the 
connection between the ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason, it is now 
possible to investigate the two competing accounts that Rawls give of what citizens in an 
overlapping consensus mutually affirm.  The following analysis first examines the 
primary support for the MOC.  I then compare two versions of an argument supporting 
the claim that an overlapping consensus is a genuine practical possibility in order to bring 
to light the view I am calling the family of conceptions interpretation (FOC).  I finally 
present several reasons to hold that the FOC is irreducible to the MOC view.  The 
implications of this irreducibility for the characterization of public reason will be 
examined more closely in the following chapter.  I will claim there that the FOC provides 
a more plausible account of overlapping consensus, and further, that it fails to exclude 
strong conceptions of property rights from the set of public reasons.  This consequence 
                                                
25 “In a well-ordered society, then, the public conception of justice [that is the object of 
an overlapping consensus] provides a mutually recognized point of view from which 
citizens can adjudicate their claims of political right on their political institutions or 
against one another.” See Rawls 2005 p 9. 
26 While this greatly oversimplifies the role of overlapping consensus, it is accurate to say 
that the public reason of a well-ordered society would be limited to considerations 
connected the political conception(s) that is, or are, the object of an overlapping 
consensus among all reasonable citizens.   
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places the FOC in tension with the egalitarian concerns of justice as fairness, and perhaps 
the conception of political equality at the heart of political liberalism    
 
2. The ‘Model Case’ and the Basis for the MOC 
 
I assume that the following description of an overlapping consensus is recognizable to 
those familiar with the main debates following the publication of Political Liberalism.  
According to most accounts, a society is said to have an overlapping consensus when all 
the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a WOS affirm the regulative conception of 
justice (in the qualified sense explained above) in that society and each citizen endorses 
one of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines.27  Rawls refers to this description of 
overlapping consensus that as the ‘model case’.28  The ‘model case’ is an overlapping 
consensus between two kinds of comprehensive doctrines (liberal and religious) and one 
pluralistic view.   
The ‘model case’ is the focus of much of the debate about overlapping consensus in 
the secondary literature.29  Minimally, Rawls introduces the ‘model case’ in order to 
distinguish an overlapping consensus from a modus vivendi.  The ‘model case’ illustrates 
the logical possibility that a freestanding conception of justice could be supported by 
converging moral arguments and therefore could transcend the instability of the 
                                                
27 “Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and stability is 
possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically 
active citizens” Rawls 2005 
28 See “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” in Rawls and Freeman 1999. 
29 I suspect that the apparently widespread conviction that the idea of overlapping 
consensus, as well as political liberalism’s notion of stability, attempt to answer the same 
set of questions as the congruence argument in Theory of Justice rests on an appeal to the 
‘model case’ and the MOC. Jonathan Quong holds a similar suspicion. See Quong 2011 
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prudential reasoning characteristic of a modus vivendi by providing a ground for moral 
motivation.   
It is widely recognized that Rawls rejects a Hobbesian answer to the conflict between 
moral pluralism and social unity.30  He develops the concept of overlapping consensus 
(along with other key ideas of political liberalism) in order to show how citizens might 
achieve a limited moral consensus on freestanding political principles in the context of 
reasonable moral pluralism.31   The broadly logical possibility that the regulative 
conception of justice in a WOS could gain the support of an overlapping consensus 
purports to show that pluralism is not inconsistent with a morally significant form of 
social unity. 
The ‘model case’ implies that the key features of overlapping consensus are (a) all 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines contain distinct moral reasons that converge in 
support of the same political conception of justice, and (b) insofar as each reasonable 
citizen endorses one of these reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the obligations 
imposed on her by basic structure will not be alien to her conception of the good.32  These 
two features are characteristic of the view I refer to as the MOC.   
On this view, an overlapping consensus exists when all reasonable doctrines endorse 
the same political conception of justice that unifies and regulates the basic structure.  The 
content of this agreement satisfies the need “to specify a point of view from which all 
citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political institutions are 
                                                
30 That answer depends on the sovereign power suppressing dissent about which 
principles ought to regulate the institutions of the basic structure.   
31 This still leaves an explanatory gap between ideal theory and our endorsement here and 
now.   
32 Whether each citizen’s commitment to these obligations is final is another question.   
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just.”33  Thus the MOC implies that the normative standpoint citizens are required to 
adopt in order in offering public justifications to each other is constituted by shared 
principles of justice.34  Below, I argue that the FOC suggests that there are good reasons 
to think that Rawls came to think that describing the shared normative standpoint in this 
way is too restrictive.  I suggest that the FOC implies a more general description of the 
normative standpoint appropriate for public justification. 
Before examining the FOC, however, I would like to provide some justification for 
my claim that the view of MOC is something of an orthodox view in the literature.  I 
cannot hope to survey the entire literature on overlapping consensus to show that, on 
balance, the MOC is the most common.  Rather, I will offer some support for this claim 
by presenting three noteworthy, though incompatible, accounts of what kind of condition 
overlapping consensus places on the justification of conceptions of justice, each of which 
seems to rest on the MOC.  Joshua Cohen and T.M. Scanlon endorse different versions of 
a more general justificatory interpretation, namely, that overlapping consensus provides a 
condition on the justification of conceptions of justice.  Samuel Freeman, by contrast, 
holds a version of a more general practical interpretation, which holds that an 
overlapping consensus characterizes the consequences of applying norms of justice that 
are independently justified.35  Despite broad disagreement about what normative value an 
overlapping consensus achieves, each of these three views implies that the content of an 
overlapping consensus is a single conception of justice supported by independent 
considerations of several comprehensive doctrines.  This goes some way to support my 
                                                
33 See “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” in Rawls and Freeman 1999  
34 This need not entail that this is a sufficient condition for stability. 
35 Habermas also holds that overlapping consensus does not provide a justificatory 
condition on conceptions of justice. See Habermas 1995 
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claim that the MOC amounts to an orthodox view among Rawls scholars.  It should be 
noted that my claim does not entail that the MOC is the only interpretation of overlapping 
consensus found in the literature. I only mean to show that it is prominent enough among 
sympathetic Rawlsians to justify my claim that it is the orthodox view.   
In an early defense of Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus, Joshua Cohen endorses 
a weak version of the justificatory thesis.  While overlapping consensus provides part of 
an answer to the question “what sorts of constraints on realizability are constitutive of 
ideal justice”, overlapping consensus is not quite a necessary condition for a conception 
of justice.  Satisfying the “pluralistic consensus test” which establishes the possibility of 
an overlapping consensus is one consideration, among several, that “count in favor of the 
correctness of a conception of justice”. Cohen gives a rather explicit endorsement of the 
MOC.  He claims that a “society features an overlapping consensus on the norms of 
justice if and only if it is a morally pluralistic society with a consensus on norms of 
justice [emphasis added] in which each citizen… supports the consensual norms as the 
correct account of justice.”36   
T.M. Scanlon endorses a relatively strong version of the justificatory thesis.  
Justification for principles of justice according to Rawls proceeds through the original 
position argument.  But principles in the original position are chosen in part because they 
could be the ground of a certain kind of social stability.  The possibility of an overlapping 
consensus is relevant to the choice made by individuals in the original position because it 
is part of Rawls’ modification of the account of stability in light of reasonable 
                                                
36 See “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus” in Cohen 2009. 
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pluralism.37  On Scanlon’s view, Political Liberalism describes general normative 
conditions for a stable society “organized around some political conception of justice”, 
which the principles of justice as fairness are said to best satisfy. If the concept of 
overlapping consensus is connected to the earlier argument for justice as fairness in this 
way, then it is clear that the content of an overlapping consensus must be a single 
conception of justice. 
Finally, unlike Cohen and Scanlon, Samuel Freeman endorses the thesis that 
overlapping consensus is connected to the application of a conception of justice.  He 
holds that overlapping consensus is not constitutive of ideal justice, but rather is an 
element in “the most fundamental part of non-ideal, partial compliance theory.” On his 
account, overlapping consensus is essentially a “conjecture” about the range of 
conceptions of the good that would tend to gain adherents in a society well-ordered by a 
liberal conception of justice.38 An overlapping consensus promotes stability insofar as its 
existence is a sign that a sufficiently large proportion of citizens in a WOS endorse 
conceptions of the good that support the principles of justice that guide the basic 
institutions in that society.  Ultimately, Freeman views the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus as a consequence of applying freestanding principles of justice, rather than as 
providing any independent evidence for the correctness or reasonableness of such a 
conception.  Like Cohen and Scanlon however Freeman holds that overlapping consensus 
is the idea that “comprehensive views could and likely would affirm justice as fairness 
                                                
37 See Scanlon’s “Rawls on Justification” in Freeman 2003 




[or some other single conception] as reasonable and/or true based on its own reasons and 
resources”39 
 
3.  The Family of Conceptions Interpretation of Overlapping Consensus 
 
As I mentioned above, the family of conceptions interpretation of overlapping 
consensus (FOC) is not completely ignored in the literature.  The fact that Rawls refers to 
the FOC in Political Liberalism and in several subsequent articles is, in fact, widely 
recognized.  The oversight in much of the literature about overlapping consensus lies 
rather in failing to recognize that this view rests on fundamentally different grounds than 
the MOC and represents a different concept.40  I will take up the issue of this significance 
of this difference in a later chapter.41  The most complete account of the FOC is found in 
Political Liberalism, but to see how these grounds are distinct from those supporting the 
MOC, I will compare the relevant passages in Political Liberalism with an earlier version 
of the same argument.  By comparing the two versions, a clearer picture of the FOC is 
possible.  This comparison helps to identify the distinct set of reasons supporting the 
FOC and thereby helps to clarify the way that it is not merely a partial realization of the 
MOC as it often seems to understood in the literature.42 
                                                
39 See “Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution”, 
Freeman 2007a p 191. 
40 Paul Weithman’s recent book on Rawls is emblematic of much of the literature in this 
regard: “I am simply trying to lay out what I take to be the basic stability argument … 
[so] I am confining my inquiry to an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness rather 
than on a family of liberal political conceptions”, see Weithman 2010 p 277. 
41 I will argue that the FOC provides a very different basis for public reasoning than the 
MOC.  This basis is much less clearly egalitarian than the MOC. 




3.1 The Political Sociology of an Overlapping Consensus  
 
The possibility of an overlapping consensus on a family of political conceptions is 
introduced in §6-8 of Lecture IV in Political Liberalism. This section modifies an 
argument previously published in “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”. Both the 
original and the modified versions of the argument address the same objection to the 
practical plausibility of an overlapping consensus.  This objection holds that there are no 
“political, psychological, or social forces either to bring about an overlapping 
consensus… or to render one stable”, and therefore, the idea is unrealistically utopian.43   
The first version of this argument attempts to undermine the force of this objection by 
answering the question “how might an overlapping consensus on a liberal conception of 
justice develop from its acceptance as a mere modus vivendi.”44  Rawls suggests that this 
question can be answered by describing how the institutional context of a WOS might 
provide moral reasons to support a liberal conception of justice to individuals who 
already have prudential reasons to support the institutions of a liberal basic structure 
implied by that conception. 
Rawls uses an idealized moral sociology to describe a process of social evolution 
beginning with a modus vivendi on a liberal basic structure and ending in an overlapping 
consensus on a single liberal conception of justice, such as justice as fairness.  This 
                                                
43 See Rawls 2005, pp 158 – 172; and Rawls and Freeman 1999, pp 440 - 446 
44This same objection is found in Rawls article “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”. 
However, there it is clear that Rawls thought the model case would be sufficient to refute 
this claim.  The MOC, as mentioned earlier, seems to be implied by the model case.  That 
the MOC is implied by the argument that an overlapping consensus develops from a prior 
CC is less convincing 
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idealized sociology is based on three assumptions.  First most citizens (practically 
speaking) do not affirm “fully comprehensive doctrines”, or at least, they usually have 
not conclusively decided what their comprehensive doctrine requires for all aspects of 
social life.45  Second liberal institutions tend to secure significant moral values for 
citizens who consequently support such institutions on those grounds.46  Third, each 
citizen already has sufficient prudential reason to support the same liberal institutions as 
all other citizens, and this basic structure is unified and regulated by a political 
conception of justice. 
These assumptions provide the basis for a bootstrapping argument.  The social forces 
establishing the possibility that an overlapping consensus might develop from a modus 
vivendi are connected to the operation of existing liberal institutions.  Liberal institutions 
work to secure significant moral values for citizens and those they care about, which is 
only clear to citizens with the passage of time living under liberal institutions.47  
Furthermore, given the three assumptions above, citizens already have sufficient, if 
contingent, practical reasons to support liberal institutions but are also unlikely to have 
conclusive practical reasons to reject liberal principles outright.  Therefore, citizens may 
come to affirm the liberal moral principles unifying and regulating the basic structure of 
their society as “congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with” their 
                                                
45 This is in a number of ways the most surprising assumption, since a standard reading of 
Rawls holds that citizens holding comprehensive doctrines pose the core challenge to 
liberalism. 
46 More specifically, these moral interests are the “public good” secured in a stable, and 
reasonably just constitutional democracy.  The public good of a such a regime is 
expressed in three values it secures and promotes: (a) basic rights and liberties, (b) public 
reason, and (c) cooperative virtues.   
47 There is a close resemblance between the bootstrapping argument and the psychology 
of reciprocity presented in section III Rawls 1999a. 
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comprehensive moral conception because of the political (moral) values secured and 
promoted by liberal institutions.  They may come to endorse the morality of liberal 
principles through the good that liberal institutions accomplish.  According to Rawls, “it 
is possible for [citizens] first to affirm the political conception and to appreciate the 
public good it accomplishes in a democratic society” and only subsequently to examine 
whether a commitment to liberal principles based on these grounds is consistent with 
their broader moral commitments.48 
 In “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, this idealized moral sociology is used to 
support the claim that citizens would come to affirm the same liberal political conception 
that unifies and regulates the institutions of the basic structure.  This argument is 
supposed to establish the possibility of something like the ‘model case’ of an overlapping 
consensus. The institutions of a liberal basic structure provide citizens with freestanding 
reasons to support the procedural and substantive principles of liberal justice that unify 
and effectively regulate those institutions.  If successful, this bootstrapping argument 
shows that there are (or at least might be, given favorable conditions) social and 
psychological forces sufficient to support the development of an overlapping consensus 
given the institutional context of a WOS. 49  This is enough to minimize the force of the 
original objection that overlapping consensus is utopian in the wrong kind of way. 
 
                                                
48 This claim is more clearly expressed in “The Idea of public Reason Revisited”, see 
Rawls 1999b  p 160: “Hence, it is possible for citizens first to appreciate the good those 
principles accomplish both for themselves and those they care for, as well as for society 
at large, and then to affirm them on this basis.”  
49 In other words, this response to the objection holds that the ‘model case’ of 
overlapping consensus could come about in a society whose institutional structure is 
already unified and regulated by a single political conception of justice.  Needless to say, 
this response to the objection depends upon the highly idealized context of a WOS. 
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3.2 The Political Sociology is Insufficient to Support an Overlapping Consensus 
 
 The modified version of the argument found in Political Liberalism uses the same 
ideal sociology to explain the possibility of a limited kind of consensus that Rawls 
introduces in §6 – 8 of Lecture IV.  This kind of consensus, which Rawls terms a 
constitutional consensus, is distinct from both a modus vivendi and an overlapping 
consensus.  It lies at an intermediate point in a process of social evolution ending in an 
overlapping consensus.50   
 Unlike the original version, the argument presented in Political Liberalism does not 
hold that the “public good” secured by liberal institutions is sufficient to bring about an 
overlapping consensus.  One explanation for the more modest position expressed here is 
that in both the original and modified versions the “public good” that grounds the moral 
affirmation of liberal principles is secured largely through the procedures and guarantees 
expressed in a political constitution.  Issues of distributive justice (narrowly understood) 
are relegated to a marginal role in this explanation.  Thus freestanding reasons derived 
from the “public good” achieved by liberal institutions support only that part of a 
political conception of justice that is specified by a democratic constitution but they do 
not provide direct support for liberal distributive principles.   
 The introduction of the idea of a constitutional consensus may express an attempt to 
clarify an ambiguity in the original argument.  There Rawls makes clear that 
                                                
50 It is important to note that a constitutional consensus is itself a minimal moral 
consensus.  Procedural elements of liberal justice embodied in a constitution, such as the 
democratic process, are endorsed as principles, and not merely for prudential reasons.  
Significantly, it does not seem to include a consensus on the scope of basic agency rights, 
beyond those necessary to secure freedom of political speech and association. 
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constitutional institutions are the primary source of the “public good” grounding the 
bootstrapping strategy.  A fuller explanation of why Rawls found it necessary to modify 
the early argument is not needed here.  All that needs to be seen is that the argument in 
Political Liberalism expresses a more modest conjecture about the capacity of liberal 
institutions to be the source of freestanding moral reasons supporting liberal principles of 
justice.  This change requires him to provide an additional explanation to show how an 
overlapping consensus might develop from the more limited constitutional consensus, 
and so to complete the explanation of how an overlapping consensus might develop from 
a modus vivendi. 
The distinction between these two arguments can be further sharpened by examining 
two changes introduced in Lecture IV of Political Liberalism.51  The first change is to the 
content of the modus vivendi agreement initiating the social process that ends in an 
overlapping consensus.  In the original version, the institutions supported by a modus 
vivendi encompass the entire basic structure, which ex hypothesi, is already regulated by 
a single political conception of justice.  The original explanation, therefore, assumes that 
broad support for a unified set of political and distributive institutions among citizens 
already exists, though this support is grounded on contingent prudential considerations 
rather than on principled moral considerations. 52    
                                                
51 I will argue that if one endorses these modifications, then there are few convincing 
reasons to hold onto the MOC at all.   
52 “Now let’s suppose that at a certain time, as a result of historical events and 
contingencies, the principles of a liberal conception of justice have come to be accepted 
as a mere modus vivendi, and that existing political institutions meet their requirements.” 
Rawls and Freeman 1999, p 441.  A political conception will include principles of 
distributive justice, given the completeness condition on political conceptions. 
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The argument in Lecture IV of Political Liberalism expresses a more modest 
assumption.  Here Rawls assumes that the range of the institutions supported by a modus 
vivendi includes only the political institutions embodied in a liberal democratic 
constitution.  This reading is suggested by the following passage from Political 
Liberalism: 
“Suppose that at a certain time, because of various historical events and 
contingencies, certain [emphasis added] liberal principles of justice are accepted as a 
mere modus vivendi, and are incorporated into existing political institutions”.53  
 
The fact that this passage refers to “certain liberal principles of justice” rather than to a 
“liberal conception of justice” as in the original version and the fact that the remainder of 
the argument elaborates on the public good secured by a constitutional regime supports a 
reading of this assumption that excludes liberal principles of distributive justice from the 
initial modus vivendi agreement.54  In other words, the initial assumption does not entail 
that citizens support one and the same set of distributive institutions (narrowly 
understood), let alone the same principles of distributive justice.  The modified version of 
the argument, therefore, appears to abandon the notion that the full range of institutions 
implied by a liberal conception of justice could be the object of a prudential agreement 
among citizens.55  At the very least, the modified version appears to hold that this 
assumption would be too unrealistic to ground a plausible response to the original 
                                                
53 See Rawls, 2005 p 159. 
54 Rawls rejects the idea that principles of distributive justice ought to be fixed by a 
political constitution, with the notable exception of a guaranteed social minimum. 
55 It is difficult to conclusively attribute this view to Rawls, though I think the fact that he 
altered the argument for publication in Political Liberalism strongly suggests that he may 
have held such a view. 
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objection.56  This change arguably attempts to express a more historically informed 
account of the range of institutions that citizens might be expected to agreed to as a 
means of ensuring the end to civil strife (modus vivendi).   
The second change is connected to the first.  If the initial assumption is only that each 
citizen has prudential reasons to support the constitutional institutions of a liberal basic 
structure, then the bootstrapping argument cannot completely explain how an overlapping 
consensus might develop from a modus vivendi.  That is because the bootstrapping 
argument conjectures that the morally attractive features of liberal institutions could be 
the source of freestanding moral reasons to individuals who already have independent 
prudential reasons to support those institutions.  It does not make the stronger claim that 
individuals might come to view liberal institutions as a source of moral reasons apart 
from any consideration of their prudential interests.   
 
3.3 Additional Social Forces are Needed to Complete the Development of an 
Overlapping Consensus  
 
The earlier version of the bootstrapping argument is capable of providing a complete 
explanation for the possibility of an overlapping consensus only because of the 
assumption that citizens already have prudential reasons to support a liberal basic 
structure.57  It succeeds insofar as citizens already support liberal institutions of 
                                                
56 This objection is that no realistic social process could bring about or sustain an 
overlapping consensus. Considerations of realism therefore should carry a lot of weight 
in this argument.   
57 A key feature of this argument must be that the liberal basic structure is unified and 
regulated by a political conception of justice, and citizens know this.   
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procedural and distributive justice out of self-interest.  But if citizens only have 
prudential reasons to support the procedural institutions of liberal justice articulated in a 
democratic constitution, then the bootstrapping argument on its own cannot fully explain 
the possibility of an overlapping consensus.  Another account is needed to show how 
further consensus about distributive institutions and the remaining substantive principles 
of liberal justice might develop from an agreement on political procedures.  The second 
change in the argument is the additional explanation introduced to fill the explanatory 
gap opened by the first change.   
The account of how a constitutional consensus might transition into an overlapping 
consensus is based on three requirements of democratic lawmaking.   These three needs 
are (a) the need for democratic coalitions, (b) the need for constitutional interpretation, 
and (c) the need for resolution of non-procedural issues of basic justice.  These needs are 
connected to the fact that a constitutional consensus is too narrow an agreement to ground 
judgments about the entire basic structure of society that can be shared by all citizens.  A 
constitutional consensus will prove inadequate to provide the shared moral resources 
necessary for the practice of constitutional democracy.  Below is a brief survey of the 
problems that generate these needs.  
 (a) Long-term success in a constitutional democracy requires individuals and groups 
to build majority coalitions.  In a pluralist society citizens need to “move out of the 
narrow circle of their own views and to develop political conceptions [of justice]… so as 
to put together a majority” since only a permanent supermajority could pass legislation 
without consulting or gaining the support of a broader group citizens.58 In order to gather 
                                                
58 See Rawls 2005 p 165. 
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lasting support from other citizens who may not share the same views about the non-
political realm of values individuals and groups will find it rational to establish a 
“common currency of discussion and a deeper basis for explaining the meaning and 
implications of the principles and policies each group endorses.”59  Since a constitutional 
consensus provides the initial ground for this “common currency of discussion” this 
claim primarily implies that insofar as the legitimacy of democratic law requires citizens 
to build lasting coalitions with other citizens, it will appear rational for each group of 
citizens to develop a substantive account of distributive justice based on values and 
commitments shared with other citizens.   
(b) A constitutional consensus will also prove too thin to support two essential 
practices of constitutional interpretation.  These practices likewise tend to make it 
rational for citizens to develop and adopt freestanding conceptions of justice so that their 
interpretations of what the constitution requires, or ought to require, can be presented to 
other citizens as predictable, consistent, and clearly determined by shared principles and 
values. 
For similar reasons, the practice of declaring a statute constitutional or 
unconstitutional (by whatever institutional mechanism) will often require appealing to the 
values and ideals that underlie the constitution.60  Judges (or whomever is charged with 
this practice) will be motivated to justify their decisions in terms that other citizens may 
accept as, at least, reasonably just.  They may, therefore, develop freestanding 
conceptions of justice to provide order and predictability to their judgments.   
                                                
59 Ibid. 
60 “In a constitutional system with judicial review… it will be necessary for judges… to 
develop a political conception of justice in the light of which the constitution, in their 
view, is to be interpreted and important cases decided.” Ibid. 
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On the other hand, citizens wishing to amend the constitution will also be forced to 
appeal to the deeper values expressed in their constitution in order to justify their 
demands to change it.  Freestanding political conceptions may provide citizens with the 
resources to show other citizens how such a change in the constitution is consistent with 
the moral values and ideals embodied in the constitution.  In both cases, a consensus on 
the procedural requirements of liberal justice is unlikely to prove sufficient and a deeper 
basis of agreement expressed by political conceptions of justice will be needed.   
(c) A constitutional consensus does not determine how the basic liberties should be 
protected outside the political process nor what level of material well-being, if any, 
should be publicly guaranteed to all citizens.  These questions are connected to the justice 
of the basic institutional structure taken as a whole.  Citizens will need to find a 
reasonable basis for legislating about these issues or else they will remain potent and 
destabilizing sources of conflict.  Political conceptions of justice provide citizens with a 
shared normative perspective to resolve these conflicts.   
 Each of these needs (a) – (c) contributes to an explanation of why citizens might find 
it “rational” to develop and publicly refer to conceptions of justice that are 
metaphysically neutral, that refer primarily to institutions, and that are broadly consistent 
with the fundamental procedural elements of constitutional democracy.  However they do 
not provide a convincing explanation for the possibility that citizens might come to agree 
that some single conception of justice is the most reasonable.  Even if there is a 
consensus on which moral principles are expressed in the constitution and the 
considerations mentioned above make it rational for citizens to develop political 
conceptions of justice, the expectation that these two conditions are sufficient to generate 
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an agreement on distributive justice seems to conflict with the most fundamental 
assumptions of political liberalism.  If political philosophy should reject the expectation 
of consensus on perfectionist moral principles, what reason is there to expect that free 
and fair conditions of rational discussion could produce consensus on distributive 
justice?61   
 
3.4  Two Kinds of Overlapping Consensus: (a) Full and (b) Family 
 
 The recognition that agreement about the most reasonable conception of justice 
appears to conflict with the value of mutual respect grounding the acknowledgement of 
the burdens of judgment may be the reason that Rawls ultimately describes two possible 
ways a constitutional consensus may develop into overlapping consensus:62 
                                                
61 That this worry would not apply to constitutional liberal principles is clear from the 
fact that citizens already have prudential reason to support the institutions that embody 
those principles.   
62 One difficulty with my claim that there are two distinct possible outcomes is that 
Rawls seems to say that a “full overlapping consensus” on one conception of justice may 
only be “approximated”.  This seems to suggest that rather than two distinct outcomes, he 
holds that the idea of an overlapping consensus provides an ideal that may be “at best 
only approximated”.  But the notion that such an approximation is sufficiently similar to 
the ideal is difficult to maintain for two reasons.  First, if the imperfect realization of a 
full overlapping consensus is sufficient to secure stability for the right reasons, what 
further values is achieved by a full overlapping consensus?  Second, if, as Rawls 
suggests, the imperfect realization of an overlapping consensus can be attributed to 
reasonable disagreement about the requirements of distributive justice, then the imperfect 
realization is a consequence of the burdens of judgment.  Such disagreements would then 
be as intractable as disagreements about comprehensive doctrines.  But linking 
disagreements about justice to the burdens of judgment in this way seems to undermine 
any reasonable expectation of a closer approximation to the ideal.  This last comment 
does not necessarily imply that considerations of distributive justice would transgress the 
boundaries of public reason in the same way that appeals to salvation or moral perfection 
would.   
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“I have for simplicity assumed all along that [overlapping consensus’] focus is a 
specific political conception of justice, with justice as fairness as the standard 
example.  There is, however, another possibility that is more realistic and more likely 
to be realized.  In this case the focus of an overlapping consensus is a class of liberal 
conceptions that vary within a certain more or less narrow range [emphasis 
added].”63 
 
 The first possibility is that all citizens come to endorse the very same conception as 
most reasonable, or what Rawls in this section calls a “full overlapping consensus”.  
Although such an outcome is consistent with the general description of the ‘model case’ 
it rests on very different grounds.  According to the ‘model case’, each individual 
ultimately affirms the same set of principles as every other individual for reasons that are 
internal to the comprehensive doctrine she endorses.  So comprehensive liberals, 
religious believers, and value pluralists all affirm the same conception as most reasonable 
but for unique reasons.  But in Political Liberalism, individuals are said to affirm the 
same conception as all others on the basis of freestanding reasons ultimately connected to 
the ‘public good’ produced by an existing liberal constitution.   
 Rawls does not sufficiently explain how the process of social evolution connecting a 
constitutional consensus to an overlapping consensus might end with an agreement on a 
single conception of justice.  He only speculates that a limited number of liberal political 
conceptions could be accurately based on the underlying values of a democratic 
constitution.64  Further, a “fully overlapping consensus” is possible only if the basic 
structure of a society does not encourage deeply opposed social and economic interests.   
                                                
63 See Rawls 2005 p 164 
64 “How specific is the consensus, or how wide is the range of the liberal conceptions 
defining it? ... One [consideration] concerns the range of views that can plausibly be 
elaborated from the fundamental ideas of society and person found in the public culture 
of a constitutional regime.” See Rawls 2005   p 167 
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 The second possibility, then, is that citizens agree on that some family of conceptions 
of justice are all sufficiently reasonable to the be the basis for terms of fair cooperation, 
but they disagree on what the most reasonable conception is.  Since Rawls links this 
possibility to conflicting social and economic interests, it is safe to assume that the 
primary division between conceptions in the family of liberal conceptions is on the 
question of acceptable range of distributive inequalities.65  Their most significant 
disagreements are likely to be focused on what the most reasonable principle of 
distributive justice is.   
 This possibility suggests that citizens agree on a set of reasonable principles of 
distributive justice, but disagree about which is the most reasonable.66  This possibility 
seems to imply that citizens hold that liberal constitutional principles are grounded in 
significant moral values and ideals, give priority to these values over other social values, 
and yet still disagree about how these values should apply to a range of distributive 
questions (narrowly understood).  If each citizen endorses some reasonable principle of 
                                                
65 The political procedural principles of a political conception would already be the 
subject of consensus given the constitutional consensus.  Thus the development of an 
overlapping consensus is largely a question of what principles of distributive justice 
citizens will endorse as a consistent extension of the values, ideals, and principles of the 
constitutional consensus.   
66 Rawls prefers to use the idea of family resemblance to describe this class, so my claim 
that citizens agree on the criteria defining a ‘reasonable principle of distributive justice’ is 
slightly stronger than Rawls own suggestion.  Part of the attraction of the idea of a family 
resemblance is it allows Rawls to avoid determining the content of this class through an a 
priori argument.  I think his argument requires a more precise specification of this class, 
as Rawls himself implicitly acknowledges by defining ‘political conception of justice’ in 
the way he does.  I investigate this idea more thoroughly in presenting Rawls definition 
of a political conception and its relation to public reason.  
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distributive justice,67 then it is possible for citizens to view the exercise of political power 
in the name of any one of these principles as reasonably just (in other words, an 
approximation of what justice requires). 
 This analysis supports the following understanding of the way in which political 
conceptions belong to a family.68  Two features characterize this family: (a) each 
conception must support the list of basic (constitutional) liberties and give them priority 
over other social values, and (b) each conception must support a principle of distributive 
justice that specifies the application of the political values and ideals underwriting the 
constitution to issues of distributive justice.  If all reasonable citizens recognize each 
conception in this family as sufficiently reasonable, then an overlapping consensus is 
achieved.  The possibility of an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions implies 
that each citizen endorses some principle that supports the basic liberties already 
articulated in the constitution, and judges distributive justice on the basis of ‘political 
values’ underlying the constitution.  Rawls held that a consensus on a family of 
conceptions so defined is the “more realistic and more likely to be realized” outcome of 
the ideal sociological process just described.69 What this greater realism should mean is 
left undetermined.  I will return to this question in more detail when discussing the 
implications of the FOC. 
 
                                                
67 A reasonable principle of distributive justice can be defined as having the following 
two qualities: (a) it is consistent with the constitutional consensus and (b) it specifies how 
political values apply to distributive questions. 
68 Presumably Rawls is using the idea of a family relation in order to avoid the 
appearance of the philosopher determining the boundaries of an overlapping consensus 
ahead of time.  This false modesty is betrayed by his definition of ‘liberal political 
conception of justice’.   
69 See Rawls 1999b p 164. 
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4.  The Distinction between MOC and FOC 
 
 A brief summary may bring some needed clarity to the distinction I am trying to draw 
between the MOC and FOC.  It is central to this distinction that evidence for the MOC 
view of overlapping consensus is provided primarily by the description of an overlapping 
consensus given in the ‘model case’ containing two (or three) comprehensive doctrines 
and one indeterminate view.  The most important implication of the ‘model case’ is that 
an overlapping consensus exists if and only if the political conception of justice that 
regulates their WOS is supported by unique reasons drawn from these three (or four) 
incompatible doctrines.  Consequently, citizens will find that they have weighty moral 
reasons to affirm this political conception of justice and comply with the obligations it 
implies insofar as the conception is supported by reasons internal to the comprehensive 
doctrine they endorse.  The MOC just is the view that ‘overlapping consensus’ designates 
a state of affairs in which reasons drawn from a society’s influential comprehensive 
doctrines support one political conception of justice that unifies and regulates the basic 
structure of that society.70   
 But the analysis above shows how the argument for the claim that the political 
sociology underlying the claim that the idea of an overlapping consensus describes a 
genuine practical possibility does not provide much support for the ‘model case’.  As we 
saw, the argument first developed in “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” (and then 
significantly altered in Political Liberalism) shows how the public good secured by a 
liberal basic structure could support a “fully overlapping consensus” on a single 
                                                
70 I emphasize that the MOC is neutral with regard to the role that an overlapping 
consensus plays in the justification of principles of justice. 
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conception of justice.  But this conclusion rests on the assumption that citizens, by and 
large, endorse the pluralist view.  The conjecture at the center of this argument (namely 
that a unified liberal basic structure secures such important and undeniable public goods 
that citizens living in such a society would affirm its underlying political conception on 
this basis) explicitly rests on the assumption that citizens hold few strong beliefs about 
the political implications of their moral view.  So according to this argument, the 
practical possibility expressed by the idea of an overlapping consensus is not that 
comprehensive doctrines might conceivably support the very same political conception of 
justice, but rather that liberal institutions are capable of generating sufficient support 
among citizens for liberal principles independently of any reference to a comprehensive 
doctrine (liberal or otherwise).71   
 Now the conclusion of the original version of this argument holds that the political 
conception is completely supported by reasons derived from the great public good 
secured by liberal institutions.72  Comprehensive doctrines, presumably, provide some 
secondary considerations in favor of the principles underlying these institutions.  But if 
the reason-giving role of the comprehensive doctrines is minimized in this way, then the 
relation between a fully overlapping consensus and the ‘model case’ is only superficial.  
A fully overlapping consensus is similar to the ‘model case’ insofar as each citizen 
endorses the same conception of justice.  In more fundamental sense, however, it departs 
                                                
71 In other words, the order of explanation is reversed.  Liberal institutions (the 
conceptions of justice they imply) bring about reasonable pluralism, and not vice versa. 
72 There is an ambiguity here in Rawls’ argument.  Rawls does not clarify whether the 
order of explanation matches the order of justification.   It is unclear, in other words, 
whether citizens’ most fundamental reasons for supporting the political conception are 
given by the “public good” achieved by liberal institutions, or whether their 
comprehensive doctrine provides the ultimate warrant for the political conception.  I am 
assuming the former view, since there is some evidence that Rawls rejects the latter view.  
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significantly from the ‘model case’ since it implies that liberal institutions on their own 
provide each citizen with sufficient reason to endorse the political conception.73  
According to the ‘model case’, reasons drawn from a comprehensive doctrine do the 
work of justifying the political conception and its obligations to citizens, though few 
detailed reasons are given to explain why citizens would seek to accommodate their 
comprehensive doctrines to the political conception where they conflict, rather than vice 
versa.74  Despite these differences, one might still maintain that the sociologically 
grounded account of a fully overlapping consensus and the ‘model case’ only emphasize 
different aspects of one and the same idea of an overlapping consensus. 
 It is unclear, however, that such a move can reconcile the conclusion of the version of 
this argument found in Political Liberalism with the ‘model case’. 75  The conclusion of 
that argument not only minimizes the role of comprehensive doctrines in providing 
converging justifications for a political conception, but it also conflicts with the claim 
that citizens in an overlapping consensus must agree on the same political conception of 
justice.  To see this second point, one must remember in Political Liberalism Rawls drops 
the claim that the “public good” achieved by liberal institutions is sufficient to provide 
                                                
73 Another way to look at this is that this argument explicitly assumes that most citizens 
effectively have an unsystematic view of the moral good, which is the pluralistic view in 
the ‘model case’.  Thus this explanation implies either that no one actually endorses a 
comprehensive doctrine, or that no one has clear beliefs about what their comprehensive 
doctrine requires of political institutions. 
74 The relation between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception is a 
complicated question.  Rawls denies that comprehensive doctrines alone provide , this 
often seems to be the view of those who endorse the MOC through the ‘model case’.   
75Although Rawls seems to suggest that there is no tension between the ‘model case’ and 
the conclusion of this argument. See Rawls 1999b pp 169-171. 
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citizens with a justification for a political conception of justice.  Rather Rawls argues that 
this “public good” justifies only that a liberal constitution is a requirement of justice.76   
 The public good secured by a liberal constitution in other words provides each citizen 
with reasons to support just that part of a political conception of justice that grounds the 
constitutional protection of a scheme of basic rights and broadly democratic political 
procedures.  Political Liberalism argues that each reasonable citizen might integrate these 
principles into a broader conception expressing a unified view of social justice because of 
internal dynamics of the democratic lawmaking process.  However it is not obvious how 
the democratic process tends to promote agreement on any unified account of social 
justice.  That possibility is implausible even if some aspects of the democratic process 
make it rational for citizens to develop political conceptions of justice to effectively 
communicate their convictions about basic justice to other citizens.  Consensus among 
citizens on the most reasonable political conception is simply not a plausible outcome of 
the democratic process given the obstacles to rational agreement connected to the burdens 
of judgment.  Therefore the argument that a plausible political sociology grounds the idea 
of an overlapping consensus ultimately does not support the conjecture that either the 
‘model case’ or a fully overlapping consensus express realistic possibilities.  Rather, this 
argument provides stronger support for the family of conceptions interpretation (FOC), 
which is characterized by a specific agreement on the particular constitutional protections 
and procedures that must be implied or otherwise supported by any reasonable 
                                                
76 Roughly, one could say that the “public good” gives reason to citizens to support the 
principles of equal basic liberties and the priority of those liberties over other social 
values.  It is difficult to say whether this gives citizens a reason to endorse Rawls’ strong 
understanding of the lexical priority of liberties.  
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conception of justice, and a much less specific agreement on the requirements of 
distributive justice.77   
 The distinction between the FOC and MOC therefore can be parsed in the following 
way.  According to the FOC view, the idea of an overlapping consensus does not 
preclude disagreement about which conception of justice is the most reasonable.  The 
central element of an overlapping consensus on the FOC view is the specific list of rights 
and liberties and the democratic procedures guaranteed by their political constitution.  
Citizens may disagree about which principle(s) of justice justifies that list, as well as 
which principle of justice provides the most reasonable basis for establishing the range of 
acceptable inequality.  Insofar as their agreement is deeper and wider than the 
constitutional consensus, it must be characterized by the conditions that define the set of 
reasonable conceptions of justice, each member of which provides an account of social 
justice consistent with the constitution and its underlying values that all can acknowledge 
as reasonable. 
 By contrast, the account of overlapping consensus connected to the MOC holds that 
all citizens in an overlapping consensus agree on which principles of justice are the most 
reasonable.  Therefore it is difficult to see how an overlapping consensus focused on a 
family of liberal political conceptions can easily be characterized as merely an imperfect 
realization of the ‘model case’ under non-ideal conditions, as Rawls and his followers 
often seem to suggest.  The FOC allows for a wider range of principled disagreement 
about the requirements of basic justice than is compatible with the MOC.  Rather it seems 
much more plausible to view the FOC as articulating a distinct idea of overlapping 
                                                
77 Much more needs to be said about how specific an agreement is required on 
distributive issues.   
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consensus.  The possibility of two distinct conceptions of overlapping consensus raises a 
number of important questions for the general theory of political liberalism, but I will 
focus mainly on its implications for the relation between public reasoning and the 
egalitarian concerns that motivate justice as fairness.    
  
5.  Two Objections to the Irreducibility Thesis 
  
 So far I have argued that two distinct conceptions of overlapping consensus can be 
elaborated from Rawls’ various descriptions of the idea.78  I will call this my 
irreducibility thesis.  Below I present two objections that may be raised against this 
thesis, and some reasons to think that these objections are not fatal.   
 The first objection is that the passages most clearly expressing the idea of an 
overlapping consensus on family of conceptions admit of another interpretation, which 
does not entail that this possibility represents a completely distinct idea.  Such an 
interpretation might point out that the passages describing an overlapping consensus on a 
family of conceptions suggest that an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions 
expresses practical limits on the realization of a “fully overlapping consensus” on a single 
political conception.  The practical limits of realizing this ideal of consensus on a single 
conception of justice are derived from the range of conflicting social and economic 
interests that are encouraged or supported by a given set of liberal institutions.  The wider 
                                                
78 Strictly speaking, I have presented three views, an overlapping consensus expressed by 
the model case, a fully overlapping consensus on a single conception of justice, which is 
connected to the political sociology, and an overlapping consensus on a family of 
conceptions.  I have for simplicity sake only explicitly examined the model case and the 
family of conceptions view, since a fully overlapping consensus supported by the 
political sociology is an unconvincing possibility. 
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the range of these conflicting interests the more likely that agreement on one conception 
will be elusive, since even reasonable citizens motivated by fairness will not freely adopt 
a conception of social justice that radically undermines the social and economic position 
they possess. According to such an interpretation, there is no distinct idea of consensus 
associated with the family of conceptions view.  Rather the family of conceptions view 
only expresses an approximation of the ideal of an overlapping consensus on one 
conception of justice.   
 This strategy, however, parses the distinction between a consensus on a family of 
conceptions and a consensus on a single conception only in terms of the political 
sociology of reciprocity.  It ignores the distinct grounds of an overlapping consensus 
given by the model case, and views the difference between an overlapping consensus on 
one conception and on a family of conceptions as a difference between an ideal and an 
approximation of that ideal, rather than as a difference in kind.   
 This is significant because, as I have shown, the idea of an overlapping consensus on 
a family of conceptions rests on a different set of assumptions than the model case.  The 
political sociology grounding the former assumes that individuals generally fix their 
beliefs (or perhaps more accurately their intuitions) about what justice requires by 
reference to existing institutions and not first through their comprehensive doctrine.  The 
model case on the other hand suggests that citizens affirm the same political conception 
(and thus agree that its requirements are reasonably just) on the basis of reasons that are 
internal to their distinct comprehensive doctrines.   
 Under criticism, Rawls came to see that the model case description undermines the 
notion that the political conception can be justified apart from the comprehensive reasons 
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that lead citizens to support it. However, though he denied that the model case had this 
implication, he never modified his description of the model case to adequately respond to 
this objection.  It seems to me that the description of the model case does carry the 
implication that citizens endorse the same conception on the basis of converging 
comprehensive reasons.  But citizens’ comprehensive doctrines need not be the primary 
ground of their endorsement of a political conception of justice according to the political 
sociology grounding the FOC view.  As an interpretive matter then the view of 
overlapping consensus derived from the model case needs to be distinguished from the 
view connected to the political sociology of reciprocity.   
 Additionally, though Rawls’ use of the idealized political sociology is meant to 
support the possibility of consensus either on a single conception or a family of 
conceptions, it provides little plausible support for the possibility that consensus on a 
single conception would develop from a prior constitutional consensus.  This is because 
the political sociology supposes that citizens’ intuitive beliefs about justice are connected 
to existing institutions.  Presumably, these beliefs condition the process of reflective 
equilibrium that leads reasonable citizens to endorse some political conception of justice 
in the first place. Even if such a reflective equilibrium is achieved in part through the 
exchange of reasons characteristic of a deliberative democracy (as the political sociology 
implies), there is little reason to hold that this process should generate consensus on a 
single conception of social justice that is consistent with acknowledging the burdens of 
judgment.   
 The reason for being skeptical about this possibility is that the range of citizens’ 
intuitive beliefs are only constrained by the explicit institutional forms articulated by the 
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constitution, which are fundamentally about specifying political procedures and 
protections.  Given the assumptions of the political sociology, there is no similar 
constraint on the range of citizens’ intuitive beliefs about distributive justice.  
Consequently, while citizens can be expected to form a fairly limited range of intuitive 
beliefs about the content of constitutionally guaranteed rights, there is not a basis for 
presuming a similarly narrow the range of intuitive beliefs about distributive justice.   
 In the absence of settled institutions to constrain the range of intuitive beliefs, 
reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse a much wider range of conflicting beliefs 
about distributive justice, such that an expectation of a consensus on any given principle 
of distributive justice appears to deny any reasonable disagreement about distributive 
justice.  This consequence seems contrary to the underlying commitment to reasonable 
pluralism that grounds the idea of political liberalism.  
 The irreducibility thesis provides a clearer explanation of the reason for discrepancies 
in Rawls’ descriptions of an overlapping consensus.  However it does so by denying the 
possibility of a unified account of the idea of overlapping consensus.  This is a cost that 
political liberals should be willing to incur, if their goal is to provide a plausible theory of 
political justification for liberal societies divided by reasonable pluralism, rather than to 
engage in scholastic debates about Rawls. 
 But aside from the issue of interpretive fidelity, there may be a stronger case against 
the irreducibility thesis based on Rawls’ account of public justification.79  According to 
one common interpretation, the public justification of an institutional policy or law 
                                                
79 The significance of the idea of public justification in contemporary debates about 
liberalism can hardly be overstated.  Further, it is important to note that Rawls uses the 
term “public justification” to refer to the justification of principles of justice.   
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proceeds within limits set by a conceptually prior consensus on the most reasonable 
political conception of justice.80  This means that public justification does not require 
consensus at the level of individual laws or policies.  Rather the ideal of public 
justification only requires that each citizen be given, and be prepared to give, 
considerations to support laws or policies that are implied by, derived from, or otherwise 
connected to, principles of justice that each affirms as the most reasonable basis of social 
cooperation.81  This moral requirement grounds both the idea and the ideal of public 
reason.  
 Given that an agreement on the most reasonable principles of justice premised upon a 
broader consensus about the moral good is not just unlikely in a liberal society, but 
contrary to the basic character of such a society, a more limited kind of consensus must 
be the basis of the ideal of public justification.   
 The idea of an overlapping consensus provides a basis for public justification that is 
more consistent with well-founded expectations of social life in a liberal democratic 
society.  But if reasonable citizens belonging to an overlapping consensus disagree about 
                                                
80  “…justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it must 
always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others public 
recognize as true; or better publicly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of 
establishing a working agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice.” See 
Rawls and Freeman 1999, p 394 
81 This account of public justification is opposed to other views of public justification, 
such as those of Habermas or Gaus, in which a law or policy itself is the proper object of 
justificatory consensus.  The distinguishing feature of Rawls’ idea of public justification 
is its emphasis on the normative significance of a shared normative standpoint in 
providing the limits of public justification.  This does not require agreement on all 
political outcomes, as models like Habermas’ and Gaus’ seem to require.  Further, my 
characterization here elides over the important distinction between justification to 
individuals, and justification to reasonable individuals.  This should not change the 
fundamental point, which is that Rawlsian public justification rests on a conceptually 
prior consensus on principles, rather than aiming at consensus as the outcome of public 
deliberation in particular cases. 
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which principles of justice are most reasonable (which is the view entailed by the FOC), 
then the ideal of public justification resting on a shared conception of justice seems to fall 
apart.  Without an agreement on which conception of justice is the most reasonable, 
citizens lack sufficient resources to ground a set of shared premises, undermining the 
possibility of the public justification as practice of reasoning according to shared 
considerations.  Therefore, an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions may 
represents a distinct account of overlapping consensus, but it does so at the cost of 
undermining the link between overlapping consensus and public justification.82   
 This is a significant if indirect objection to my claim that the FOC cannot be reduced 
to some version of the MOC.  This objection rests on the claim that the possibility of 
public justification requires prior agreement on the most reasonable principles of justice.  
Therefore an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions (which implies 
disagreement about which principles of justice are most reasonable) is incapable of 
delivering an agreement sufficient to ground this ideal.   
 Showing how an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions might yield a 
shared normative standpoint that is consistent with the demands of public justification 
can minimize this objection.  In the following section, I examine two recent arguments 
that support the claim that disagreement about the most reasonable principles of justice is 
consistent with the requirements of public justification.  It is especially important to 
                                                
82 This possibility is opposed to the view that a consensus on a family of conceptions 
represents an approximation under empirical conditions of the idea of consensus on a 
single conception of justice.  On this view, the consensus on a family of conceptions 
might simply represent an acknowledgement that the ideal of public justification can only 
be approximated under empirical conditions.   
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counter this objection because in doing so, it is possible to give a better account of what 
public justification might demand in a non-well-ordered society.   
 The second objection rests on the claim that disagreement between citizens about the 
most reasonable conception of justice is inconsistent with the ideal of public reason.  But 
this assumes that possibility public reason is conditioned by a prior consensus on the 
most reasonable conception of justice.  Recent publications by Rex Martin and Jonathan 
Quong undermine this rather widespread assumption among political liberals about how 
public reason must be characterized.83  A brief, if relatively uncritical, examination of 
these arguments provides undermines this assumption, and without it, the second 
objection loses most of its force.   
 Martin and Quong approach the claim that public reason requires agreement on the 
most reasonable conception of justice from slightly different theoretical perspectives.  
Martin’s analysis is closely related to my own analysis of the relation between a prior 
constitutional consensus and an overlapping consensus, and emphasizes the institutional 
preconditions of public justification.  On the other hand, Quong’s analysis rests on more 
abstract concerns about how to characterize the ideal of justification to reasonable 
citizens.   Quong develops a conclusive argument against the assumption underlying the 
second objection so I will begin by examining his argument. 84  Martin’s analysis of the 
significance of institutional preconditions for public justification shows how close 
                                                
83 See Martin, Rex “Overlapping Consensus” and Jonathan Quong “On the Idea of Public 
Reason” in Mandle and Reidy 2014. One might want to distinguish rawlsian political 
liberalism, from a more general theory political liberalism. Martin and Quong do not 
endorse rawlsian political liberalism if this term is restricted to a species of political 
liberalism expounded by John Rawls. 
84 Not incidentally, Quong’s analysis also weakens the general interpretive case for the 
MOC as a plausible view of overlapping consensus. 
 
 50 
attention to the relation of overlapping consensus and public justification provides 
clarifies how the moral requirements of public reason can be satisfied without the 
idealizing assumption of a well-ordered society.85 
 In another place, Quong argues that an overlapping consensus on the most reasonable 
principles of justice is not sufficient to establish a common basis for public justification 
about justice. Even if citizens judge the same principles of justice most reasonable 
because each finds those principles to be congruent with her comprehensive doctrine, 
they may still be unable to reason according to common standards when debating the 
more precise requirements of those principles.86  Though the judgment of each citizen 
converges on the same principles, which in this sense embody a common standpoint, the 
underlying moral values and ideals that support each citizen’s judgment are not be 
shared.  On a common view of overlapping consensus, these values and ideals would be 
drawn from citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. 87  But if the resources for interpreting the 
principles of justice are provided by comprehensive doctrines, then citizens clearly lack a 
shared basis for reasoning about justice, even though each endorses the same principles 
as most reasonable. 
                                                
85 The fact that Quong seems committed, at least in theory, to the ideal of a WOS shows 
how his version of political liberalism does not represent a sharp break with Rawls’ 
version of political liberalism.  However, I would argue that his commitment to 
characterizing the ideal of public justification by reference to a WOS leaves it quite 
unclear what the demands of public reason might be under non-ideal conditions.   
86 If I understand Quong’s criticism correctly, even if the justification for principles of a 
political conception at the pro tanto stage rests on democratic values and ideals, and each 
citizen supports those political principles for comprehensive reasons, there still will not 
be a sufficiently shared normative standpoint between citizens to ground the practice of 
public reason. See Quong 2011 pp 161 – 191. 
87 The view of overlapping consensus that Quong criticizes is roughly the same as the 
view I have referred to as the “model-case”.  Further, this view is implied by Cohen’s 
pluralistic consensus test. See “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus” in Cohen 2009 
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 According to Quong, an overlapping consensus cannot provide the common currency 
for public justification as long as it is viewed merely as the focal point of converging 
comprehensive reasons.  The fact that citizens endorse the same principles would not, on 
its own, provide a sufficient basis for public reasoning.88  It is at least as important that 
citizens agree on the underlying political values and ideals that the principles of justice 
specify.89  This is in part why Quong proposes that the content of an overlapping 
consensus be reconceived as a set of political values and ideals supported in one way or 
another by all reasonable comprehensive doctrines.90  Not only is agreement at this more 
general level key to ensuring that principles of justice are interpreted according to shared 
values, but agreement at that level is a “more plausible candidate for an overlapping 
consensus between comprehensive doctrines.”91   
 Given that fundamental liberal ideas, such as fair cooperation and citizenship, are “all 
the common normative ground there is to be found in a well-ordered liberal society”, an 
overlapping consensus on the principles of justice, though perhaps desirable, proves to be 
an unnecessarily demanding condition on the practice of public reason.92  On Quong’s 
                                                
88At least insofar as the idea of public reason is conceived in broadly Rawlsian terms.  
There are a number of other models of public reason, among which, the justificatory 
liberalism of Gerald Gaus and the universal pragmatics of Jurgen Habermas are perhaps 
most widely known.   
89 Quong seems to think that standard Rawlsian accounts of overlapping consensus 
perhaps assume that agreement on principles also secures agreement on the underlying 
political values as well.  It this is true, the Quong’s analysis only clarifies that this 
assumption is unwarranted, and that public reasoning only requires a consensus on 
political values, not necessarily on principles of justice. Gerald Gaus makes a related 
point in “The Turn to Political Liberalism” Mandle and Reidy 2014. 
90 “I claim that it is this fundamental idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation 
between free and equal citizens (or something close to it) which should be the subject of 
the overlapping consensus.” See Quong 2011 p 182. 
91 ibid 185 
92 ibid 183 
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view, all that is required for the practice of public reason is that reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines support the fundamental ideas on the basis of which various 
political liberalisms, such as justice as fairness, are elaborated.  These values imply a 
generalized account of political liberalism, which is specified by particular conceptions of 
justice, such as justice as fairness.93  
 Reconceiving the object of an overlapping consensus as these ideas is therefore not 
strictly consistent with the claim that the object of an overlapping consensus is a family 
of conceptions, since the focus of consensus according to Quong is the basic liberal 
values.  This account of overlapping consensus illustrates how disagreement about the 
most reasonable principles of justice could still be consistent with political liberalism’s 
basic requirement that public justification proceed in terms of premises shared by all 
reasonable citizens. 
  One need not fully endorse Quong’s version of political liberalism to see that his 
criticism of the “comprehensive support for principles” position, or what I have called the 
‘model case’, is conclusive.  An overlapping consensus in which citizens endorse a 
limited set of political principles on the basis of comprehensive reasons would not be an 
adequate basis for the practice of public reasoning envisioned by political liberalism (i.e. 
a practice characterized primarily by agreement on the terms of justification though not 
necessarily on the outcome of justification).  This conclusion is enough to undermine 
much of the force of the objection above.   
                                                
93 Agreement on this general definition of liberalism can satisfy two central theoretical 
functions of an overlapping consensus (a) its role in ensuring congruence, and (b) its role 
in the public justification of coercive political power.  
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 In a recent anthology, Rex Martin offers another argument for the same conclusion.  
This argument, however, emphasizes the important sociological assumptions underlying 
the claim that an overlapping consensus is a practical possibility and embodied in the idea 
of a constitutional consensus.94  Quong’s otherwise commendable account is largely 
silent about the sociological background presumed by the idea of overlapping consensus.  
Like Rawls, Quong focuses on the capacity of comprehensive doctrines to jointly support 
the object of an overlapping consensus, though they specify that object in different ways.  
As with Rawls, this is intended to be a useful simplification, since “there are less 
doctrines than citizens”.  However prioritizing reasonable comprehensive doctrines over 
reasonable persons emphasizes one aspect of the question of whether historically 
enduring moral and religious communities are congruent with basic liberal commitments.  
This simplifying assumption exaggerates the agency of the doctrines themselves.   
 A more relevant question is whether reasonable citizens will adopt conceptions of the 
good that are congruent with basic liberal commitments.  Part of the answer to this 
question will certainly be found in the fact that the practical requirements of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines are generally congruent with basic liberal commitments.  But it 
is important to keep in mind that, for Rawls anyways, a settled liberal constitution is also 
a source of weighty moral reasons for reasonable citizens.  The main weakness of the 
‘model case’ is that it only obliquely acknowledges this assumption in guise of the 
pluralist view.  That sort of view, as Rawls’ political sociology makes clear, provides the 
most plausible ground for the claim that an overlapping consensus is a realistic practical 
ideal.  This lies in background of Martin’s view. 
                                                
94See Mandle and Reidy 2014, p 284. 
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 Martin does a better job than Quong of showing how the institutions of constitutional 
government provide the background conditions for interpreting the content of an 
overlapping consensus.  Given this background, Martin argues that an overlapping 
consensus is best understood in terms of a family of conceptions, and moreover, that this 
is consistent with the idea of public justification connected to the idea of stability for the 
right reasons.   
 First, Martin argues that a consensus on a single conception of justice (such as justice 
as fairness) is not a natural outgrowth of a constitutional consensus.  The history of 
modern constitutional democracy shows that continued debate about which principles of 
justice are most justifiable seems to be an enduing feature of healthy democracies.  The 
absence of political parties representing different specific political conceptions is most 
often a sign of political dysfunction.  The “rise of egalitarian democracy … has altered 
the shape of liberal theories, moving them away from the ideal of a single agreed-upon 
principle or closely integrated set of principles toward a family of rather variegated 
liberal principles.”95  An agreement on a single conception would therefore seem to 
violate Rawls’ deep commitment to realism.   
 A constitutional consensus, properly understood, expresses an agreement between 
citizens on the “public political conception of justice (of the sort formed by the family of 
liberal principles with certain generic features in common)”, or in other words, it 
                                                
95 Ibid p 286.  He continues by observing that this “family of principles [has] certain 
generic features in common and offer[s] varying and even competing interpretations not 
merely of policy issues but also of the constitutional and institutional essentials in the 
various liberal polities and even of the fundamental ideas of a democratic public political 
culture as such.” 
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expresses their agreement on principles of “generic liberalism.”96  An overlapping 
consensus builds on a prior constitutional consensus by lending those general principles 
“moral credentials of the sort afforded by a comprehensive critical moral theory.”97  On 
Martin’s view, an overlapping consensus, should one exist, would not need to be focused 
on a specific conception of justice such as justice as fairness.  An overlapping consensus 
that builds on a prior constitutional consensus is more plausibly understood in terms of 
the principles of generic liberalism.  
 Second, Martin argues that an overlapping consensus whose content is given by the 
principles of generic liberalism can still satisfy the justificatory ideal connected to the 
notion of stability for the right reasons (which should not be confused with institutional 
stability simpliciter).  Martin appears to hold that the ideal of stability for the right 
reasons requires justification of the public political conception at two distinct levels: (a) a 
limited, freestanding moral justification afforded by the ideals of citizenship and fair 
cooperation, and (b) a “critical moral justification” afforded by distinct comprehensive 
doctrines.  Each of these levels roughly corresponds to one of the two kinds of consensus.  
Securing both levels is a necessary condition for the full justification of a political 
conception, which shows that a society ordered according to that conception is capable of 
being stable for the right reasons.  Given that freestanding justification is conceptually 
prior to the “critical moral justification,” and that it is unlikely to center on a public 
                                                
96 Ibid p 287; Martin executes an important terminological change, which I follow in my 
comments.  When he refers to the “political conception of justice” that is the object of 
overlapping consensus and public justification, he means the principles of generic 
liberalism, and not any more specific political conception like justice as fairness. 
97 Ibid p 289 
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political conception more specific than the principles of generic liberalism, full 
justification seems likely only for the principles of generic liberalism.   
 Both Martin and Quong conclude that an overlapping consensus on a single 
conception of justice (like justice as fairness) cannot accomplish the goal of public 
justification connected to the idea of stability for the right reasons: Martin because a 
narrow consensus on a specific conception of justice violates the conditions of realism 
spelled out in the connection between a constitutional consensus and an overlapping 
consensus, and Quong because such a consensus is not deep enough to ensure that the 
practice of public justification proceeds through a shared normative standpoint.  Despite 
their different concerns, Quong and Martin both conclude that disagreement about the 
most reasonable conception of justice does not conflict with political liberalism’s idea of 
public justification.  Further they both agree that Rawls’ account of generic liberalism 
provides the most specific point of agreement possible, given an honest account of 
reasonable pluralism.   
 To conclude, the objection to my irreducibility thesis presented above rested on the 
claim that disagreement about the most reasonable conception of justice conflicted with 
the goal of public justification at the heart of political liberalism.  Recent work by Martin 
and Quong provides some reasons to think that an overlapping consensus may be better 
able to meet the goal of public justification if it is interpreted as including disagreement 
about the most reasonable conception of justice.  Their arguments undermine the claim 
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on which the objection is based, and so, my irreducibility thesis does necessarily fail for 
the reasons expressed in the objection.98  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter provides some defense for two important claims.  The first is an 
interpretive claim about the meaning of “overlapping consensus”.  I have provided 
evidence that the various descriptions of the content and justification for this concept 
given by Rawls lead to two irreducible interpretations.  Further, I have tried to show that 
an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions of justice cannot be derived from 
the idea of an overlapping consensus on a single specific conception of justice.   
 But there is a second claim I hope can be defended on the basis of the interpretive 
claims made in this chapter.  Those claims provide two important reasons that political 
liberals should adopt the FOC view of an overlapping consensus over the MOC view.  
First, the FOC view provides a more plausible view of the consequences of reasonable 
pluralism for justification through public reason.  Assuming, even ideally, that reasonable 
citizens will converge in judgment on the most reasonable principles of justice seems to 
violate the conditions that give rise to reasonable disagreement in the first place.  But 
according to the FOC view, disagreement about the most reasonable conception of justice 
may still be expressed within a shared normative standpoint established by some minimal 
conditions of reasonability for conceptions of justice and a prior agreement on the 
institutions of a political constitution.  Citizens may disagree about the most reasonable 
                                                
98 The irreducibility thesis can satisfy conditions of justification expressed in the idea of 
public reason.    
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conception of justice, but given that citizens mutually endorse the same minimal 
conditions that any reasonable conception of justice must satisfy, their disagreement here 
need not give rise to the problems of alienation and coercion as their disagreement about 
comprehensive doctrines would tend. 
 Second, the FOC view can be grounded in a plausible historical hypothesis about the 
effects of liberal institutions.  The political sociology which grounds the account of the 
FOC view speculates that the morally significant effects of liberal constitutions justify the 
liberal principles of justice that citizens believe to be expressed by the constitution.  But a 
political constitution is rarely explicit about the specific (liberal) principles of justice it 
expresses.  A political constitution is open to a certain amount of interpretation in this 
regard.  The FOC view, I think, better captures the fact that existing democratic 
constitutions are indeterminate in this way.  As Martin convincingly argues, the historical 
evidence we possess about the development and historical trajectory of existing 
constitutional governments suggests that deep disagreement about the principles of 
justice that ground existing constitutions is likely to persist indefinitely.   
 More theoretically, the FOC view implies that the particular constitutional elements 
of the basic structure are open to justifications from a number of reasonable conceptions 
of justice. Given that all minimally liberal constitutions guarantee freedom of speech and 
association, it is unreasonable to expect that citizens will all agree that their particular 
constitution is justified by one and the same conception of justice.  As a consequence, 
even given the institutional features of a well-ordered society, an overlapping consensus 
on the most reasonable conception of justice such as envisioned in the MOC seems to 
violate the basic features of reasonable pluralism. 
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 For these two reasons, the family of conceptions view of overlapping consensus 
provides a more defensible account of the idea of overlapping consensus than the model 
conception view.  Further, I have shown how the FOC may still provide a basis for 
characterizing public reason and through it the idea of political justification connected to 
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“[The] content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, 
and not be a single one. There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore 
many forms of public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions.” – 
The Law of Peoples 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that models of public reason based on Rawls’ 
idea of overlapping consensus should reject a widely held interpretation of the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. According to this interpretation, an overlapping consensus is 
characterized by a converging consensus of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines on 
the very same principles of justice. Models of public reason that draw on this 
interpretation identify public reasons by reference to a single conception of justice that is 
supported in different ways by the main comprehensive doctrines in a society. This 
conception provides the content of the society’s political morality and its shared public 
reason. This brief summary expresses, perhaps, the most commonly held view of Rawls’ 
account of public reason. I argued in the previous chapter that this view is not the only 
way to interpret Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus, and in fact, it overlooks the 
significant changes that Rawls made to this idea in Political Liberalism and several 
essays published after its publication. 
 The competing model of overlapping consensus I presented in the last chapter is 
based on a close reading of §6-8 of Chapter IV in Political Liberalism. In these passages, 
Rawls presents for the first time, and in the greatest detail, the idea that a constitutional 
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consensus provides a precondition for the possibility of an overlapping consensus. A 
constitutional consensus is shallow and narrow. A constitutional consensus is shallow 
because not all reasonable citizens may view the political rights granted in the 
constitution as supported by principles of justice or as derived from a (moral) conception 
of the person, and it is narrow because it is only a consensus on the rights and procedures 
that must be granted to enable a functioning democratic political process that provides 
adequate protection for the rights of the minority.  
On this modified view, an overlapping consensus can only develop in a society in 
which comprehensive doctrines lend some support, or at least do not outright conflict 
with, the political guarantees of a liberal democratic constitution. Reasonable citizens 
adopt political conceptions of justice in order to justify their policy preferences to each 
other on the basis of what they sincerely take to be the best (most reasonable) 
interpretation of the moral values and principles expressed in the procedural guarantees 
they all already endorse. An overlapping consensus occurs when a set of these political 
conceptions (at the extreme a single conception) becomes widely recognized by all 
citizens as a reasonable (if not entirely just) basis for organizing the entire basic 
structure.99 The modified view of overlapping consensus proposed in these sections no 
longer implies that all citizens hold that one and the same political conception of justice 
is the most reasonable. The object of their overlapping consensus is now described by 
                                                
99 This essentially means that in an overlapping consensus, reasonable citizens do not 
view the political conceptions that guide the basic structure as deeply conflicting with 
their comprehensive moral commitments. This explains Rawls persistent use of the 




Rawls as a family of freestanding liberal conceptions of justice, with an overlapping 
consensus on a single conception taken to be a limit case.  
The main consequence of these modifications to the idea of overlapping 
consensus is that the limits of public reason can no longer be understood in terms of the 
most reasonable conception of justice. Rather, the limits of public reason must be 
understood in terms of a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. A model of 
public reason based on the modified account of overlapping consensus is consistent with 
robust disagreement among reasonable citizens about which principles of justice are the 
most reasonable. But disagreement about the most reasonable principles of justice need 
not undermine the possibility of public reasoning as long as there is consensus among 
reasonable citizens on the composition of the family of conceptions of justice.100 This 
would mean that while citizens disagree about the most reasonable conception of justice, 
they agree on which conceptions of justice are reasonable in a minimal sense. This seems 
to imply that citizens recognize a criterion of bare reasonability that determines the 
content of the family of conceptions.  
Achieving a clearer view of bare reasonability is an important step in developing 
a more complete account of the changes that Rawls made to the idea of public reason 
after the publication of Political Liberalism than has currently been offered in the 
literature to date. The modest goal of this chapter is to show that idea of bare 
reasonability supported by textual evidence from Political Liberalism and elsewhere 
serves to exclude libertarian views of property from the family of conceptions of justice. 
                                                
100 The idea that public reasoning is based on a prior consensus and is therefore shared by 
all citizens can be modified so that the idea of shared reason means roughly, “supported 




The analysis further shows that Rawls makes contradictory claims about whether 
classical liberal views of property fall within the range of bare reasonability. In the next 
chapter, I attempt to clarify whether interpreting the family to include classical liberalism 
provides a more plausible view of public reason or whether Rawlsians are broadly correct 
that the limits of public reason exclude most classical liberal views of property. The hope 
is that by examining how wide a range of liberal views about property rights can be 
accommodated by Rawls description of the family of reasonable conceptions, some 
further clarity can be achieved about the distributive implications of the of idea public 
reason.101 
This chapter is motivated by the suspicion that the ideal of deliberative democracy 
connected to the idea of public reason may express a much weaker commitment to 
distributive equality than is often thought to be the case. A similar concern is raised in a 
number of early criticisms of Rawls. Critics such as Bernard Williams, Susan Moller 
Okin, and Brian Barry were deeply skeptical of the claim that the difference principle, or 
any comparably demanding principle of egalitarian distributive justice, could be 
supported by comprehensive doctrines in an overlapping consensus.102 These criticisms 
are largely rejected in the subsequent literature because they are rightly viewed as 
misrepresenting the idea of overlapping consensus in ways that Rawls later clarified.103 
The underlying worry that the distributive implications of the political liberalism may be 
significantly less egalitarian than Rawls and his followers seem to believe recurs in a 
slightly different way given my analysis of the model of public reason that follows from 
                                                
101 In one sense, this chapter continues a broad debate about the continuity of the two 
main periods of Rawls thought.  
102 See Williams 2014; and Barry 1995; and also Okin1993. 
103 See “Reply to Habermas” in Rawls 2005.  
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FOC view. Without a clear account of the boundaries of the family, it is unclear just what 
principles of distributive justice can be excluded from public reason. This chapter argues 
that within the broad framework of public reason that follows from the FOC view, there 
is no conclusive reason to think that forms of high liberalism have an exclusive claim to 
public reasoning about distributive justice. 
This chapter analyzes the status of economic freedom and property in public 
reason as a way of examining the limits of public reason that derives from the family of 
conceptions view of overlapping consensus. If conceptions that support giving a high, or 
even nearly absolute, value to economic freedom and property rights belong to, or at least 
are not clearly excluded form, the family, then there seems to be little reason to think that 
the ideal of public reason implies any significant commitment to distributive equality. On 
the other hand, if conceptions of justice in the family endorse the view of economic 
freedom and property characteristic of high liberalism (that freedoms of speech, 
association, and conscience must be given priority over economic freedom and property), 
this would establish a provisional link between the value of public justification expressed 
in the idea of public reason and some of the basic commitments of high liberal views of 
distributive justice. 
These reflections support the conclusion that political liberals may be too hasty is 
excluding classical liberal principles from public reason. Many forms of classical 
liberalism can accommodate the restriction of private property and economic liberty to 
support publicly provided social insurance that guarantees citizens do not fall into deep 
poverty because of disability, unemployment, or retirement. This feature of most forms of 
classical liberalism suggests that political theorists like John Tomasi and Gerald Gaus 
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may be correct in claiming that the distributive commitments of high liberalism do not set 
the boundaries of public reason, even on recognizably Rawlsian grounds. Acknowledging 
that at least some recent forms of classical liberalism meet a plausible criterion of bare 
reasonability may lead to a more plausible account of the idea of public reason.  
 
1. Family Traits 
  
A model of public reason needs to provide a way of distinguishing public from 
non-public reasons in order to be a useful guide for our judgments about which exercises 
of political power are reasonable. Further, the set of public reasons it distinguishes must 
at least be capable of supporting citizens’ beliefs about the content of constitutional 
protections, and the requirements of basic (distributive) justice.104 
 The family of conceptions view of overlapping consensus (FOC view) 
undermines a widely held view about how to draw the distinction between public and 
non-public reasons. The FOC view assumes that reasonable citizens are unlikely to reach, 
or simply cannot reach, a consensus about the most reasonable conception of justice. 
Consequently no single conception of justice is able to provide the ultimate criteria for 
distinguishing public reasons from non-public reasons. Rather, the distinction between 
public and non-public reasons is drawn on the basis of a closely related group of 
conceptions of justice. If public reasons are still to be characterized in terms of a prior 
agreement, then a consensus on a family of conceptions must imply that central features 
                                                
104 Completeness requires that “the values specified by [the political conception of 
justice] can be suitably ordered or otherwise united so that those values along give a 
reasonable answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice” See, “Reply to Habermas, Rawls 2005 p 386 
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of conceptions in the family are the object of a consensus, including (perhaps) a view 
about the criteria that distinguish barely reasonable from unreasonable conceptions of 
justice. A largely overlooked question in the recent literature is whether there is textual 
evidence on which to develop a Rawlsian account of the distinction between barely 
reasonable and simply unreasonable conceptions of justice. 
Few attempts have been made in the secondary literature to examine the broader 
consequences of the more inclusive model of public reason that follows from the 
modified FOC view in which some citizens regard the conceptions of justice endorsed by 
other citizens as barely reasonable, though insufficiently just. Recent scholarship 
suggests at least two ways to interpret the FOC view, and consequently, two slightly 
different ways of developing a criterion to distinguish barely reasonable from 
unreasonable conceptions of justice. 
Jonathan Quong argues that the best way of maintaining the normative 
significance of consensus given the modified idea of an overlapping consensus on a 
family of conceptions is to presume citizens reach consensus on features of justice that 
are more abstract than conceptions. On his interpretation, citizens agree on the 
fundamental ideas of political liberalism. Different conceptions in the family reflect 
plausible differences in the way that citizens interpret these fundamental ideas. One 
weakness of this view is that it largely overlooks the fact that Rawls came to view a 
consensus on a written constitution protecting certain fundamental political rights as a 
necessary condition for the possibility of an overlapping consensus. Moreover, Quong 
fails to investigate very deeply whether there are any limits on the interpretation of these 
ideas that might establish a range of barely reasonable conceptions of justice. 
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Rex Martin gives a slightly different interpretation of the family of conceptions. 
He argues that consensus on a general idea of liberalism is sufficient to characterize the 
common features of the family.105 The range of the family of conceptions is limited by a 
generalized idea of liberalism that is expressed in the central features of liberal 
constitutions. Conceptions of justice that belong to the family of conceptions specify this 
general idea and provide justification for the essential features of a liberal democratic 
constitution that originally served a purely pragmatic function. Though Martin’s view is 
more sensitive than Quong’s to the constitutional context that Rawls came to believe was 
a necessary condition of an overlapping consensus, Martin’s analysis still leaves the issue 
of barely reasonable conceptions largely unexamined.  
Despite their differences, both these interpretations suggest that that although 
Rawls came to doubt that public reason could be grounded in a consensus on the most 
reasonable conception of justice given the causes of reasonable disagreement, he 
maintained his belief that some consensus about justice was possible, even if he no longer 
characterized that consensus in terms of one specific political conception. The FOC view 
suggests that political conceptions of justice belonging to the family specify values and 
principles that reasonable citizens support on the basis of converging reasons drawn from 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines. The consensus of reasonable citizens is therefore 
properly characterized at a more abstract level.  
Both Quong and Martin, however, fail to fully examine whether a consensus on 
abstract principles and ideas connected to justice provides a sufficient basis for an 
account of minimal reasonability. An account of minimal reasonability is necessary 
                                                
105 See “Overlapping Consensus” in Mandle and Reidy 2014. 
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because without some way of identifying whether a given conception is sufficiently 
reasonable, it seems doubtful that a thoroughgoing distinction can be maintained between 
public and non-public reasons.106 A clear account of this distinction is to answer whether 
permissible social inequalities. 
The analysis below develops an account of bare reasonability for conceptions of 
justice from some of Rawls’ mature reflections on public reason. I argue that this account 
is sufficient to identify a range of reasonable principles of property and economic liberty. 
A narrow focus on property and economic liberty may provide only a partial account of 
bare reasonability of a conception of justice. However, if this account is sufficient to 
show that at least some prima facie liberal views of property are unreasonable, then some 
further insight into the content of the family of conceptions, and consequently of public 
reason, has been achieved. Narrowing the range of conceptions that could belong to an 
overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions will contribute to a full investigation of 
the implications of the Rawlsian idea of public reason for questions of basic (non-
constitutional) justice. 
The analysis below considers three types of liberal views of property: High or 
Egalitarian Liberal, Classical Liberal, and Libertarian. I understand these principles to 
differ mainly according to the degree of protection for property rights and economic 
liberties deriving from ownership that the principle supports.107 Libertarian principles of 
                                                
106There is some risk is attempting to characterize a threshold of reasonability. A 
plausible account of the threshold should remain incomplete and open to revision, since 
the democratic process may reveal insights that suggest a wider or narrower range of 
reasonable conceptions of justice. A theory of ‘reasonability’ should try to avoid . 
107 Perhaps a more characteristically Rawlsian way of viewing the problem is to ask 
whether all three interpretations of justice as fairness: natural liberty, liberal equality, 
and democratic equality meet the threshold of bare reasonability, or whether one or more 
 
 69 
property hold that ownership rights covering all the incidents of property are basic 
liberties that deserve the highest level of institutional protection (constitutional 
entrenchment). High Liberal principles of property hold that, at most, some central 
incidents of property are basic liberties that that deserve the highest level of institutional 
protection (constitutional entrenchment). High Liberal principles generally hold that the 
other incidents of property may be limited in order to secure gains in other social values, 
like equality or welfare. Classical Liberal principles, like Libertarian principles, give a 
high priority to protecting all the incidents of property. Unlike Libertarian principles, 
Classical Liberal principles do not share the view that the incidents of property may never 
be limited to secure gains in equality or welfare. Thus, Classical Liberal principles of 
property occupy something of a middle ground between Libertarian and High Liberal 
principles of property. 
These principles can be arranged according to a decreasing degree of protection 
for property rights and economic liberty. Libertarian views occupy one end of the range. 
They support near absolute protection for all incidents of property rights and economic 
liberty against any limits connected to other social values. High liberal views occupy the 
other end of the range. Such views often support restrictions on property and economic 
liberty to promote other social values, like equality or fairness. Classical liberal views fall 
somewhere in between the near absolute protection of property supported by Libertarian 
                                                                                                                                            
of these interpretations falls below the threshold. The weakness of this way of posing the 
question is that Rawls explicitly acknowledges that conceptions of justice that bear no 
relation to justice as fairness might also belong to the family of conceptions.  
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views, and the highly qualified, and often extremely narrow, protection of property 
supported by High liberal views.108  
Whether an overlapping consensus focusing on a family of conceptions 
encompasses all three kinds of liberal views of property or just a subset of them, will 
have a direct implication on the range of redistributive institutions that can be supported 
by public reasons. If each of these principles is contained in at least one conception 
belonging to the family, then public reasons may support both the highly redistributive 
basic structure implied by High liberal views, and the night-watchmen state envisioned 
by Libertarian views. This seems to be an implausible account of public reason since it 
implies that almost any institutions of property can be justified by public reasons. 
Consequently, public reason could justify both extremely egalitarian and anti-egalitarian 
basic structures. 
A more plausible model of public reason could be developed on the basis of a 
clearer account of the threshold of bare reasonability that principles of property rights 
and economic liberty must meet. This may resolve what could be a troubling implication 
of the family of conceptions view of overlapping consensus, which is that public reasons 
may justify any remotely liberal convention governing property rights and economic 
liberty. More importantly, an account of the threshold of bare reasonability in terms of 
principles of property would make possible a more precise account of the range of 
                                                
108 In this analysis, I explicitly avoid the question of whether the princple grounds 
property rights and economic freedom in claims about individual’s natural rights. It is 
clear that such claims are not sufficiently political. Natural rights liberalism, whether 
libertarian or not, is not a political conception of justice, since it derives liberal basic 
rights from a non-political conception of the person. Nevertheless excluding conceptions 
(or in this case principles) because they are insufficiently political does not eliminate the 
possibility that the offending principles of such conceptions could be stated in terms of 
political values.  
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principles of distributive justice that belong to the family of conceptions, and therefore 
whether the balance of public reasons tilts in an egalitarian direction.109 The analysis in 
the next section presents three ways that Rawls characterizes the common features of 
members of the family of conceptions in order to begin to develop a threshold notion of 
bare reasonability. This threshold is then shown to be sufficient to exclude Libertarian 
principles of property from the family. 
 
2 Freestanding Principles of Property 
 
Rawls describes the common features of the family of conceptions of justice in 
several different ways. First, the family consists of any conception of justice that can be 
constructed from the twin foundational ideas of political liberalism: persons as free and 
equal citizens, and society as system of mutual cooperation. In other words, all 
conceptions belonging to the family must be capable of being represented as outputs of a 
model of political construction that specifies political liberalism’s basic ideas of society 
and person. Second, members of the family represent different specifications of a more 
general concept of liberal justice. Understood this way, each member of the family 
specifies principles of the same general concept of liberal justice. Third, the family 
consists of conceptions of justice that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.110 Rawls does 
                                                
109 The question is what conventions of property are justified by liberal conceptions of 
justice, and so conventions of property that deny individuals all property rights and 
economic liberty need not be addressed here. Such conventions are manifestly illiberal, 
and therefore, are not justified by any plausibly liberal conceptions of justice. 
110 Introduction to the second edition of Political Liberalism “Any conception that meets 
the criterion of reciprocity and recognizes the burdens of judgment” may belong to the 
family of freestanding conceptions. See, Rawls 2005 p xlix. 
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not make clear whether these ways of describing the members of the family are 
independent of each other, or whether some may be derived from the others.111 On my 
reading, Rawls derives the first two from the criterion of reciprocity, which provides the 
ultimate criterion for distinguishing conceptions of justice that can provide public reasons 
from those that cannot.  
However, a full analysis of the relation between these accounts is not necessary to 
develop a provisional account of bare reasonability. My account of bare reasonability 
draws mainly on the second description, and turns to the first for clarification, and the 
third to resolve a conflict in Rawls’ descriptions of a reasonable social minimum. I also 
draws on the ideas of a ‘constitutional consensus’ and ‘constitutional essentials’ for 
clarification of several points. Finally, I show that this provisional account of bare 
reasonability is sufficient to exclude Libertarian views of property fall from the range of 
reasonable principles of property.  
The second description of the family holds that members of the family specify 
three principles of a general idea of liberal justice. According to Rawls, members of the 
family of reasonable concepetions:  
(i) “specifies certain rights, liberties, and opportunities (of the kind 
familiar from democratic regimes);” 
(ii) “assigns a special priority for these rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
especially with regard to claims of the general good and of perfectionist 
values;” and 
                                                
111 Some evidence suggests that Rawls may have thought that the abstract idea of 
liberalism could ultimately be derived from the criterion of reciprocity, which would 
therefore provide the fundamental normative value specified by the family of 
conceptions. The passages in which he describes the family of conceptions does not 
provide clear evidence that this is the case, however. 
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(iii) “affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and 
opportunities.”112  
 
I will refer to this concept of justice as generalized liberalism.  
 The idea of generalized liberalism along with the first and third way of 
describing the family of reasonable conceptions imply a threshold criterion of 
reasonability. Below I shows that in order to specify the idea of general liberalism a 
conception must fall between two extremes with regard to the protection of property. At a 
minimum, a conception must support the constitutional protection of incidents of 
property that are necessary for the exercise of political rights and liberties. At the 
maximum, a conception must not support protections of private property that undermine 
the public provision and guarantee of a minimum level of resources for all citizens.113  
The analysis below presumes that Rawls’ idea of a family of conceptions of 
justice is neither a focal concept whose precise boundaries are contested, nor a family 
                                                
112 See, Rawls 2005 pp 223; and also pp 375 and xlviii; “Public Reason Revisited” in 
Rawls 1999b p 141; and Rawls 1999b  pp 14 and 49.  
In the introduction to the paperback edition, the third condition is modified to read “it 
affirms measures assuring all citizens, whatever their social position, adequate all-
purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities.” 
Close examination of these three conditions in the critical literature has been relatively 
sparse. One explanation might be that the manner in which Rawls specifies the content of 
the family of liberal conceptions may seem less important than his claim that liberal 
conceptions only articulate political values. Another explanation might be that the 
common features of liberal freestanding conceptions are not all that significant if one 
holds that the idea of an overlapping consensus requires agreement on a single 
conception. The common content of freestanding conceptions of justice becomes 
relatively more interesting if, following Rawls suggestion, an overlapping consensus does 
not require that citizens agree on the most reasonable conception of justice, but only that 
they agree on a family of reasonable conceptions of justice. Consequently, “Citizens will 
differ as to which of these conceptions they think the most reasonable, but they should be 
able to agree that all are reasonable even if barely so.” See, Rawls 1999b p 14. 
113 Both the minimum and maximum derive from Rawls description of “constitutional 
essentials”, an indication of the importance of a constitutional consensus.  
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resemblance concept whose members bear only a haphazard relation to each other. 
Rather, the idea of a family of conceptions is defined by a few necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions regarding reasonable protections for private property. On my 
interpretation, Rawls’ account of the family of reasonable conceptions is sufficient to 
exclude libertarian views of property. However, his account of the family supports 
conflicting views about whether classical liberal view of property are reasonable or not. 
To anticipate a point presented in more detail below, Rawls’ various descriptions of the 
family of conceptions admits of a stronger and weaker interpretation of the maximum, 
but still reasonable, level of protection for private property. On the stronger interpretation 
of this condition, it is unlikely that classical liberal principles fall within the range of bare 
reasonability established by the two propositions. On the weaker interpretation, classical 
liberal principles are likely to fall within the range of reasonable conceptions and 
therefore to belong to the family of conceptions. I present some reasons for thinking that 
Rawls remained uncertain about whether an overlapping consensus on a family of 
conceptions included Classical Liberal principles. Which interpretation provides a better 
model of public reason overall requires further argument. A full analysis of this question 
will come in the following chapter.  
 
3. Generalized Liberalism and Property  
 
The analysis in this section draws heavily on Rawls’ description of members in 
the family as specifications of the idea of generalized liberalism. It will therefore prove 
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helpful to restate the three conditions of this concept. A conception of justice specifies 
the idea of generalized liberalism if and only if it: 
(i) “specifies certain rights, liberties, and opportunities (of the kind familiar from 
democratic regimes);”  
(ii) “assigns a special priority for these rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
especially with regard to claims of the general good and of perfectionist 
values;”  
(iii) “affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities.”114 
 
Justice as fairness is the paradigm specification of the idea of generalized liberalism, and 
so it might seem that its treatment of property might be shared by all reasonable 
specifications of generalized liberalism. This supposition is misleading for the following 
reasons. 
Justice as fairness might provide a paradigm for other reasonable conceptions of 
justice because members of the family converge to support its account of the basic 
liberties. If other members of the family relate to justice as fairness in this way, then each 
conception in the family supports the same constitutional protections for property rights 
as justice as fairness. On this view, reasonable conceptions of justice identify the same 
narrow class of incidents of property for constitutional protection as justice as fairness. 
Rawls work supports at least three distinct accounts of why reasonable conceptions other 
than justice as fairness might adopt its account of property and basic liberties. Two of 
these accounts seem to violate the basic assumptions about pluralism which motivate 
political liberalism in the first place. The third provides a plausible, historically informed 
explanation for the convergence of reasonable conceptions on a similar view of which 
incidents of property count as basic liberties. 
                                                
114 See Rawls 2005 pp 223, 375 and xlviii, and Rawls 1999b pp 14, 49, and 141.  
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First, it is possible all conceptions adopt Rawls’ view about the moral significance 
of ownership. In Theory of Justice, Rawls introduces a distinction between personal and 
productive property in the discussion of basic liberty. 115 Rawls leaves the basis of this 
distinction vague, but it clearly anticipates the basic features of Margaret Radin’s 
personality theory of property.116 Radin argues that some items of property are valued 
fundamentally as constituent parts of a person’s identity. The value of personal property 
is fundamentally independent of whatever exchange value the item might also have. 
Radin’s view sheds some light on what Rawls might have meant in claiming that the right 
to own “personal property” counts among the basic liberties, while the right to own 
productive resources does not. According to Rawls, protection of the right to own 
“personal property” provides a “material basis for personal independence and self-
respect” in a way that the right to own productive property is not. Ownership of items 
whose value is primarily fungible is not essential to the sense of self-respect, security, 
and independence that is needed to develop and exercise the capacities of citizenship.  
The problem with this account is that the distinction between personal and 
productive property is not implied by the idea of generalized liberalism. Consequently, 
there is no strong reason to suppose that conceptions of justice that specify generalized 
liberalism will all rely on this distinction. This distinction is but one plausible way of 
                                                
115 See Rawls and Kelly 2001, p 114. This approach would not rule out the possibility 
that some conceptions might support stronger protections for private property as a matter 
of best economic policy, even if not as a matter of basic right. 
116 See "Property and Personhood" in Radin 1993. It is probably the case that Rawls is 
drawing on the pragmatist and Hegelian traditions in the same way as Radin. See 
especially, Rawls lectures on Hegel in Rawls and Herman 2000 p 341 - 344, in which 
Rawls seems to approve of Hegel’s view that “our property rights are based not on our 
desires and wants, but on our status as persons”. 
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identifying which incidents of property ought to count as basic liberties.117 The crucial 
point is that it is far from obvious that the personality theory of property provides the only 
reasonable basis for identifying incidents of property that ought to be protected as basic 
liberties. The idea of generalized liberalism provides no reason to exclude the possibility 
that some reasonable conceptions might use other ideas of ownership and property to 
identify incidents of property as basic liberties, for instance, a freestanding form of 
Lockean just acquisition and transfer, or a purely conventionalist view, such as that 
recently defended by Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy.118  
A second explanation of why reasonable conceptions might share one account of 
the incidents of property that count as basic liberties can be developed from the general 
account of basic liberty found in of Rawls’ account of political constructivism. He holds 
that each basic liberty corresponds to a social condition that individuals need to develop 
the moral capacities and attitudes needed to successfully adopt the role of free and equal 
citizens. For example, a citizen is not free if she is not able to adopt and act on the 
conception of the good that she believes is best or true. But she only possesses this ability 
if she is protected from coercive efforts to get her to perform religious practices she 
rejects. This is how the conditions needed to realize citizenship justified the protections 
of religious liberty. In general, this is how Rawls derives the protection of basic liberties 
from idea of citizenship. The social conditions required for citizenship can also justify a 
                                                
117 One might argue that individuals just assign irrationally high exchange values to their 
personal items, and that this should not imply that a completely different order of values 
is at work, or at least, that this fact about the way people value items with personal 
significance should not be reflected in political institutions. Perhaps, political institutions 
ought to reflect only exchange value because it can be objectively determined, whereas 
the non-fungible value attached to ownership of a personal item will always remain 
arbitrary and subjective. 
118 Murphy and Nagel 2002. 
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basic liberty to own some items of property. However, Rawls’ view of the social 
conditions that are necessary for citizenship remains informed by the distinction between 
personal and productive property. Individuals need to be secure in the ownership 
(possession, use, and exclusion of others) of the material extensions of their personality, 
for example a house or a wedding ring, in order to develop and maintain a sense of 
themselves individuals.119 On this view, the incidents of ownership that count as basic 
liberties only extend to those objects in which one’s interests are directly tied to one’s 
identity, and does not obviously extend to one’s market interest in the exchange value of 
those items.  
This second account is vulnerable to a similar sort of criticism as the first. In order 
for other conceptions to share the same view what incidents of ownership count as basic 
liberties as justice as fairness, all conceptions share the same view of the social 
conditions that realize the social role of the free and equal citizen. To clarify, Rawls’ 
political constructivism derives the scheme of basic liberties from the social conditions 
necessary to realize the idea of the person as citizen. Whether a conception of justice can 
be elaborated in terms of this idea of the person establishes that it is a form of political, 
rather than comprehensive, liberalism. A key part of this elaboration is the identification 
of basic liberties by reference to the idea of free and equal citizen, rather than through 
reference to a broader set of moral facts. But the social role of the citizen can be 
interpreted in ways that make ownership of property central feature of the idea of free 
and equal citizen. Perhaps an individual’s ability to develop a sufficiently detailed sense 
                                                
119 Presumably, all forms of political liberalism share this feature with justice as fairness. 
The political conception of the person grounds the political constructivism whose 
outcome is justice as fairness and the other forms of political liberalism.  
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of the good life requires a robust set of constitutionally guaranteed liberties of ownership 
and contract.120 There is little reason to think that all conceptions in the family converge 
on the same view of the relation of liberties to own property and the role of citizens. 
Rawls presents the particular scheme of basic liberties presented alongside justice 
as fairness in terms of both these accounts. The idea that all conceptions in the family 
share this scheme of basic liberties seems to imply that all conceptions would endorse 
either the personality theory of property expressed in the distinction between personal 
and private property, or Rawls’ interpretation of the social conditions necessary to realize 
the role of the free and equal citizen. But the sources of disagreement that generate the 
burdens of judgment weigh heavily against assumption. Recognizing the consequences of 
the burdens of judgment seems to undermine the idea that the list of basic liberties of 
justice as fairness provides a paradigm whose content other conceptions in the family 
share. 
A third account of why reasonable conceptions might converge in support of 
justice as fairness’ view of the basic liberties of property is suggested by Lecture IV of 
Political Liberalism. In that lecture, Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus is 
possible only on the basis of a prior consensus on which political liberties and procedures 
must be protected in order to enable an ongoing democratic political order.121 It is not 
entirely clear what the basis of such a consensus would be. On the one hand, Rawls 
strongly suggests that liberal political forms may be supported on a more or less 
pragmatic basis. In a closely divided pluralistic society, only the protections offered by a 
                                                
120 See Tomasi 2012. 
121 This consensus includes familiar liberal protections for the rights of the minority as 
well as majoritarian political procedures. 
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liberal constitution can minimize the risk of the oppressive use of political power. On the 
other hand, some comprehensive doctrines may place a high value on social cooperation 
and civil peace, and may support liberal forms of government insofar as they achieve 
those moral values though they may fall short of justice in other ways. Finally, liberal 
comprehensive doctrines will support liberal constitutional forms as expressions of the 
requirements of justice. The core feature of a constitutional consensus is that individuals 
in a pluralistic society without a shared basis for endorsing political basic liberties, 
nevertheless find that they have converging moral and non-moral reasons to support the 
political basic liberties. The question here is whether the converging reasons that citizens 
have for constitutionally entrenching the protection of political basic liberties can be 
extended to support a similar level of protection for liberties to own, acquire, and dispose 
of property. 
As shown earlier, justice as fairness justifies the constitutional protection for the 
ownership of ‘personal property’ insofar as protecting some of the incidents of ‘personal 
property’ supports the development of the moral capacities of citizenship. Rawls’ 
justification for this claim draws on a moralized conception of citizenship that is not 
necessarily shared by reasonable citizens who may nevertheless have moral and/or 
pragmatic reasons to support the constitutional protection of political basic liberties and 
democratic procedures. This moralized idea of citizenship provides the shared grounds 
for the explication of political conceptions of justice, but a constitutional consensus is not 
necessarily grounded on any shared moral ideas. The idea a constitutional consensus 
implies that even in the absence of shared moral commitments, it is possible for 
reasonable citizens to have converging reasons to endorse political guarantees of a liberal 
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constitution. Whether all the reasons supporting these political protections are ultimately 
drawn from any principle of justice is unlikely, as Rawls ultimately came to realize.  
Converging support for the constitutional protection of the political basic liberties 
plausibly extends to support for some constitutional protections for liberties to own and 
dispose of property. Protections for liberties of conscience will not be of much value to 
citizens, if citizens do not have the liberty to exclude other individuals from physical 
spaces (houses or churches), items, and records of communications that those citizens are 
also at liberty to occupy and use. The idea that ownership of physical objects and spaces 
must be given some protection in order to fully realize the protection of the liberties of 
conscience is sufficient to conclude that a constitutional consensus includes at least some 
protection for liberties of ownership and property. Justice as fairness provides a plausible 
index for which incidents of ownership are most likely to be covered by such an 
extension. If I am correct, conceptions in the family that reject the personality theory of 
property and Rawls’ interpretation of the social conditions required by the idea of 
citizenship support the same minimal constitutional protections for ownership and 
property as justice as fairness on the basis of the likely content of a constitutional 
consensus.122  
 My analysis suggests that political conceptions overlap on one set of political 
liberties and that an important range of incidents of property will be protected by 
extension, namely those needed to secure spaces and objects necessary for the exercise of 
                                                
122 This is no trivial consequence, since the threshold of minimal protection for property 
cannot be met by purely conventionalist views of property, like that expressed by Nagel 
and Murphy. Such views argue that since all property rights are generated by the state, 
that the state can legitimately regulate or limit them in any way it deems fit. This view 
does not  
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political liberties and liberties of conscience. The importance of other incidents of 
property may remain an issue on which conceptions in the family differ. Some 
conceptions may give much more weight to commercial and productive ownership than 
justice as fairness, perhaps holding that a broad range of economic liberties deserve 
constitutional protection.123 Nevertheless, based on a shared commitment to protecting 
political basic liberties, it is safe to suppose that all conceptions in the family are 
committed to constitutional protections for at least those incidents of property picked out 
by the first principle of justice as fairness. 
Citizens’ agreement on the political basic liberties may establish a minimum level 
of protection for property that all conceptions in the family must meet. With few 
exceptions, however, liberal views of property do not fall below the threshold set by the 
list of basic liberties presented alongside justice as fairness.124 Consequently agreement 
on the set of political basic liberties does not give sufficient reason to rule out any of the 
three general types of liberal views of property mentioned above from being expressed by 
some conception in the family.  
All three views fall within the range of views of property expressed by some 
conception in the family only if all three views of property fall within the upper bound of 
the range. Since all conceptions in the family specify the third condition of generalized 
liberalism mentioned earlier, all conceptions support some principle that guarantees each 
                                                
123 Whether some conceptions in the family hold that a wider range of protections for 
property are warranted, does not imply that those protections are constitutionally 
essential. 
124 A notable exception would be the conventionalist view defended by Thomas Nagel 
and Liam Murphy in Murphy and Nagel 2002. This is a clear example of a liberal view 
that rejects the very idea that property is a basic liberty. Such a view would fail to support 




citizen “adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their basic liberties and 
opportunities” through the basic structure.125 Call this third condition the social minimum 
condition. Below I explain how the social minimum condition establishes an upper bound 
on the range of views of property expressed by conceptions in the family. 
In order to fall within the range of bare reasonability defined by the conditions of 
generalized liberalism, conceptions of justice must be consistent with the institutional 
implications of the social minimum condition. This means that no specification of 
generalized liberalism can endorse either of the following claims: (a) the only legitimate 
role for the basic structure is the protection of the basic constitutional liberties, or (b) 
taxation is only legitimate for the production of public goods construed in a very narrow 
sense.126 In order to satisfy the social minimum condition, conceptions of justice must 
support the existence of a scheme of redistributive taxation, given realistic assumptions 
about institutional design.127 In general, a conception of justice that prohibits any 
restriction of economic liberties and property through redistributive taxation cannot fully 
specify the conditions of generalized liberalism, and for that reason would fall outside the 
boundaries of bare reasonability that derived from the idea of generalized liberalism. 
                                                
125 See Rawls 2005, p 223 
126 The narrow construal of public goods I have in mind is the one that corresponds to the 
legitimate aims of a Nozikian minimal state which exclude taxation to support 
redistributive institutions. 
127 One must keep in mind that the minimum threshold protection of property is 
consistent with the possibility that some member of the family of freestanding 
conceptions support a high degree of protection for the liberties of private property for 
reasons other than those of basic liberty (efficiency for example). This threshold criteria is 
consistent with the possibility that a libertarian-type principles of property rights could be 
justified by reasons drawn from the family of freestanding conceptions. What is crucial is 
that whether the threshold is preempts the possibility that any member of the family of 
freestanding conceptions protect private property from any redistributive taxation.  
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128Libertarian views of property are characteristically committed to both (a) and (b). 
There is no way that I can see to maintain a strong commitment to (a) and (b) without 
also rejecting the primary institutional implication of the social minimum condition, i.e. 
the existence of a scheme of redistributive taxation.  
Even without any specification, the social minimum condition provides sufficient 
reason to think that libertarian views of property fall outside the range of reasonable 
conceptions of justice. Closer investigation of what counts as an “adequate” level of 
resources may be able to ground a more precise account of the degree of redistributive 
taxation that all conceptions must be capable of supporting. In any case, some account of 
the minimal degree of redistributive taxation that reasonable conceptions support is 
necessary to achieve a clear view of the upper limit of the range of views of property that 
conceptions in the family can express. An account of this limit is necessary to determine 
whether conceptions in the family are free to express classical liberal and high liberal 
views of property. Unfortunately, Rawls provides two conflicting interpretations of the 
level of (as well as what kinds of) resources that is necessary to secure an “adequate” 
social minimum for each citizen. For this reason, it is unclear whether conceptions in the 
family express classical liberal and high liberal views of property, or only high liberal 
views. This ambiguity is significant because it effects whether the content of public 
reason can accurately characterized as an extension of the egalitarian commitments of the 
                                                
128 The significance of this implication is that they clarify Rawls’ somewhat obscure 
rejection of libertarian conceptions of justice. On the one hand, such conceptions often 
rest on metaphysical ideas of self-ownership, and so are insufficiently political. But even 
if this obstacle could be overcome (perhaps if the idea of self-ownership could be 
interpreted in terms of political values), the social minimum condition provides the idea 
that the degree of protection for property supported by libertarianism could satisfy the 




early Rawls or represents a break or retreat from those commitments as many have 
argued. The next section takes up these questions in more detail. 
 
4 The Requirements of the Social Minimum Condition. 
 
The previous analysis shows that that libertarian principles of property fall outside 
the range of reasonable accounts of property established derived from the idea of 
generalized liberalism. It remains to be seen whether both classical liberal and high 
liberal accounts of property fall within this range. The analysis below assumes that 
specifications of generalized liberalism cannot preclude the possibility of redistributive 
taxation, since this is a necessary means of securing an ‘adequate social minimum’. 
Specifications of generalized liberalism must provide some support for restricting 
economic liberty through redistributive taxation, in order to guarantee that each citizen 
has access to a minimum level of resources.129  
The idea of an adequate social minimum is subject to a several plausible 
interpretations. Different interpretations are likely to hold that the social minimum 
condition requires that citizens be guaranteed different levels of resources. More 
egalitarian interpretations will obviously guarantee a much higher level of resources to 
each citizen than others. Egalitarian interpretations will therefore require a greater degree 
of redistributive taxation. High liberal views of property may be consistent with such an 
egalitarian interpretation, since they hold that most incidents of property are not basic 
                                                
129 It seems uncontroversial to say that the minimum level of resources required to satisfy 
the social minimum condition will correlate with a minimum degree of restriction for 
economic liberty through redistributive taxation.  
 
 86 
liberites, and therefore can be restricted for gains in equality or general welfare. By 
contrast, classical liberal views hold that most incidents of property are basic liberties and 
deserve a high level of protection, whether through legislation or constitutional 
entrenchment.130 Classical liberal views therefore support a (significantly) smaller degree 
of redistributive taxation than high liberal views. 
Determining whether these two views of ownership and property are both 
consistent with the social minimum condition requires a clearer picture of the line 
between a reasonable and an unreasonable social minimum. Which views of property are 
consistent with the idea of generalized liberalism depends on the level of resources 
required by the least demanding, yet still reasonable, interpretation of the social 
minimum condition.  
A clear view of the requirements of the social minimum condition is important, 
since the content of the family of liberal views will remain unclear as long as the 
requirements of the social minimum condition remain vague and unanalyzed. Without 
some clarity about which conceptions of belong to the family, citizens will be unable to 
recognize when other citizens satisfy their obligation to use public reason. Such mutual 
recognition is necessary for public reasoning to be a means of mutual assurance that 
motivates public reasons liberalism in the first place. If, as I have shown, Rawls’ mature 
view of public reason rests on the idea of a family of political conceptions that specify the 
abstract features of generalized liberalism, a full account of citizens’ obligation to use 
                                                
130 There is some reason to think that classical liberals might reject a distinction between 
‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ liberties to property, so I avoid the use of this distinction to 
describe the view. Freeman argues that the fact that many classical liberals support some 
restriction of these liberties to provide a social minimum shows that they do not really 
hold that liberties to property are ‘basic’ in the robust sense that Rawls uses the idea of 
‘basic liberty.’ See Freeman 2011  
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public reason is possible only if the boundaries of reasonable interpretation of those 
features can be established well enough to determine which of the three liberal views of 
property belong within the family.  
Remaining within the model of Rawls’ account of public reason, there are two 
strategies one could use to determine the requirements of the social minimum condition. 
The first strategy would be to develop an idea of the least demanding set of resources 
required by the social minimum condition by working backwards from the paradigm 
provided by justice as fairness. The second strategy would be to examine one of the other 
descriptions of the common features of the family of reasonable conceptions of justice to 
see whether those accounts provide any indication of the requirements of the social 
minimum condition.  
The first strategy is unlikely to provide much clarity about the least demanding, 
yet still reasonable, interpretation of the social minimum condition, since the social 
minimum supported by justice as fairness is both (a) complex, insofar as it involves a 
number distinct principles and types of resources, and (b) quite a bit more demanding 
than could be expected of the least demanding interpretation of the social minimum 
condition. So for instance, justice as fairness requires the basic structure to provide each 
citizen with fair equality of opportunity. This guarantee is logically independent of any 
consideration of what level of income and wealth each citizen should be guaranteed, if 
any at all. Fair (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity means more than the 
absence of legal obstacles. It requires that citizens have access to an expansive set of 
educational and employment training resources (possibly on an ongoing basis) so that 
each is able to participate as an equal in the market for labor and also in public 
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deliberation about the common good. These educational and training resources should 
certainly count as part of the social minimum required by justice as fairness, even though 
they are unconnected to a guaranteed level of income and wealth. Does the least 
demanding interpretation of the social minimum condition require such a generous 
provision of educational resources to all citizens? If so, the range of liberal views of 
justice that could satisfy its requirements is implausibly narrow. Justice as fairness, in 
other words, supports a social minimum that is too far above a plausible threshold 
between reasonable and unreasonable interpretations of the social minimum condition, 
and includes too wide a range of resources to provide clear view of the minimal 
requirements of the social minimum condition.  
The second strategy appears slightly more promising than the first. Passages in 
which Rawls links reasonable conceptions of justice to the criterion of reciprocity provide 
some indication of the conceptions that Rawls thought could satisfy the requirements of 
the social minimum condition. The main problem revealed in my analysis of these 
passages is that they do not yield a consistent view of what these requirements might be. 
The passages examined below suggest on the one hand that a robust set of social 
democratic institutions is required to satisfy the social minimum condition. On the other 
hand, they suggest that a guaranteed basic income satisfying a rather meager 
sufficientarian standard might also satisfy the social minimum condition. Ultimately, the 
analysis of these passages shows that Rawls did not fully resolve the tensions within his 
mature views about the basis of public reason. 
In order to reveal the tensions within Rawls’ mature view of public reason, and to 
further examine the requirements of the social minimum condition of generalized 
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liberalism, I turn to Rawls claim that reasonable conceptions of justice satisfy the 
criterion of reciprocity. The criterion of reciprocity provides an account of reasonable 
conceptions of justice that is more fundamental than the conditions of generalized 
liberalism.131 The criterion requires that the principles and ideals contained in reasonable 
conceptions of justice must support only constitutional institutions that all individuals can 
accept in their capacity reasonable citizens, rather than as “dominated, manipulated, or 
under the pressure of an inferior social or political position.”132 Conceptions of justice 
belong to family of conceptions based on whether they only support constitutional 
institutions that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.133 The criterion of reciprocity also 
applies at a second level to limit the laws and policies that may be pursued within a 
constitutional framework that satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. The application of the 
criterion of reciprocity to matters of legislation and policy does not seem to be a strict 
requirement of the minimal reasonability of a conception of justice.  
On my reading, the criterion of reciprocity limits the content of the family of 
conceptions by identifying a set of core liberal constitutional institutions. Applying the 
                                                
131 This characterization is parallel to the three necessary conditions that characterize the 
family of freestanding conceptions in terms of a generalized liberalism. There is an 
obvious tension that arises from characterizing the family of freestanding conceptions in 
two ways. Rawls does not sufficiently clarify how the two characterizations are related, 
though he sometimes indicates that generalized liberalism derives from the criterion of 
reciprocity. I do not attempt to investigate this question here. For an analysis that 
suggests that the conditions generalized liberalism derive from the criterion of 
reciprocity, see Langvatn 2016. 
132 See Rawls 2005 p xliv. The criterion of reciprocity bears a close resemblance to 
Scanlon’s principle of reasonable rejectability, and other formulations of the basic 
contractualist principle. 
133 Rawls says the criterion of reciprocity claims “our exercise of political power is 
proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action 
may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions” and that 
“Political conceptions to be reasonable must justify only constitutions that satisfy this 
principle.” Rawls 2005 p xlvi.  
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criterion of reciprocity to the questions of basic political order identifies the institutions 
that all reasonable citizens can accept without being dominated or coerced. These 
features are what Rawls elsewhere calls “constitutional essentials”. The criterion of 
reciprocity identifies the liberal institutions that provide the content for the constitutional 
consensus that prefigures an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions of justice, 
for example, individual rights protections and democratic political procedures. Assuming 
with Rawls that a social minimum is an essential feature of liberal constitutions, closer 
analysis of the criterion of reciprocity may reveal what guaranteed level of resources 
provides a threshold that all reasonable conceptions of justice must meet. 
To summarize a bit, the criterion of reciprocity requires conceptions in the family 
to support only constitutional arrangements that (a) provide some guarantee that each 
citizen will not fall below a certain level of resources, and (b) protect that guarantee from 
being revoked by normal legislative (majoritarian) procedures. It would be unreasonable 
either to propose or accept a constitutional arrangement that did not achieve both of these 
ends. The particular level (and kind) of resources that must be guaranteed by every 
constitutional arrangement satisfying the criterion of reciprocity can therefore serve as a 
threshold that no reasonable interpretation of the social minimum can fall below. 
However, as I show below, Rawls held conflicting views about the level and kind of 
resources that must be given constitutional protection according to the criterion of 
reciprocity.  
In one passage from the “Introduction to the Paperback Edition of Political 
Liberalism”, Rawls claims that a conception of justice that “substitutes for the difference 
principle, a principle to improve well-being subject to a constraint guaranteeing for 
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everyone a sufficient level of adequate all-purpose means” satisfies the criterion of 
reciprocity.134 Rawls elsewhere calls this conception the principle of restricted utility.135 
Such a social minimum would aim to provide a level of resources to “permit [citizens] to 
lead a decent human life, and to meet what in [their] society is seen as citizens’ essential 
needs.”136 If “essential needs” is construed narrowly in terms of food, clothing, and 
shelter, this kind of social minimum could be provided for through a basic income 
guarantee. This passage suggests that the criterion of reciprocity may only require a 
constitution to guarantee a basic income to each citizen that is sufficient to keep them 
from suffering from the direst forms of material poverty and nothing more.137 It is not 
hard to find classical liberal accounts of property that support publicly providing such a 
social minimum. Providing cash transfers to needy individuals at the level imagined not 
need impose significant restrictions on liberties of private ownership or property. 
The passage cited above indicates that Rawls believed that a guaranteed basic 
income sufficient to meet a set of very basic human needs meets whatever minimal level 
of resources is required to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Elsewhere, however, Rawls 
strongly criticizes the social minimum guaranteed by the principle of restricted utility. In 
Justice as Fairness: Revisited for instance, Rawls argues that the sufficientarian social 
minimum associated with the principle of restricted utility cannot prevent the worst-off 
citizens from becoming deeply alienated from the social and political system. Preventing 
                                                
134 See Rawls 2005 p xlix; Strictly speaking, he claims that the principle of restricted 
utility satisfies the three defining criterion. I see no reason not to draw the implication 
that the principle of restricted utility satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. 
135 See §38 in Rawls and Kelly 2001. 
136 Ibid p 128 
137 Even though elsewhere Rawls expresses deep skepticism that this standard satisfies 
the requirements of justice.  
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the worst-off citizens from falling into the direst forms of material poverty may keep 
them from violently rebelling against the social system, but it cannot prevent them from 
“grow[ing] distant from political society, and retreat[ing] into [their] social world.”138 A 
social minimum that is sufficient to protect citizens against the most pressing kinds of 
humanitarian need may still be insufficient to prevent the worst-off citizens from 
developing into a permanent lower-class. He argues that a social minimum that does not 
aim to prevent the development of a permanent lower-class and their alienation from the 
social system cannot be reasonably accepted by all citizens. This implies that the social 
minimum of the principle of restricted utility cannot satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. 
This criticism of the principle of restricted utility seems to be reflected in a 
passage in The Law of Peoples in which Rawls argues that the “the criterion of 
reciprocity… requires a basic structure that prevents social and economic inequalities 
from becoming excessive [emphasis added].”139 It is not clear from the passage how 
‘excessive’ inequality is to be measured, nor what precise range of goods this claim 
concerns. A list of five institutions Rawls cities as necessary means of preventing 
“excessive and unreasonable” inequalities indicates, at least, that the range of goods in 
question is wider than income and wealth. These institutions are: (a) equal access to 
educational and employment opportunities, (b) institutions to guarantee a “decent 
distribution of income and wealth”, (c) public institutions that guarantee employment, (d) 
institutions providing basic health care to all citizens, (e) public financing for elections 
and sources of public information.140 This list suggests that a conception of justice 
                                                
138 See Dworkin 2000 p 128 
139 See Rawls 1999b p 49 
140 Ibid p 50 
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satisfies the requirements of reciprocity only if it supports specific institutions that limit 
unequal distribution of income, wealth, educational opportunities, stable employment, 
health care, and access to the political process.  
Excessively unequal distribution of any of these goods is not necessarily 
objectionable from the sufficientarian standpoint adopted by the principle of restricted 
utility. Sufficientarian principles aim to guarantee a baseline level of resources to all 
citizens, but they do not require that those resources be distributed equally, or even that 
access to any of these goods beyond some minimal level be distributed equally. Even so, 
many of the institutions above could be justified in terms of a sufficientarian principle 
using humanitarian need as the baseline. Most obviously a sufficientarian social 
minimum could justify the main redistributive institutions falling under (b) and (d). 
Sufficientarian principles also seem capable of justifying at least the central features of 
the educational institutions falling under (a), since only an extremely narrow definition of 
basic humanitarian need would not justify providing some baseline educational resources 
to all citizens.141  
But even if a sufficientarian principle using a modestly inclusive idea of 
humanitarian need could justify the central features of (a), (b), and (d), it is difficult to 
see how a sufficientarian principle could justify the institutions implied by (c) and (e). 
These institutions have no clear relation to the underlying concern with insuring citizens 
against material poverty that motivates sufficientarianism. These institutions are better 
                                                
141 In general, sufficientarianism aims to secure citizens against a level of material 
poverty that impairs basic human functioning. Sufficientarianism requires the provision 
of educational resources and opportunities only insofar as some level of cultural 
knowledge is necessary to achieve the level of functioning that is minimally sufficient for 
a decent human life. 
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understood as preventing or minimizing the development of attitudes of alienation among 
those citizens who are least advantaged by the social system. Rawls’ critique of social-
welfare capitalism is based on the fact that social-welfare programs, even where 
sufficient to satisfy citizens’ most basic humanitarian needs, often fail to provide the 
worst-off citizens with sufficient resources to secure the social bases of self-respect, 
which leads to social alienation.  
For example, periods of unemployment subject citizens to material insecurity. 
From a sufficientarian standpoint, this is the only morally salient feature of 
unemployment. However, by depriving individuals of a role in the productive system, 
periods of unemployment also deprive individuals of an important source of self-respect. 
Long-term periods of unemployment can lead citizens to develop a belief that the social 
system does not need or value their cooperation. The institutional requirements of (c) do 
not merely compensate individuals for periods of unemployment, but actually guarantee 
them productive employment through the political structure. The goal of protecting 
citizens from falling into material poverty as a result of unemployment does not seem to 
justify (c), since simple cash transfers could accomplish that goal just as well. A better 
justification of (c) is provided by the goal of securing each citizen equal access to an 
important basis of self-respect found in productive employment. Citizens who are 
gainfully employed by the social system see their talents, skills, and willingness to work 
rewarded by the social system. Gainful employment undermines the development of 
attitudes (such as despair, hopelessness, worthlessness) that contribute to a sense of 
alienation from the social system. 
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Similarly, if the political process is not sufficiently isolated from sources of 
private power, like income, wealth, and social class, the outcomes of the process will 
inevitably reflect the interests of the better-off classes. Excessively unequal influence 
over the outcomes of political processes may promote the belief that the political process 
itself is tilted to protect the interests of the better-off classes, and citizens in the lower 
class may see no point in participating in public deliberation at all. They may ultimately 
come to privately reject the legitimacy of the political process, though given enough 
material security, they may not try to violently overthrow the political structure. To this 
end, public funding for elections and independent sources of information about public 
affairs is a necessary (if not sufficient) measure for ensuring that the political process is 
not captured by those with greater private power.142 But lack of influence over the 
political process is not a direct concern of sufficientarian principles, since influence over 
the political process is not a resource that citizens directly need to satisfy their basic 
humanitarian needs.  
If reciprocity requires that conceptions of justice support a social minimum that is 
generous enough to prevent the development of marginalized social classes, it seems 
likely that a basic income guarantee sufficient to provide for citizens’ basic material 
needs may not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity after all. The main problem is that a 
basic income guarantee that uses a narrow idea of ‘humanitarian need’ as the measure of 
guaranteed income may not be sufficient to prevent the development of a large underclass 
of socially and economically alienated citizens. 
                                                
142 The capture of the political process by private power is a central concern for Rawls. 
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This section began with the observation that the specification of generalized 
liberalism must support an “adequate” social minimum, but that the idea of an “adequate” 
social minimum can be interpreted in a number of different ways. A clearer idea of what 
counts as the least demanding, yet still reasonable, interpretation of an “adequate” social 
minimum is necessary to determine whether classical liberal and high liberal views of 
property are consistent with social minimum condition. By examining passages in which 
Rawls explains the criterion of reciprocity, I developed two conflicting interpretations of 
what counts as an “adequate” social minimum. On the one hand, Rawls suggests that a 
basic income guarantee at a level sufficient to meet a very basic set of humanitarian 
needs satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. Members of the family of conceptions of 
justice must support a constitutionally guaranteed social minimum providing citizens 
with at least this level of resources. On the other hand, he also seems to indicate that the 
criterion of reciprocity requires a social minimum that guarantees a wide range of 
resources apart from income, and that a conception must support a number of specific 
institutions that work to prevent “excessive” inequalities of income and other resources.  
It is my view that classical liberal views of property are generally consistent with 
the first interpretation but not the second. A redistributive tax scheme providing a 
guaranteed basic income is envisioned, in various forms, by many classical liberal 
theorists. Such a scheme could exist without imposing significant restrictions on private 
liberties of property and ownership. By contrast, if political conceptions satisfy the 
criterion of reciprocity only if they support a broad range of institutions that aim to 
minimize the social and economic alienation of citizens, such conceptions will need to 
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restrict the private liberties to own property in ways that classical liberal views are 
unlikely to support.143  
Ultimately, Rawls’ is not of one mind about the requirements of the social 
minimum condition. Consequently, there is no conclusive answer as to whether Rawls 
thought that an overlapping consensus on a family of conceptions of justice included 
classical liberal views about property. Conversely, there is no conclusive reason to 
suppose that the ideal of public reason can be realized on in the institutional contexts of 




 I have argued that the FOC view of overlapping consensus requires a reappraisal 
of the idea of public reason. Most interpretations of the FOC view in the literature 
suggest that the view implies that reasonable citizens reach a consensus about justice at a 
more abstract level than a conception of justice. On these interpretations, citizens endorse 
either the fundamental ideas of political liberalism, or a general account of liberal justice 
expressed by three conditions. Even if these interpretations are correct, the literature 
leaves largely unaddressed the problem of how the boundaries of the family are to be 
established. Identifying public reasons by reference to a family of liberal political 
conceptions of justice, rather than through a single conception that gains the consensus of 
all reasonable citizens, appears to require that citizens broadly agree on what counts as a 
                                                
143 For instance the transfer of wealth between generations is thought be many to be 
source of unjust social inequality. A tax on wealth transfers between generations may do 
something to remedy the injustice, but it would arguably come at the cost of limiting the 
scope of private authority over property. 
 
 98 
barely reasonable conception of justice. If a consensus on the abstract features of all 
political conceptions of justice does yield criteria sufficient to distinguish barely 
reasonable from unreasonable conceptions of justice, then the FOC view seems unable 
to ground a meaningful distinction between public and non-public reasons. 
To illustrate this problem, I focused on the justification of different institutions of 
property and redistributive taxation through public reasons. If an overlapping consensus 
on a family of liberal political conceptions of justice is broad enough to include 
conceptions of justice that express libertarian, classical liberal, and high liberal views of 
property rights, then just about any degree of protection for property, or conversely, any 
amount of redistributive taxation, can be supported by public reasons. This would make 
the idea of justification by public reason empty, at least with regard to the relation 
between institutions of property and redistributive taxation. This chapter develops an 
account of how Rawls may have approached defining the range of liberal views of 
property that conceptions in the family may express. I develop an account of the 
boundaries of this range by examining the main constitutional institutions that Rawls 
believed that all conceptions in the family would support. On one end of the range, the 
political basic liberties that all conceptions in the family support include a narrow set of 
liberties to property. This establishes a threshold that all conceptions in the family must 
support. On the other end, a constitutionally guaranteed social minimum implies a set of 
restrictions on liberties to property that all conceptions in the family must also support. 
The views of property that members in the family can express fall within a range 
established by the institutional protections implied by the political basic liberties and the 
institutional restrictions required by the guarantee of a social minimum. Ultimately, this 
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account supports the claim that no conception in the family expresses a libertarian view 
of property, but that the textual evidence supports conflicting views about whether any 
conception in the family expresses a classical liberal view of property.144  
A constitutional consensus is limited to the “right to vote and freedom of political 
speech and association, and whatever else is required for the electoral and legislative 
procedures of democracy”.145 These political liberties provide a kernel that conceptions in 
the family have in common. I argued that it is plausible that the scope of these political 
basic liberties and a commitment to rule of law covers some incidents of property as 
well.146 Some degree of constitutional protection for property is therefore a common 
commitment of all conceptions that belong to an overlapping consensus.147 The idea of a 
constitutional consensus provides a way to describe a threshold level of constitutional 
protection for property for all conceptions in the family. Conceptions belonging to the 
family can therefore be expected to hold that incidents of property directly connected to 
the protection of political rights and liberties are beyond the scope of revision or 
restriction through normal (majoritarian) legislation. The protections for property that are 
implied by the idea of a consensus on political basic liberties establish a threshold for the 
                                                
144 This assumes that it is obvious that some member(s) of the family express high liberal 
views of property, typical of conceptions like justice as fairness. 
145 Rawls 2005 p 159 
146 One could argue that the freedom of association is empty without at least the right to 
exclude others from a private residence. Further, some protection of personal property 
(one’s house and personal items) is connected to due process rights and guarantee of the 
rule of law, both of which plausibly fall under the other requirements of the “electoral 
and legislative procedures of democracy”. 
147 The constitutional protection of property that can be derived from the idea of a 
constitutional consensus is not expansive. I argued that constitutional protection of 
“personal property” connected to justice as fairness provides a plausible account of the 
degree of protection for property that follows from a consensus limited to democratic 
political rights and procedures. 
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range of views of property that can be expressed by conceptions belonging to the family. 
All views of property that are expressed by the conceptions in the family must support at 
least the constitutional protections for property that is entailed by the protection of the 
political basic liberties. 
I argued that justice as fairness provides a plausible model for identifying the 
incidents of property that need to be protected in order to secure democratic political 
rights and procedures. The incidents falling under what Rawls calls ‘personal property’ 
can be seen as implications of the constitutional protection for political association and 
speech, and the idea of due process under the rule of law. Using justice as fairness as a 
model in this way does not imply that other conceptions necessarily endorse the 
personality theory of property, nor the thick moralized interpretation of citizenship that 
Rawls deploys to argue that basic liberty only extends to protect a narrow set of incidents 
of property. The point is rather that the incidents categorized as ‘personal property’ are 
arguably necessary for liberal democratic political procedures in a way that economic 
rights and liberties that might also be connected to property are not.148 
In any case, the constitutional protections for property that can be derived from 
the idea of a constitutional consensus are not expansive and fall far short of the level of 
protection envisioned by classical liberal and libertarian views of property. Though these 
views can support the minimal degree of protection for property that seems necessary to 
secure democratic political procedures, they also support a much broader range of strong 
institutional protections for property. In other words, all three types of views of property 
                                                




considered do not fall below the threshold for reasonable views of property expressed by 
conceptions in the family that can be derived from the idea of a constitutional consensus. 
I argued that analysis of the principle of reciprocity might indicate where to find 
maximum end of the range. Rawls claims that constitutions satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity only if they contain some provision guaranteeing each citizen a minimum 
level of resources. This condition cannot be met by libertarian views of property that 
reject the very possibility of redistributive taxation. If institutional protections for 
property express the absolute (or near absolute) value given them by libertarian 
conceptions, then the possibility of redistributive taxation is severely undermined, if not 
made entirely impossible. I argued that this is sufficient to show that libertarian views 
would definitely fall outside the range of views of property that defines membership in 
the family of conceptions. 
Whether the two remaining liberal views of property fall within the range defined 
by the implications of a constitutional consensus and the criterion of reciprocity can only 
be completely determined given a more precise account of the lowest level of resources 
that satisfies the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity. I showed that Rawls adopts 
conflicting accounts of the level (and types) of resources needed to satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity. As a consequence, a strictly interpretive approach seems unable to support 
any general conclusion about whether Rawls’ preferred economic forms are uniquely 
supported by the content of public reason, or whether economic forms that he explicitly 
rejects, such as welfare-state capitalism, and laissez-faire capitalism, might also be 
supported by public reasons. Whether this ambiguity is an acceptable consequence for a 
theory of public reason is open to question. It certainly runs contrary to the assumptions 
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that public reason expresses a slightly more rarified commitment to a Rawlsian 
perspective on distributive justice. 
  The conclusions of this chapter indicate the need to go beyond the limitations of 
trying to interpret Rawls in order to support the claim that institutions supported by 
public reasons will express some meaningful egalitarian distributive values. In the next 
chapter I will examine one way in which the underlying values of the idea of public 
reason might provide some support for the claim that classical liberal accounts of 




















 The Audience of Public Reason 
 
The previous chapter argued that Rawls’ mature account of public reason is 
unable to provide a clear answer to whether conventions that extend strong protections 
for private property rights can be supported by public reasons. The problem arises 
because the two methods of identifying public reasons that characterize Rawls’ mature 
view do not clearly rule out the possibility that at least some classical liberal conceptions 
of justice belong to public reason. 
The argument rested on four claims. First, Rawls’ mature view of public reasons 
holds that the criteria for identifying public reasons is provided by the idea of an 
overlapping consensus on a family of political conceptions.149 Second, each conception in 
this family satisfies the criterion of reciprocity and specifies the three conditions of 
generalized liberalism, in addition to being grounded in political values. Third, strong 
protection for extensive private property rights is supported by public reasons if there is 
at least one classical liberal conception of justice that jointly satisfies these two criteria, 
and at least some citizens sincerely believe that conception to be the most reasonable 
conception in the family.  
Fourth, there are no convincing reasons to hold that a conception combining a significant 
(through not absolute) commitment to protecting extensive private property rights with 
the guarantee that the basic structure protects each citizen against (deep) material poverty 
                                                




does not satisfy the formal conditions of generalized liberalism. Consequently, Rawls 
mature view of public reasons appears to imply that the institutional and distributional 
schemes supported egalitarian-liberalism do not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
public political power determined by the boundaries of public reason. On my analysis, a 
basic structure shaped by classical liberal commitments appears to have an equal claim to 
legitimacy as the more redistributive basic structure preferred by egalitarian-liberals. 
My analysis of the fourth claim led to the conclusion that though classical liberal 
conceptions of justice seem to specify the three principles of generalized liberalism, it is 
unclear whether Rawls believed that such a conception could satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity. The reason for this is that Rawls expresses contradictory views about whether 
sufficientarian distributive principles satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Since it is 
unlikely that a significant commitment to extensive private property rights could be 
combined with a more egalitarian social minimum, there seems to be no definitive answer 
to whether Rawls’ mature view of public reason includes classical liberal conceptions or 
not. 
In order to provide a more satisfactory answer this question, an analysis of the 
criterion of reciprocity is necessary. According to Rawls’ clearest expression of the 
criterion of reciprocity, it requires that “citizens offering [a conception of justice]… 
reasonably think that citizens offered [it] might also reasonably accept [it].”150 The idea 
of reasonable acceptability specifically means that a person’s (hypothetical) acceptance 
of a conception of justice must not depend on her being in an inferior, dominated, or 
marginalized social position. Reciprocity demands that the person making the proposal 
                                                
150 See Rawls 2005 p xlii 
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sincerely believe that the acceptance of her offer is consistent with the status of the other 
as a free and equal citizen. This explains why the paradigm cases of violating the 
criterion of reciprocity are violations of basic rights, like freedom of religion.151 
 A complete and theoretical analysis of the requirements of reciprocity is neither 
desirable nor necessary for the purposes of my argument. It is not desirable because such 
an analysis of reciprocity is open to the criticism that public reason provides an arbitrary 
theoretical excuse for excluding certain views from democratic deliberation. By 
proposing a complete account of the range of acceptable, ‘reasonable’ views, it rightly 
appears that the theorist of public reason is attempting to limit the range of genuine 
outcomes of democratic deliberation to fit her preferred conception of justice. A complete 
theoretical analysis of reciprocity is not necessary because all I aim to show is that a 
hypothetical conception of justice expressing three paradigmatic classical liberal 
commitments is not reasonably acceptable from the standpoint of all reasonable citizens, 
nor given the predictable consequence of institutionalizing it, would it be reasonable to 
believe that all citizens could accept it in the absence of being in an inferior social 
position. 
Specifically, this chapter investigates the following question, could reasonable 
citizens with physical disabilities reasonably accept a classical liberal conception of 
justice whose social minimum took the form of a universal basic income (CL + UBI). 
This hypothetical conception includes three principles. First, the basic structure should 
favor extensive private ownership of resources. Second, the basic structure interfere 
                                                
151 This is most clearly explained in Rawls’ example of Servetus and Calvin. The reasons 
Calvin gives to Servetus justifying his execution are not reasons that are consistent with 
Servetus’ free and equal citizenship. 
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minimally with private contractual agreements. Third, the basic structure should limit is 
redistributive institutions to a single institution, a universal basic income (UBI) set at a 
level that is sufficient to satisfy citizens basic needs.  
I argue that in order for citizens with disabilities to reasonably accept a 
conception of justice as providing fair terms of cooperation, the basic structure implied 
by that conception would need to sufficiently protect their distinct interests in, and needs 
for, employment, mobility, and health care. These three interests, at least, are central to 
realizing social conditions under which citizens with physical disabilities could genuinely 
develop the capacities of citizenship. The protection of these interests would be among 
the necessary social conditions of citizenship for individuals with physical disabilities. If 
these interests are not sufficiently protected by the basic structure, citizens with physical 
disabilities could not reasonably accept such a conception. My analysis shows of the 
hypothetical CL + UBI scheme shows that it will predictably fail to adequately protect 
these interests. Furthermore, my analysis suggests that significant regulation of private 
property rights, aggressive anti-discrimination rules, and rather demanding subsidies for 
health care, is required for any conception of justice to be reasonably acceptable to 
individuals with physical disabilities. While this may not ultimately rule out all classical 
liberal conceptions of justice, my argument provides some reason to think that classical 
liberal conceptions that remain centrally focused on private property, liberty of contract, 
and sufficientarian assistance schemes will find, on reflection, that their views are not 
reasonable or fair from the standpoint of citizens with disabilities, and for that reason fall 





1. Making Citizens with Disabilities Present for Public Reasoning 
 
In the last twenty years, political philosophers have become increasingly aware 
that common ways of theorizing about justice often lead to distorted judgments about the 
injustices faced by individuals with disabilities. Beginning with the publication of 
Amartya Sen’s seminal article “Equality of What”, the idea that primary goods or 
resources provide the best lens through which to identify unjust distributive inequalities 
has come under criticism for ignoring the way in which citizens with disabilities often 
require a greater share of resources to achieve parity of function with other citizens. 
Principles of justice that use a primary goods metric, Rawls’ justice as fairness is an 
example, are unable to provide a principled explanation for why citizens with disabilities 
may deserve a greater share of resources than other citizens as a matter of justice.152 By 
bringing attention to the perspective of citizens with disabilities, Sen and other 
capabilities theorists have argued (convincingly I believe) that a plausible conception of 
distributive justice, even one that rejects equality as a distributive ideal, must be 
responsive to the unique needs and interests of citizens with disabilities.  
More recently, Martha Nussbaum has used the perspective of individuals with 
disabilities to construct a more general objection to the contractualist approach expressed 
in Rawls’ argument for justice as fairness. Nussbaum provides the best example of this 
                                                
152 Martha Nussbaum and other capabilities theorists, for instance, point out that 
standards of distributive justice that focus on the distribution of primary goods and 
resources often fail to account for the different capacities of citizens to use those 
resources. Citizens with disabilities may require more of a given resource to achieve a 
similar level of function. See “Disabilities and the Social Contract” in Nussbaum 2006 pp 
96 - 154; See also, Kittay 2011, 1999 
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kind of criticism, though Eva Kittay has developed a substantially similar criticism in 
early work. Nussbaum points out that Rawls explicitly excludes the perspective of 
citizens with mental and physical disabilities from the procedure that determines which 
principles of justice should regulate the basic structure. Consequently, individuals behind 
the veil of ignorance do not choose principles of justice that reliably protect the non-
standard interests and needs of citizens with disabilities. Further, the distributive principle 
they do choose (specifically the difference principle) cannot be extended in any 
principled way to resolve questions about how the basic structure should relate to citizens 
with disabilities, since this would require a further consideration and agreement on the 
principle of extension. Thus, Rawls’ conception of justice only provides indeterminate 
answers to whether individuals with disabilities raise legitimate claims to unjustly 
treatment when their unique needs and interests are not protected by the basic structure, 
or whether those claims are not claims of justice at all but rather claims to public charity. 
Nussbaum ultimately concludes that contractualist arguments cannot adequately explain 
why citizens with disabilities must be protected from various kinds of inequalities and 
discrimination as matter of basic justice, rather than as a matter of public charity.  
In response to this kind of objection, some have argued that Rawls’ contractualist 
methodology can be modified to include the perspective of individuals with 
disabilities.153 The central idea is that ‘reciprocity’ need not be understood narrowly in 
terms of mutual advantageous cooperation, but can extend to include a broad range of 
pro-social interactions that are not necessarily mutually advantageous in a narrow 
economic sense. Appealing to a wider idea of reciprocity enables contractualists to 
                                                
153 See Stark 2007; and also Becker 2005. 
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represent the perspective of citizens with disabilities (perhaps even severe mental 
impairments) in a way that the idea of reciprocity as mutual advantage cannot. Whether 
this response to the objections developed by Kittay and Nussbaum ultimately proves 
compelling is not necessarily important for my argument. The important point is that 
many followers of Rawls accept the basic claim underlying Nussbaum’s criticism of 
Rawls, specifically the claim that the voice of citizens with disabilities must be allowed a 
role in (modeled) deliberations about justice. 
These debates provide several insights that can be used to specify the idea of the 
threshold of reasonability for conceptions of justice. First, Nussbaum’s criticism of the 
original position seems easily extended to the idea of public reason. The constituency of 
who is owed public reasons certainly includes citizens with disabilities, since they engage 
in most if not all of the cooperative activities and relations that characterize the core 
meaning of citizenship.154 This on its own may not imply that the idealized constituency 
whose overlapping consensus establishes the content of public reason includes citizens 
with disabilities, but I see no reason why individuals with physical disabilities should not 
be part of this constituency. Individuals with physical disabilities are just as capable of 
developing the moral capacities of citizenship as any other individual. It makes sense 
then to presume that if an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens exists, some 
of those citizens will have physical disabilities. I am unsure whether this line of thought 
can be extended to require that individuals with severe mental disabilities be represented 
                                                
154 They work and play, learn, teach, develop friendships, start families and businesses, 
and run for political office, among other things. An exhaustive list of activities that 
characterize citizenship may not be possible, but this list seems to identify many of the 
key activities and relations that would intuitively be found on such a list. All these 
activities are typical of the lives of citizen with disabilities. 
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in the constituency of public reason. Whether such an extension is required, however, 
does not need to be resolved here. All that I aim to show is that several specific 
conclusions about the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity can be drawn by paying 
close attention to the fact that the group of reasonable citizens whose agreement 
constitutes an overlapping consensus will include at least some citizens with physical 
disabilities. These conclusions will prove enough to develop a more specific account the 
threshold of reasonability. 
Second, whether one finds Sen’s criticism of the primary goods metric 
conclusive, or whether one believes that a primary goods metric can in fact accommodate 
Sen’s criticisms, the broader point illustrated by this debate is that standards of 
distributive justice should be sensitive to the unique injustices faced by citizens with 
disabilities. The notion of distributive injustice need not be confined to the idea of unjust 
inequality, which rests on a comparative judgment between individuals. Distributive 
injustice can be characterized in terms of non-comparative principles as well, such as 
sufficiency or priority. The point is that whether distributive justice is thought of in terms 
of equality, sufficiency, or priority, Sen provides compelling reason to think that the that 
the standard of distributive justice cannot be fixed once and for all by reference needs and 
interests of individuals without disabilities. Judgments about just treatment for 
individuals with disabilities should not be left to ad hoc, intuitive extensions of principles 
that are ultimately justified by the needs and interests of non-disabled individuals.  
The criterion of reciprocity states that a conception of justice is fair if and only if 
“citizens offering [it]… reasonably think that citizens offered [it] might also reasonably 
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accept [it].”155 Nussbaum’s inclusivity objection to the original position suggests that 
whether a conception satisfies the criterion of reciprocity should depend, at least in part, 
on whether it is reasonable to believe that citizens with (physical) disabilities might 
“reasonably accept” its terms as fair terms of cooperation. Sen’s criticism of primary 
goods suggests that it is reasonable to believe that citizens with disabilities can 
“reasonably accept” a conception of justice only if it is clear that the conception protects 
the non-standard needs and interests of citizens with (physical) disabilities. These 
conclusions can help to develop a specific account of the requirements of the criterion of 
reciprocity given a plausible account of the non-standard needs and interests of citizens 
with disabilities. The following section develops an account of the non-standards needs 
for access to employment, health, and mobility for individuals with disabilities. Using 
this account, I then examine whether a CL + UBI conception sufficiently protects these 
needs and interests, and find that it fails to do so.  
 
2 Non-Standard Needs and Interests 
In order to specify the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity on the basis of 
the two insights above, I need to identify a set of non-standard needs that individuals with 
physical disabilities have that it would be unreasonable not to provide for through the 
basic structure. The point is not to identify a set of non-standard needs whose protection 
is a matter of basic justice according to a conception of justice that some citizens regard 
as the most reasonable. Rather, the crucial point is to identify a set of non-standard needs 
whose protection any reasonable citizen with a (physical) disability would regard as an 
                                                
155 Rawls 2005 p xlii 
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essential component of a minimally reasonable basic structure. Before attempting to 
characterize this set, I will briefly examine Ronald Dworkin’s well-known method of 
identifying the requirements of basic justice for citizens with disabilities in order to 
illustrate why typical ways of identifying the requirements of justice for citizens with 
disabilities do not provide a plausible basis for specifying the minimal requirements of 
the criterion of reciprocity.  
Dworkin argues that society owes individuals with disabilities additional 
resources because disabilities are a form of “bad brute luck” that prudent individuals 
would insure against, if given the opportunity. His argument rests on a distinction 
between “option luck” and “brute luck” on the one hand, and between “person” and 
“circumstance” on the other. 
The first distinction is between two kinds of risks that may impact, positively or 
negatively, the resources an individual controls. A risk one deliberately undertakes results 
in “option luck”. A risk that is not deliberately undertaken results in “brute luck”. An 
individual whose resources are negatively impacted by the unsuccessful risks she 
deliberately undertakes has no claim to unjust, unfair, or unequal treatment. Society owes 
her no compensation as a consequence of her “bad option luck”. On the other hand, some 
forms of “bad brute luck” give rise to a social obligation to compensate individuals. An 
individual whose resources are negatively impacted by risks that she did not deliberately 
undertake may have a claim to unjust, unfair, or unequal treatment as a result. Whether 
she does depends, in part, on whether individuals would generally find it prudent to 
insure against that risk, if given the opportunity.  
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The distinction between person and circumstance provides a way of 
distinguishing between forms of “bad brute luck” that individuals would generally find it 
prudent to purchase insurance for and those that they would not. An individual’s beliefs 
and attitudes about the good life are aspects of her person. Dworkin argues that even if an 
individual came to regard elements of her person as a form of “bad brute luck” (if for 
instance, she possesses fewer resources because of her strong desire to surf for four hours 
every day, rather than work), few people would think it prudent to purchase insurance 
against the risk of developing a strong preference for surfing. By contrast, individuals 
generally think it is prudent to purchase insurance against the risk that their 
circumstances, by which Dworkin means the mental and physical resources that provide 
the means to live out a conception of the good life, will be a significant negative impact 
the resources they are able to control over their life. Physical disabilities are the central 
example of individual circumstances that it would be prudent to purchase insurance 
against at a market rate. On Dworkin’s view, individuals with disabilities have unique 
needs and interests in virtue of the unequal mental and physical resources they possess as 
a consequence of ‘bad brute luck’ that most people would find it prudent to insure 
against. Ultimately, disabilities correspond to a deficit in resources that can be partially 
ameliorated through a social insurance scheme. 
Whatever the merits of Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance argument are, there are 
two relatively obvious reasons not to use ‘individual circumstances caused by bad brute 
luck’ as the criterion for identifying a set of non-standard interests whose protection 
would provide a standard of minimal reasonability from the standpoint of individuals 
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with disabilities.156 Dwokin’s criterion is both too particular and too comprehensive to 
serve as a basis for clarifying the requirements of reciprocity. 
The criterion is too particular in the sense that it cannot be cleanly separated from 
Dworkin’s broader argument for equality of resources. Dworkin defines ‘disability’ in 
terms of a kind of undeserved inequality of mental and physical resources in order to 
defend the idea that a commitment to equality of resources requires a social responsibility 
to provide additional resources to individuals with mental and physical disabilities. The 
criterion he uses to identify disabilities entails that the primary justice claims that citizens 
with disabilities may raise in regard to the basic structure are claims relating to unjust 
inequalities of resources. This definition proves too narrow, I think, to capture the 
dimension of inequalities of recognition that also seem central to typical claims to unjust 
treatment that individuals with disabilities also make.157  
In other words, the ‘individual circumstances caused by bad brute luck’ criterion 
for identifying the non-standard interests of individuals with disabilities seems tailored to 
Dworkin’s resource egalitarian idea of distributive justice. I see no reason to think that 
the criterion of reciprocity entails Dworkin’s claim that disability is most fundamentally a 
form of resource inequality. There are other plausible views about disability, for example, 
                                                
156 There are other less obvious reasons not to use Dworkin’s model. Most prominent 
among these is that Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance model rests on a particular 
contestable view of disabilities. Dworkin’s account seems to define disability as an 
impairment or lack of normal function that negatively impacts an individual’s resources 
or welfare. This view is opposed to the social model of disability, which holds that 
impairments do not necessarily have a negative impact on welfare or resources, rather, it 
is social discrimination against certain kinds of bodies and conditions that negatively 
impacts welfare or resources. Therefore, using Dworkin’s account has the additional 
difficulty of resting on a contestable account of ‘disability’.  
157 For an illustrative discussion of the distinction between ‘recognition’ and 
‘redistribution’ see Nancy Fraser contribution to Fraser and Honneth 2003. 
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that disability is a distinct form of social discrimination involving both inequality and 
misrecognition, or that disabilities are a kind of inequality in valuable functionings or 
capabilities. It makes little sense, I think, to rely on any one of these views to draw the 
line between reasonable and unreasonable conceptions of justice, as if the criterion of 
reciprocity itself entailed only one view about disability. If there are any general claims 
about the non-standard needs and interests of individuals with disabilities that support 
particular conclusions about the requirements of reciprocity, they cannot, I think, draw 
too deeply on any one view about disability.  
Dworkin’s criterion is also too comprehensive in the sense that it grounds a 
complete account of the issues of distributive justice that are raised by disabilities. This is 
a desirable aim for a theory of distributive justice, but it is not necessary to adopt a 
particular metaphysical account of disability nor to adopt a complete theory of 
distributive justice to determine whether there are any conclusions about the requirements 
of reciprocity that can be drawn from the interests of citizens with disabilities. A 
defensible approach to identifying the implications of fully including the perspective of 
citizens with disabilities into the constituency of public reason would not rely on any 
particular or comprehensive account of disability or distributive justice, but would focus 
on what institutions would generally need to provide or protect in order to ensure that 
citizens with disabilities could develop as free and equal citizens.  
 I believe that at least three conclusions follow from holding that the perspective 
of citizen’s with (physical) disabilities must in part determine whether it is reasonable to 
believe that “citizens offered [a conception] might also reasonably accept [it].” Citizens 
with disabilities have unique needs and interests related to employment, mobility, and 
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health care. If the needs and interests of citizens with disabilities give rise to any distinct 
claims on the basic structure, it is relatively certain that claims regarding employment, 
mobility, and health care are likely among them. Only brief reflection is needed to see 
how the public rules that govern employment, mobility, and the distribution of health 
care resources uniquely impact the ability of individuals with disabilities to inhabit the 
role of an active citizen who cooperates in the reproduction of political society over time. 
Emphasizing the idea that the basic structure is responsible for securing at least some of 
the social conditions that individuals with disabilities need to acquire the capacities of 
active citizenship grounds a general claim about where the threshold of reasonability lies 
if the perspective of citizens with disabilities is fully included in the constituency of 
public reason. This general claim is derived from the fundamental ideas that ground all 
conceptions of justice in an overlapping consensus, that of free and equal citizens and fair 
terms of mutual cooperation.  
Whether the unique needs of individuals with disabilities connected to 
employment, mobility, and health care can also be grounded in an account of capabilities, 
equality of resources, or non-discrimination can remain an open question.158 The central 
claim of my argument is that if a conception of justice generally rejects or is in some way 
inconsistent with the idea that the basic structure bears some responsibility for protecting 
the interests of individuals with disabilities arising from their unique needs for 
employment, mobility, and health care, citizens with disabilities are unlikely to judge that 
that conception establishes fair terms of cooperation. Moreover, given the predictable 
consequences of rejecting the basic structure’s responsibility for satisfying these needs 
                                                
158 I think it is an open question whether or not it is possible to reduce the justice claims 
of citizens with disabilities to one type of explanation.  
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and interests, it would be unreasonable to believe that citizens with disabilities could 
accept such a conception as providing fair terms of cooperation. The rest of this section 
provides a brief explanation of the core needs and interests in employment, mobility, and 
health care that are unique to individuals with disabilities. In §4 I provide some reasons to 
think that a hypothetical CL + UBI scheme does not sufficiently protect these core needs 
and interests. 
In the United States, individuals with disabilities have a much higher rate of 
unemployment than the general population. While it seems unlikely that there is a 
monocausal explanation for this phenomenon, it seems undeniable that discrimination 
plays a prominent role in the unemployment rate of citizens with disabilities. 
Employment discrimination against of citizens with disabilities may take a number of 
forms. It may be due to hiring practices that exclude citizens with discrimination. It may 
also be due to the fact that citizens with disabilities voluntarily exit the workforce 
because employers do not generally offer terms of employment that accommodate the 
needs of their non-standard bodies. In either case the explanation for the higher rates of 
unemployment is not the existence of formal barriers to equality of opportunity, but 
rather to the prevailing fact that employers overtly or covertly discriminate against 
citizens with disabilities.159  
                                                
159 The discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities is different in several notable 
ways from other forms of discrimination. Most importantly, racial minorities and women 
often face barriers to employment that originate outside the terms of employment. The 
combination of a commitment to meritocracy in the labor market, and a robust effort to 
educate and develop talents equally might resolve much (though not all) of the 
employment discrimination faced by racial minorities and women. But at least one cause 
of unemployment among citizens with disabilities is the absence of accommodations in 




Many physical disabilities make it difficult for individuals to navigate a built 
environment designed for standard kinds of bodies. The use of a wheelchair makes 
buildings without elevators or ramps inaccessible. Individuals who are blind may need 
signage in braille. Individuals with achondroplasia may not be able to access counters, 
light switches, and sinks placed at ‘normal’ heights. Individuals whose disabilities 
prevent them from driving may need some form of reliable public transportation in order 
to leave their home for work or to access services they need. If a society’s built 
environment is generally inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, there is good reason 
to think that those individuals will be unable to fully participate in the civic life of the 
society. At the most fundamental level of civic activity, if the physical locations where 
the core activities of civic life take place are not accessible to those with disabilities, then 
the opportunity to participate in civic life is unequally distributed. There is a real sense in 
which a society that does not see fit to require that buildings be accessible to all citizens 
actively denies citizens with disabilities the activities that constitute civic identity, like 
voting, attending public meetings, or participating in the court system. If public spaces 
are generally inaccessible to those with disabilities, individuals with disabilities may also 
find it difficult to participate in economic dimensions of public life, or even to find proper 
long-term housing. The problem of mobility and accessibility of physical spaces 
compounds the problem of discriminatory employment practices. 
Many physical disabilities also involve unusually high medical costs. Some 
physical disabilities require complex, recurring medical treatment that can be extremely 
expensive. If citizens with disabilities are made to bear the same proportion of the costs 
of medical treatment as citizens with more normal medical needs, citizens with 
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disabilities may find that their incomes are dramatically impacted by the larger overall 
medical costs of their medical needs. A social minimum is likely to appear ‘adequate’ 
from the standpoint of a citizen with disabilities only if it ensures that she is able to afford 
health care resources that are sufficient to care for her medical needs and that the cost of 
those resources to her will not be so great as to throw her into poverty.160 If either of 
these two conditions are not met, the lives of many citizens with disabilities will likely be 
shaped by insecurity, poverty, ill-health, and dependency. The basic character of such a 
life is inconsistent with the claim that the basic structure secures the “necessary social 
conditions” for individuals with disabilities to fully develop as free and equal citizens. 
The unique needs for employment, mobility, and health care identified above do 
not rest on any particular standard or metric of distributive justice. Rather, I believe that 
they can be derived from the fundamental civic interests of citizens with disabilities, to 
secure gainful employment, to freely access the built environment, and to secure 
necessary but expensive medical resources without falling into poverty or dependency. 
These needs can be derived in a rather straightforward way from the social conditions 
necessary for citizenship without the mediation of any particular theory of disability or 
distributive justice. In order for the basic structure to provide conditions for individuals 
with disabilities to occupy the role of a citizen, it seems relatively uncontroversial to say 
                                                
160 I think it is important to note that I am claiming that the distribution of health care 
resources to individuals with disabilities may appeal reasonable without necessarily being 
committed to equality of resources. Citizens with disabilities will likely judge a principle 
for distributing health care resources unreasonable if it denies them routine, if expensive, 
medical resources or the provision of medical resources is prohibitively expensive. I 
don’t think it necessary to presume that citizens with disabilities must be committed to 
some version of equality of resources, or capabilities theory that provides them with 
additional health care resources with aim of equalizing resources or welfare. One could 




that the basic structure must support the efforts of individuals with disabilities to achieve 
employment, access built spaces, and secure affordable health care. I believe that the 
interests generated by these three needs must play an indispensible part in the rational life 
plan developed by any reasonable individual with a disability. To deny this, would imply 
that citizens with disabilities might generally develop ideas of a flourishing life that bears 
no essential connection to the goods of employment, public activities, or health. This 
generalization strikes me as implausible. Just as the basic and undeniable interests at the 
center of any religious citizen’s rational life plan correspond to the rights of toleration 
and association, the core interests in achieving employment, mobility, and health care 
will play a central role in the rational life plan of citizens with disabilities because of the 
fact that their needs for these goods may require that the basic structure treat them 
differently than other citizens.  
 
3 The Features of a CL + UBI Conception of Justice 
 
 The following sketch of the main features of a CL + UBI conception of justice is 
necessary in order to examine whether or not these interests can be sufficiently protected 
by a CL + UBI conception. The conception has three parts. The first is a principle that the 
basic structure should support private ownership of property including economic 
resources. The second principle is that the basic structure should generally respect 
voluntary contractual relations. The third principle is that the basic structure should 
provide a universal basic income to insure that every citizen has resources sufficient to 
provide for her basic needs.  
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 The CL + UBI view is a species of what is somewhat ironically called ‘bleeding-
heart libertarianism’, which attempts to wed the vocabulary of social justice to the 
empirical paradigm of neo-classical economics and the normative paradigm of classical 
liberalism. I prefer the term ‘reasonable classical liberalism’ for this general type of view, 
which is broader than the CL + UBI conception. There are a number of political 
philosophers whose views can be classified as examples of reasonable classical 
liberalism, and who endorse, in more or less explicit terms, versions of the three 
principles characteristic of CL + UBI. Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this form 
of classical liberalism is Gerald Gaus’ “justificatory liberalism”. Others, like John 
Tomasi, and Kevin Vallier, have followed, each in their own way, the path first broken 
by Gaus.161 I refer to these views to illustrate what I take to be the core claims of my 
hypothetical CL + UBI conception without necessarily reducing this conception to any 
one of the examples just cited. Their existence indicates that there are a number of 
reasonable classical liberal views that conceive of themselves as members of the family 
of conceptions that define public reason. Below, I give a brief explanation of each of the 
principles. 
 The first principle is not to be confused with stronger principle libertarian 
principles that hold that the basic structure must respect rights to property that are 
discrete, detailed, and whose existence is logically prior to political institutions. Such 
libertarian principles generally rest on comprehensive moral claims about self-ownership 
or natural rights, and therefore are not properly public reasons. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
                                                
161 Furthermore, many have argued that Theory of Justice can plausibly support a 
recognizably classical liberal basic structure. See Barbara Fried’s “The Unwritten Theory 
of Justice: Rawlisan Liberalism versus Libertarianism” in Mandle and Reidy 2014; see 
also Loren Lomasky’s “Libertarianism at Twin Harvard” in Paul, Miller, and Paul 2005; 
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whether any such libertarian principle is consistent with the idea of social responsibility 
for basic needs that is one of the conditions of reasonability for a conception of justice.162 
By contrast, the reasonable classical liberal principle of property holds that the exact 
shape of individual property rights is determined by the conventions of the basic 
structure, but that widespread private ownership of property is to be preferred to public 
ownership because of the way that private ownership better supports the value individual 
liberty. Tomasi goes so far as to claim that a general right to private property is a basic 
liberty, in the Rawlsian sense.  
Gaus’ “justificatory liberalism” provides what I think is the clearest justification 
of this principle from within the set of commitments that characterize the broadly 
Rawlsian approach to public reason. Gaus argues that free and equal persons concerned 
with justifying the exercise of public power to one another in terms that all endorse may 
find that a compelling answer to the problem of public justification lies in simply 
minimizing the exercise of public power to regulate the use of resources rather than in 
seeking a way to justify a more active use of public power to all persons. Free and equal 
persons may come to see that by minimizing the number of public regulations on the use 
or ownership of resources and devolving the authority to make those decisions to 
individuals, eases the burden of justifying to all reasonable individuals how resources are 
to be regulated and distributed. Free and equal persons, according to Gaus, will therefore 
agree to give broad authority over the ownership and use of resources to individuals in 
their private capacities in order to exclude most economic questions from the scope of 
                                                
162 Samuel Freeman provides the clearest account of why rejecting any social 
responsibility for providing for citizens basic needs shows that libertarian views are 
unreasonable. See Freeman 2001.   
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public justification.163 Thus, Gaus finds that a robust but undifferentiated right to private 
ownership is one of the most fundamental points of convergence among reasonable 
persons committed to justifying the basic structure to each other in ways that are 
consistent with the principle of reciprocity.  
 The second principle is closely tied to the first, and the two are, perhaps, not fully 
distinct. They may simply correspond to different parts of the bundle of entitlements that 
constitutes the idea of ‘full ownership’. Nevertheless, it is possible to partially distinguish 
a person’s authority over the use of resources when the use does not impact others from 
her authority to make enforceable promises to others regarding the transfer, use, or 
alienation of those resources. The reason I would like to distinguish these different types 
of authority is that each corresponds to different ways in which private economic 
decisions may significantly impact the lives of citizens with disabilities.  
The second principle states that voluntary contractual arrangements between 
individuals ought to be generally, though not universally, respected as expressions of 
personal liberty. The view is aptly expressed by Tomasi’s claim that genuine respect for 
individual liberty entails respect for the decisions individuals make in shaping the 
material and economic dimensions of their lives. To satisfy this principle, the basic 
structure must generally respect and in some cases enforce the decisions that individuals 
make regarding the use of their labor and the exchange of goods. This does not imply that 
the basic structure must enforce any and all contractual arrangements, as some libertarian 
                                                
163 See Gaus 2011 p 374: §18.3 “A deeply pluralistic social order can effectively cope 
with many of its disagreements about what evaluative standards to adopt by establishing 
a system of private property.” 
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interpretations of the principle of liberty of contract would have it. It does represent an 
endorsement of, roughly, the economic theory behind Lochner. 
 The universal basic income (UBI) principle is a condensed way of expressing two 
logically distinct claims. The first is a general normative claim that a resource 
sufficientarian standard exhausts the basis structure’s responsibility for citizens’ material 
circumstances. In other words, a resource sufficientarian principle is the most reasonable 
standard of distributive justice for free and equal citizens. This implies that the basic 
structure only bears responsibility for preventing the worst forms of abject poverty, but is 
not responsible for securing broader material equality among citizens, nor is it 
responsible for maximizing the resources or welfare of members of the lowest social 
class beyond the level of sufficient to satisfy basic needs. The point is that the normative 
justification of a UBI rests on a specific account of just distribution. I assume that this is 
the only plausible standard of distributive justice for reasonable classical liberals who 
accept that the basic structure bears some responsibility to prevent poverty. 
The second claim is that a UBI scheme is a better means for realizing the resource 
sufficientarian standard than other plausible institutional schemes, with the most 
important comparison being to means-tested social insurance schemes. There are two 
dimensions in which proponents of a UBI claim that it is better than means-tested social 
insurance schemes for realizing the normative goal of resource sufficientarianism. First, 
proponents claim that a UBI is a more efficient use of public resources than means-tested 
social insurance schemes. The fact that a UBI is universal and recurring means that fewer 
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resources need to be devoted to determining who is qualified to receive it. 164 The smaller 
administrative footprint needed to operate a UBI scheme also means that, theoretically, it 
could be supported by a lower rate of taxation.165 Second, proponents claim that 
providing income to people, rather than an allowance that can only be spent on food or 
shelter or some other resource, increases individual freedom. 166 Providing individuals 
with income increases their freedom to choose what mix of resources best reflects their 
preferences, priorities, and desires. The comparative advantage of the UBI in these two 
dimensions (greater efficiency and greater individual freedom) makes it attractive from 
the standpoint of a reasonable classical liberal who is committed to both the social 
responsibility for providing basic needs, and the securing the broadest possible range of 
individual choice for each person. 
A brief explanation of the institutional features of a universal basic income 
scheme should suffice to complete a general description of the CL + UBI conception I 
wish to examine.167 A UBI makes direct income payments at a fixed rate to all citizens 
                                                
164 This is the claim that Milton Friedman famously made when he proposed a negative 
income tax. See Friedman and Friedman 2002. 
165 The theoretically lower rate of taxation that may be possible given a UBI scheme is a 
significant point. Classical liberals will generally favor less taxation because they believe 
taxation is inherently coercive (though sometimes justified). If UBI schemes require less 
taxation than other comparable mechanisms for securing resource sufficientarian goals, 
classical liberals will judge UBI schemes to be less coercive generally, and therefore, 
preferable to other mechanisms for that reason. 
166 One of the most prominent advocates of a UBI, Phillip Van-Parijs argues that the UBI 
should be preferred to other institutions primarily because it increases individual 
freedom. 
167See, Parijs and Vanderborght 2017, for a wide-ranging summary of the history of UBI 
proposals alongside careful consideration of the normative and empirical arguments for 
such proposals.  
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regardless of need, employment status, earned income, or wealth. 168 Unlike familiar 
means-tested insurance mechanisms that have been in place in various forms since the 
early modern period, a UBI is not conditional on a person’s need or employment status. 
Individuals receive income whether or not they seeks additional employment or need the 
income to remain above the poverty line. This distinguishes the UBI from the means-
tested public assistance programs that many states have adopted in various forms since 
the 17th century. Under these programs, public assistance is conditional on demonstrating 
that one meets criteria of eligibility, which are most often require that one’s poverty or 
need is a matter of ‘bad brute luck’, to use Dworkin’s phrase. Moreover, public assistance 
programs often come in the form of vouchers that can only be spent on food, housing, or 
health insurance, rather than income that can be spent on anything, and assistance is 
terminated as soon as the individual no longer meets the eligibility requirements.169 UBI 
schemes therefore do not generate poverty traps, in which an individual find that earning 
an additional dollar of income makes him ineligible for further benefits which costs him 
much more than the additional dollar earned. 
                                                
168 There is a family of proposed institutional arrangements that can plausibly be called a 
UBI. There is no need to delve into the details of various proposals here. For my 
purposes, the general idea of a UBI includes negative income tax proposals which for 
technical reasons one might want to distinguish from a UBI on the basis of whether the 
scheme pays individuals an income, or offers them an equivalent amount through a tax 
refund. The technical differences are important but less significant, I think, than the fact 
that both realize a commitment to a resource sufficientarian normative standard by 
providing unconditional assistance to each person. For a technical description of the 
difference, see Parijs and Vanderborght 2017.  
169 This leads to a situation in which those who receive assistance through one program or 
another must constantly prepared to defend their eligibility. Moreover, these programs 
often have the perverse effect of trapping people at a certain income level, since the costs 
of losing assistance by pursuing a higher paying job, for instance, are often much higher 
than the additional employment income. 
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Two further features of UBI schemes deserve to be mentioned. First, it is often 
claimed that UBI schemes could largely replace all of or most of the patchwork of 
programs that characterize existing social insurance schemes. Most of the public 
assistance schemes typically found in existing social welfare states would be redundant if 
the basic structure contained a UBI. There would be little need for unemployment or 
retirement insurance, since individuals would receive a minimum income regardless of 
employment status.170 Poverty relief programs that provide food, shelter, and income 
supports would also be redundant, if the income from the UBI was sufficient, on its own, 
for individuals to purchase these goods for themselves. Finally, a UBI could also 
(feasibly) eliminate the need for publicly provided health insurance as long as the income 
from a UBI was set high enough to allow individuals to purchase health insurance plans 
offered in private markets. The advantage of the UBI from the perspective of the 
reasonable classical liberal is that the goal of resource sufficientarianism could be 
achieved in the absence of intrusive, conflicting, and inefficient government 
bureaucracies, and perhaps in a way that costs less than the comparable social welfare 
schemes.171 
The second feature is that a UBI scheme provides individuals with income, rather 
than vouchers that can only be used to purchase food, shelter, or health insurance. The 
advantage of this is two-fold. First, this allows individuals to pursue and acquire a range 
of goods and services that best match their own beliefs about their needs and preferences. 
                                                
170 Perhaps some extremely cautious and well-off individuals would buy individual 
disability, unemployment, or retirement insurance plans in order to maintain a higher than 
average level of expense. There would still be no need for universal enrollment in such 
insurance programs if there was a UBI. 
171 Cost estimates from UBI schemes vary widely and depend heavily on how generous 
the scheme is.  
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Second, it is argued that giving individuals the freedom to choose the basket of basic 
goods and services they require to satisfy their basic needs will increase the ability of 
market forces to bring down the cost of necessary goods over time. 
To summarize the explanation of my hypothetical CL + UBI conception, let us 
first say that a reasonable classical liberal conception must support the general claim that 
society bears some responsibility for ensuring that each citizens’ basic needs are met.172 
This commitment may not be fully specified by reasonable classical liberals like Gaus, 
Vallier, or Tomasi, but that should not imply that such a commitment is not a central part 
of the reasonable classical liberal program. As I have argued, it is one feature that 
distinguishes ‘reasonable classical liberalism’ from its unreasonable relatives, natural law 
classical liberalism and libertarianism. One explanation for why reasonable classical 
liberals like Gaus, Tomasi, or Vallier do not greatly elaborate on the content of their 
commitment distributive justice is that they are more centrally concerned with 
establishing the conceptual space for their type of view. It seems clear to me, however, 
that a resource sufficientarian standard of distributive justice is the most plausible 
candidate for reasonable classical liberals to endorse.173  
In my view, all reasonable classical liberals conceptions of justice will hold that in 
addition to protecting the principles established by a constitutional consensus (political 
                                                
172 This actually makes it questionable whether Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek 
should count as reasonable classical liberals, since neither provide a principled 
explanation for why the basic structure must secure a social minimum. Both seem to offer 
their respective alternatives to social-welfare programs more as a political concession 
than a genuine endorsement of a principle of justice. 
173 This is my own view. Jason Brennan has argued that a resources prioritarian reading 
of the difference principle may support broadly classical liberal commitments to private 
ownership and unregulated free markets for the purely historical reason that such 
arrangements have done a better job of increasing the basket of goods possessed by the 
worst off in society than other systems, see Brennan 2007. 
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equality and liberties of conscience), the basic structure must also (1) generally support 
and protect the widespread private ownership of all resources, (2) generally respect and 
enforce voluntary contractual arrangements, and (3) provide each citizens with resources 
sufficient to meet her basic needs. Given a general commitment to (3), the question is 
whether a reasonable classical liberal would judge that familiar means-tested social 
insurance schemes best achieve this end, or would judge that a UBI is a superior 
mechanism for achieving the end of resource sufficientarianism. I believe there is clear 
reason to suppose that the deepest commitments of classical liberalism, to maximizing 
free choice, private ownership, and market production, support the conclusion that 
reasonable classical liberal conceptions are better expressed by a UBI scheme. The 
strongest argument for a UBI from a reasonable classical liberal standpoint is that 
resource sufficientarianism is the goal of both UBI and means-tested social insurance 
schemes, but the UBI has a number of advantages in terms of both efficiency and 
individual freedom over means-tested social insurance. So while my hypothetical CL + 
UBI scheme may not be endorsed in all its details, the logic of reasonable classical 
liberalism pushes in this direction. Given the outline of this view, the question posed in 
the next section is whether it is reasonable to believe that citizens with disabilities could 
reasonably accept such a conception of justice as providing fair terms of cooperation. 
 





A brief restatement of the three core interests of citizens with disabilities and the 
three basic features of the hypothetical CL + UBI conception provides a framework for 
the analysis in this section. Citizens with disabilities have distinct needs and interests: 
(I1) in securing gainful employment, (I2) in freely accessing the built environment, and 
(I3) in securing necessary but expensive medical resources. The hypothetical CL + UBI 
conception of justice contains three main principles: (P1) basic structure should support 
private ownership of property including economic resources; (P2) the basic structure 
should generally respect voluntary contractual relations; (P3) the basic structure must 
provide citizens with the resources to satisfy basic needs, and the best way to achieve this 
end is a universal basic income.  
The hypothetical CL + UBI conception satisfies the criterion of reciprocity if and 
only if “citizens offering [the conception]… reasonably think that citizens offered [it] 
might also reasonably accept [it].174 This requires on the one hand that citizens with 
disabilities are able to reasonably accept the conception; that they are able accept it, that 
is, in their capacity as free and equal citizens, not as members of a marginalized class. On 
the other hand, it requires that those who propose the CL + UBI conception as the most 
reasonable terms of cooperation “reasonably think” that it could be reasonably accepted 
by citizens with disabilities. In what follows, I give reasons to think that the CL + UBI 
conception satisfies neither of these conditions. 
The first step in this argument is to provide some reason to think that citizens with 
disabilities could not “reasonably accept” a CL + UBI conception. Citizens with 
disabilities are cognizant of how the social conditions they require to develop and adopt a 
                                                
174 Rawls 2005 p xlii 
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rational conception of the good life include unique needs related to employment, 
mobility, and health care. Their ability to develop the two moral capacities of citizenship 
therefore depends on the basic structure recognizing and protecting in some general way 
their unique interests. Institutionalizing each of the principles of the CL + UBI scheme 
leads to predictable social consequences that conflict with these interests. Citizens with 
disabilities will therefore be unable to reasonably accept CL + UBI schemes in light of 
the predictable consequences of institutionalizing them. 
Principle (1) guarantees that the basic structure provides strong protection for 
private ownership of resources. It is not necessary to specify the precise bundle of 
entitlements that this principle entails, since the relevant implication of this principle is 
minimal regulation on the use, transfer, or modification of privately owned resources. 
One consequence of institutionalizing this principle is that the basic structure must give 
private individuals broad authority over the built environment. The physical environment 
of the society will be deeply influenced by the individual preferences, desires, and plans 
of private citizens.  
It is undeniable that many citizens will decide that it is too expensive, difficult, or 
aesthetically unpleasing to install ramps, elevators, signs in multiple formats, etc in 
buildings they own. An unconditional commitment to (P1), therefore, predictably 
excludes citizens with disabilities from accessing goods and services, employment, and 
housing on terms that are equal to citizens with average mobility needs. Citizens with 
disabilities will rightly judge that this principle generally fails to protect their unique 
interests in mobility (I2). Citizens with disabilities cannot reasonably accept (P1) unless 
they know that the basic structure’s general commitment to private ownership is 
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constrained by a strong regulatory system requiring private owners to build or alter their 
property in ways that protect their interests in accessing society’s physical environment. 
(P2) guarantees that the basic structure respects the terms of private contractual 
arrangements. This principle is problematic from the standpoint of citizens with 
disabilities because of its general implications for the labor market. A basic structure 
committed to (P2) generally avoids regulating the labor market, except perhaps for public 
safety. Empirically, citizens with disabilities are unemployed at a twice the rate of 
citizens without disabilities. The cause of this greater rate of unemployment is at least 
partially due to social practices of exclusion. Exclusion from employment can take many 
forms that cannot be ameliorated by a strong commitment to formal equality of 
opportunity, which only requires non-discrimination. Explicitly discriminatory hiring 
practices may be only one source of this discrepancy. The fact that prevailing terms of 
employment generally lack provision for medical leave, or flexible scheduling, or 
modification of the work environment, surely contributes to this as well. In other words, 
social exclusion may be embedded in the terms of contract that prevail across the labor 
market, if those terms are difficult or impossible to satisfy for citizens with disabilities 
who are otherwise qualified for employment.175 
First, if the predictable consequence of unregulated freedom of contract is the 
exclusion of citizens with disabilities from the employment, could citizens with 
disabilities “reasonably accept” this principle as consistent with their status as free and 
equal citizens? I believe the clear answer to this is ‘No’. A conception of justice 
                                                
175 This is not to say of course that citizens with physical disabilities are unjustly 
excluded from being steel workers. But many jobs do not require physical attributes that 
citizens with disabilities may not have. 
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proposing fair terms of cooperation cannot, it seems to me, effectively exclude a whole 
class of otherwise cooperating citizens from one of the primary dimensions of 
cooperative activity. This is not to say that (P2) forbids citizens with disabilities from 
participating in the labor market. This is only to say that allowing employers offer any 
terms of employment without regard for how that might exclude citizens with disabilities 
from jobs they might otherwise be willing and qualified to do is inconsistent with 
regarding those citizens as free and equal partners in cooperation. 
Second, if an unconstrained form of (P2) is unlikely to be reasonably acceptable 
to citizens with disabilities, would a more modest version of (P2) suffer from the same 
problem? In other words, if (P2) is constrained by fair equal opportunity (Rawls’ term for 
the substantive interpretation of equality of opportunity) or a more narrow principle of 
non-discrimination, would this be reasonably acceptable to citizens with disabilities? 
Employers would be free to offer any terms of employment as long as those terms 
provided fair equality of opportunity, and/or did not discriminate (explicitly or implicitly) 
on the basis of physical disabilities.176  
This proposal may address the primary concerns that citizens with disabilities 
may have in being excluded from an unregulated labor market, but it is hard to see how 
this is a stable or attractive constraint on (P2) from the standpoint of classical liberalism. 
The classical liberal who views freely arranged, mutually agreed upon exchange relations 
as an expression of a (nearly) basic liberty is unlikely to endorse a constraint of this sort 
on principle (P2). So for example, in a telling passage in The Order of Public Reason, 
Gerald Gaus argues that the basic structure should respect free contractual relations, even 
                                                
176 Perhaps classical liberals who endorse the equal opportunity principle already 
anticipate this application of principle (B). 
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if these agreements exploit workers. Gaus holds that the state should not attempt to 
prevent citizens from choosing exploitative employment in hierarchical firms, except 
perhaps in the most extreme cases. Workers, he argues, may prefer the wage in an 
exploitative work environment, to little or no pay under non-exploitative conditions. But 
even if one accepts Gaus’ view that the basic structure should not prevent workers from 
choosing to work under such condition, his reasoning cannot be extended to the case of 
individuals with disabilities. If citizens with disabilities cannot find employment because 
employers are generally unwilling to offer terms of employment that match their unique 
needs and interests (or actively discriminate against them), this cannot plausibly reflect a 
choice on the part of citizens with disabilities to hold out for better employment terms. 
 Further, the extension of fair equality of opportunity to citizens with disabilities 
may, in fact, be a very demanding principle that (perhaps) requires employers to offer 
flex-time, medical leave, or costly physical accommodations (like accessible computers 
or workstations). Such a principle may belong to the most reasonable conception of 
justice, but it seems unlikely that classical liberals would accept this kind of broad 
constraint on (P2). 
(P3) holds that the basic structure is responsible for guaranteeing each citizen 
sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs in the form of a fixed, recurring unconditional 
basic income payment (UBI). Given the wide range of institutions that can be classified 
as UBI schemes, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions about whether citizens 
with disabilities can reasonably accept (P3). Instead, I propose to examine two 
considerations, one general and one specific, that are likely to dominate any judgment 
citizens with disabilities are likely to come to regarding (P3). The more general 
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consideration is whether the level of guaranteed income alone would adequately protect 
citizens with disabilities against material poverty. The more specific consideration is 
whether the level of guaranteed income alone would enable citizens with disabilities to 
access expensive, but necessary, medical services and resources. The following analysis 
of these considerations shows that the form of a UBI that is most consistent with classical 
liberal commitments is unlikely (on its own) to provide sufficient income to achieve both 
of the following goals, protecting citizens with disabilities from falling into poverty and 
providing citizens with disabilities with enough income to access greater than average 
amounts of health care resources. 
The first concern assumes that the level of guaranteed income is person-
insensitive, or in other words, that each citizen is guaranteed a level of income that is 
sufficient to meet the basic needs of an average citizen. Citizens with disabilities would 
clearly be aware that their identical basic needs might require a greater than an average 
amount resources to satisfy.177 They will rightly judge that the income from a UBI mainly 
(or only) protects citizens whose basic needs are averagely expensive from falling into 
poverty. 
The second concern is more specific version of first, derived from the third from 
the core needs and interest of citizens with disabilities. Citizens with disabilities 
predictably require more expensive and unusual medical services and resources to 
achieve health outcomes that are equal to other citizens. Assuming that the level of 
                                                
177 The need for mobility is a perfect example, since for the average citizen, especially in 
urban areas this need may require next to no resources. But for citizens with physical 
disabilities, this need may be extremely costly. Motorized wheelchairs, private transport, 
orthotics, and modified vehicles are just some of the additional resources that citizens 
with disabilities may need to be mobile. 
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income each citizen receives from the UBI is calculated in part so that each can purchase 
health insurance privately,178 citizens with disabilities will likely find that a greater share 
of their guaranteed income goes toward health care resources for at least two reasons.179 
First, citizens with disabilities are more likely to purchase broader, more expensive 
insurance coverage than the average citizen.180 This cannot be dismissed as expressing a 
greater than average aversion to risk on the part of citizens with disabilities. Rather, it 
reflects a greater than average amount of health care services and resources often 
required for citizens with disabilities to achieve equal levels of health.181 Second, citizens 
whose disabilities require long-term, regular care may also find that proportionately more 
of their income is devoted to co-pays and other expenses related to regular treatment. The 
exact size and impact of these greater than average health care costs is an empirical 
question that largely depends on the medical system as a whole and the nature of the 
citizen’s disability. However, the existence of these additional, recurring, and perhaps 
expensive costs can be expected to determine whether citizens with disabilities accept 
that (P3) sufficiently protects their unique interest in securing necessary but expensive 
medical resources (I3). 
                                                
178 This assumption is consistent with the primary reasons underlying classical liberal 
support for a UBI scheme. A UBI eliminates the need to maintain large, bureaucratic 
administrations to administer programs, like disability, retirement, and health insurance, 
that can be more effectively and efficiently run as private enterprises. Arguably, a UBI 
eliminates much of the rationale for buying disability and retirement insurance. Health 
insurance would still likely be widely purchased. 
179 This assumption is consistent with the general aim of reducing the scope of public 
administration that motivates classical liberalism’s commitment to UBI schemes. 
180 An additional issue is that citizens with disabilities may be charged more for the same 
coverage. This can be resolved through regulation of the private insurance market. 
181 This is not simply a matter of citizens with disabilities needing more expensive 
medical interventions. Citizens with disabilities often need access to long-term 
medication, mobility and communication aids, and regular therapy that are simply not 
needed at all by average citizens.  
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Put another way, by proposing that citizens with disabilities should accept a 
guaranteed income tied to a person-insensitive standard of the average costs of basic 
needs, its advocate must be committed to saying something like the following:  
You should accept as fair a basic structure that provides everyone with enough 
resources to protect the average citizen from falling into poverty, even though you 
and I expect that it is likely that this income may not meet your basic needs, most 
especially your greater than average need for health care resources, and 
consequently that you may not be protected from falling into poverty.  
I see no reason to think that citizens with disabilities could generally accept such a 
proposal, unless denying it left them with no guaranteed resources at all. In other words, 
their acceptance of this proposal is contingent on their inferior bargaining position, and 
would therefore would not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. 182 
 One final qualification is necessary. The idea of a UBI is not strictly inconsistent 
with providing certain classes of citizens with additional income to cover costly basic 
needs. The suggestion that a UBI might be part of a broader refinement and perfection of 
normative commitments expressed in social welfare states is unlikely to be supported by 
classical liberal proponents of a UBI. Classical liberals like Milton Friedman find UBI-
                                                
182 Even though UBI schemes are committed to providing a person-insensitive level of 
income to each citizen, it does not follow that citizens with disabilities cannot reasonably 
accept any UBI proposal. The reason for this is a UBI could be one element of a broader 
set of institutions that protect citizens against poverty. A proposal that combined a UBI 
with additional income for citizens with disabilities (perhaps through familiar means-
tested social insurance programs) might largely answer the worry that the UBI would not 
provide sufficient income for citizens with disabilities to meet their basic needs. Whether 
citizens with disabilities could reasonably accept principle (3) likely depends on the 
particular features of the UBI in question, specifically, whether the total level of income 
guaranteed by the basic structure to citizens with disabilities reflects the often greater 
than average expense of their basic needs. 
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type schemes attractive in part because they hold out the promise of rejecting the 
regulatory ambitions of the welfare state by minimizing the range of goods and services 
produced or guaranteed by the state. It is not strictly inconsistent for a classical liberal to 
support an UBI with the qualification that certain classes of individuals might also 
receive additional income. Nevertheless, classical liberals will tend to support a UBI in 
its simplest, least qualified form, as a standard income provided to all citizens intended to 
replace other forms of compulsory social insurance. In this form, however, citizens with 
disabilities cannot reasonably accept a UBI. 
 The analysis so far provides three distinct reasons that a CL + UBI conception 
fails the test of reasonable acceptability when the perspective of citizens with disabilities 
is taken into account. This may be sufficient to show that this conception does not satisfy 
criterion of reciprocity, but I think the case against the CL + UBI conception can be made 
stronger by briefly considering several reasons that it is not ‘reasonable to think’ that 
such a conception is “reasonably acceptable” to citizens with physical disabilities. In a 
relatively uncomplicated sense, one could “reasonably think” that conception is 
“reasonably acceptable” if realizing that conception in the basic structure did not severely 
undermine the ability of some citizens to participate as free and equal citizens. There is 
likely to be reasonably disagreement in many cases about whether a conception’s 
realization undermines the ability of some class of citizens to full and equal participation. 
There are other cases, where disagreement is not longer reasonable. There is no 
reasonable disagreement about whether a conception of justice that extended full 
protection of the law only to members of the Roman Catholic Church is reasonably 
 
 139 
acceptable to all citizens in a society marked by religious and moral pluralism. Such a 
conception denies the moral equality of citizens.  
My analysis focuses on the fact that the social conditions that citizens with 
physical disabilities require to develop the moral powers of citizenship differ in important 
way from those of average citizen on account of their fundamental interests in significant 
regulation of rights of private property and contract, and their different needs for health 
care resources. Because these interests are fundamental to the ability of citizens to 
construct lives that are marked by a minimal degree of autonomy, relatively free from 
dependency, ill-health, and long-term unemployment, and in which their status as a free 
and equal citizen is more than formally realized, the failure to protect these interests 
cannot be causally set as peripheral to the question of whether a conception can be 




 The argument in this chapter is guided by the claim that Rawls’ mature view of 
public reason implies a notion of ‘minimal reasonability’ that neither he nor he 
subsequent defenders have adequately explained. Further, since the formal qualities of 
minimal reasonability are partially expressed in the idea of general liberalism, there is 
strong reason to suppose that many classical liberal conceptions of justice are capable of 
providing public reasons since they no less than the egalitarian liberal conception 
preferred by Rawls specify the idea of a reasonable conception expressed as the three 
conditions of generalized liberalism. Rawls, however, does not provide a completely 
 
 140 
consistent account of when conceptions that are less egalitarian than justice as fairness 
are no longer reasonable. Given the difficulty in deriving a consistent view about minimal 
reasonability from Rawls’ expressed views, I suggest in this chapter that the distinct 
interests contained in the perspective of citizens with physical disabilities might provide a 
lens for specifying the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity. By connecting the 
notion of ‘reasonable acceptability’ expressed in the criterion of reciprocity with the 
standpoint of citizens with disabilities, I argued that a hypothetical classical liberal 
conception of justice expressing the formal qualities of generalized liberalism would not 
satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. While the argument above does not categorically rule 
out the possibility that a Rawlsian approach to public reason excludes all classical liberal 
conceptions of justice, it provides strong reason to think that the threshold of minimal 
reasonability derived from Rawls mature view of public reason favors conceptions of 
justice that lend support to at least some significant regulations on private property rights 
and liberty of contract and endorse significant redistributive institutions in order to 








 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Rawls made significant alterations to his account of public reason after the 
publication of the first edition of Political Liberalism. The historicism of this mature 
account of public reason is generally underappreciated. In his mature work, Rawls 
characterizes political consensus as a practical achievement emerging from particular 
political problems. A political consensus on a liberal institutional framework should 
therefore be viewed as the outcome of distinct social struggles for religious toleration, 
political franchise, and economic fairness. Classic liberalism has played a historically 
important role in identifying the moral principles expressed in basic liberal constitutional 
protections, and therefore, it may appear that such conceptions of justice ought to 
continue to play a role in the public reasoning of liberal societies. This appearance is 
misleading. My analysis shows that the disability rights movement provides a compelling 
reason to develop a more inclusive account of the audience of public reason which is 
more sensitive to the interests and agency of citizens with disabilities. Further, it shows 
that classical liberalism faces an insurmountable challenge from citizens with disabilities, 
whose interests and agency as citizens are not adequately protected by its principles. A 
Rawlsian account of public reason that is sensitive to citizens with disabilities’ struggle 
for equal rights will contain sufficient resources to exclude classical liberal principles of 
property.  
The concluding reflections in this chapter further elaborate the following three 
claims. First, Rawls’ proposes that public reasoning is grounded in a prior consensus on 
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the moral necessity of liberal institutions that protect individuals’ social status as free and 
equal citizens. The formal criterion for identifying public reasons is drawn from a 
consensus that certain liberal institutions are required to enable individuals to live as free 
and equal citizens. The authority of public reasoning rests on this consensus, rather than a 
consensus on any particular conception of justice. The ongoing success of liberal 
institutions at resolving social conflict gives further plausibility to the moral arguments 
that support them. 
Second, the formal criterion for identifying public reasons is given by a family of 
conceptions of justice, each of which specifies three conditions, which together define 
what I called generalized liberalism183. These abstract conditions can be specified by a 
number of different conceptions of justice. If generalized liberalism expresses the form of 
a public reason, there appears to be reason to suppose that public reasons may be invoked 
to support classical liberal ideals of private property. This suggests that the values of 
public reason are largely unable to resolve deep conflicts about the injustice of 
distributive inequality.184 
Third, the appearance that the idea of public reasoning might justify a wide range 
of distributive inequalities is plausible only given a set of assumptions about the audience 
of public reasoning that there is good reason to reject. Recent work in the field of 
disability studies provides compelling reason to reject abstract descriptions of the 
audience of public reason that exclude citizens with disabilities.  
                                                
183 I borrow this term from Rex Martin, see Mandle and Reidy 2014 
184 This consequence is most clearly expressed in two articles by Samuel Freeman, see 
Freeman, 2001 ; and Freeman, 2011  
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Connecting these three claims provides evidence that Rawls’ model of public 
reason ultimately rests on a much more nuanced and historically grounded view of the 
consensus that circumscribes public reason than is often taken to be the case. 
Furthermore, this historically conditioned concept of public reason and political 
legitimacy is not a drastic retreat from the egalitarian commitments expressed in justice 
as fairness, despite some initial appearances to the contrary. Under the criticism of 
disabilities scholars, many contractualists have begun to develop more inclusive forms of 
contractualism. Applying these insights to the idea of public reason shows that classical 
liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason only by overlooking or ignoring 
how the perspective of disabled citizens informs which principles of justice could be 
acceptable to all citizens. 
 
1. Consensus in Rawls’ Mature Account of Public Reason 
 
Rawls’ claim that public reasoning in a pluralistic society always occurs within 
the boundaries of a prior consensus has stuck many as puzzling. How, they ask, can 
citizens agree on a conception of justice, if each genuinely endorses a moral or religious 
point of view that is deeply incompatible with those endorsed by other citizens? It 
appears to many either that Rawls’ idea of reasonable pluralism is not defensible, or that 
Rawls’ model of public reason is incoherent. The resolution lies in the historical and 
institutional premises that Rawls relies on to defend the ‘realism’ of the consensus that 
provides a necessary condition for public reasoning.  
 
 144 
I argued in Chapter One that Rawls relies on a particular interpretation of the 
historical development of liberal-democratic societies that is scattered across several of 
his final published discussions. My analysis of Rawls model of public reason shows that 
reasonable non-liberal citizens must only adopt a moral commitment to support the 
specific liberal institutions that guarantee the social conditions that ensure each individual 
the opportunity to develop a public identity as a citizen. Participation in public reasoning 
is not conditioned on a prior endorsement of liberal conceptions of justice, or liberal 
moral values like autonomy 
I showed that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on citizens’ widely held and 
ongoing practical commitment to institutional features of liberal-democratic 
constitutional forms. Rawls stipulates that three features of liberal-democratic 
constitutions in particular define this practical commitment: protections for (a) 
fundamental political and personal liberties, (b) equality of opportunity, and (c) some 
form of social insurance. These features of existing liberal-democratic regimes provide 
the basis for the consensus that grounds public reasoning. Any conception of justice 
whose principles can support each of these features in some way, and is sincerely 
endorsed by some reasonable citizen, I would argue, presumptively belongs to public 
reason on this model. Consensus among citizens on one and the same conception of 
justice is simply not a requirement of public reasoning. The paradigmatic features of 
liberal-democratic institutions establish a threshold of minimal reasonability that defines 
the content of public reasoning. Citizens’ satisfy their duty of civility when they support 
their political claims by reference to some conception of justice that meets the threshold 
requirements of minimal reasonability provided by (a) – (c).  
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The suspicion that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on deep metaphysical 
commitments to liberal principles of justice fails to appreciate the historical and 
pragmatic interpretation of liberal-democratic history that Rawls relies on to explain why 
non-liberal religious and moral perspectives could arrive at a consensus on liberal 
constitutional norms. The history of liberal institutions shows that such a consensus is 
possible. Liberal institutions represent a successful (if imperfect) resolution to problems 
of social instability posed by intolerance and inequality. One need not endorse liberal 
values to accept that liberal institutional forms secure toleration, equal opportunity, and 
material security more regularly than other institutional arrangements.185  
Even so, one may still worry that Rawls’ model of public reason functionally 
excludes the voices and viewpoints of citizens who do not, or cannot, endorse the shared 
premises of public reasoning that can be drawn from a commitment to liberal institutional 
forms. For such citizens, the outcome of public reasoning will not be rationally 
compelling because they have no reason to endorse its ultimate premises. For some, this 
shows that Rawls’ model drifts too far from the Kantian roots of the idea of public 
reason. Public deliberation is only rational according to these critics if its audience is 
unlimited and the deliberation presumes no authority or limit other than the “unforced 
force of the better argument”, i.e. reason itself.186  
I draw attention to this kind of criticism to show how a consensus on liberal 
institutions expressed in Rawls’ mature account of public reason provides a way of 
                                                
185 This should not be understood as an unqualified judgment about the absolute 
superiority of liberal-democratic constitutionalism over all comparable institutional 
forms.  
186 This worry is expressed by Onora O’Neill in her article “Autonomy and Public 
Reason in Kant, Habermas, and Rawls”. See O’Neill 2015 pp 137 – 152. 
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responding to this kind of criticism. Much of the force of this objections rests on the 
suspicion that the Rawlsian model of public reason demands too much of non-liberal 
(specifically religious) citizens. In order to engage in public reasoning, so the objection 
goes, Rawls’ model appears to demand that such citizens draw on principles and values 
that do not reflect their deepest and sincerely held moral commitments. But this 
misconstrues what Rawls’ mature model of public reasoning actually requires of citizens. 
The essential requirement is that citizens come to view (a) – (c) as genuinely moral 
constraints on their own political demands, and not merely as social conventions whose 
breach violates no serious moral obligation or value. Religious citizens do not have to 
adopt any deep metaphysical commitment to moral autonomy as a precondition of public 
reasoning. They merely have to support basic rights of conscience and political 
participation, equal opportunity, and publicly provided social insurance. The degree to 
which public reasoning requires non-liberals to adopt liberal premises as a condition of 
participation in morally binding public deliberation is consequently less drastic than non-
liberal critics of Rawls often assume. The injunction to non-liberals amounts to: do not 
reject the constitutional status of basic rights of conscience, equal opportunity, and social 
insurance in your public deliberations. In my view, the demands of Rawls model are 
much easier to meet than is often taken to be the case, though it remains true that some 
citizens may not be able to meet even this bar. Some may want to push this point further 
and claim that even requiring citizens to find a moral reason to support (a)- (c) demands 
too much of non-liberal citizens. In response, I would ask what grounds we have for 
thinking that a citizen who can find no morally compelling reason to support protection 
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for religious liberty, for instance, is genuinely interested in fair cooperation given the 
moral and religious pluralism that characterize (most) contemporary societies?  
Further, describing the limits of public reasoning in terms of a consensus on 
institutional structures serves to further explain the central role that the idea of persons as 
free and equal citizens plays in Rawls’ model of public reasoning. It is plausible to read 
(a) – (c) as necessary institutional conditions for individuals develop the capacity to 
inhabit the role of a free and equal citizen. In other words, public reasoning expresses a 
shared commitment not to undermine the social conditions that enable others to develop 
and act as free and equal citizens. These protections may have arisen in historically 
contingent ways, as pragmatic resolutions to social struggles that characterize the 
emergence and development of liberal constitutional orders, but this contingency need 
not preclude or undermine the moral value of the institutions that define democratic 
citizenship. History provides ample evidence that societies genuinely seek to protect the 
institutional status of individuals as free and equal citizens are comparatively more just 
than other political forms, and that the most conspicuous political injustices of liberal 
societies are mainly (though not exclusively) due to the unequal extension or enforcement 
of the basic institutional protections accorded to citizens. Consequently, non-liberal 
citizens may develop a genuine and compelling moral commitment to the idea of 
democratic citizenship through a commitment to (a) – (c) because (1) under modern 
social conditions, liberal constitutional forms have done a better job of tracking the 
 
 148 
requirements of justice when compared to other political forms, and (2) the existing 
alternatives to liberal constitutional forms do not promise any gains in justice.187  
 
2.  Generalized Liberalism 
 
Conceiving the shared basis of public reasoning as originating in a consensus on 
typical constitutional protections explains why treating persons as free and equal citizens 
is also central to public reasoning. Constitutional protections for equal basic liberties and 
opportunities, and the general principle of social insurance define the central meaning of 
citizenship in a constitutional democracy. The ideal of citizenship may be deeper and 
broader than the distinct protections expressed by (a) – (c). It is deeper insofar as the role 
instantiates moral values such as mutual respect, equality, and liberty. It is broader 
insofar as the moral values and social status associated with the role of a citizen can be 
applied to social norms and institutions beyond the central constitutional protections (a) – 
(c).  
The ideal of the person as citizen bridges the gap between what Rawls calls a 
constitutional consensus and an overlapping consensus, where the former is focused on 
core institutions of a liberal democracy, and the latter encompasses these institutions as 
well as the values expressed in and through them. An ideal of the person as citizen 
provides a plausible way to explain the development of “depth and breadth” that 
characterizes the emergence of an overlapping consensus, that does not rely on 
                                                
187 This idea could be further fleshed out in terms of Amartya Sen’s and Gerald Gaus’ 
recent arguments development of the idea that comparative judgments ought to be given 
a greater role in our basic judgments of justice. See Sen 2009 and Gaus 2016 
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presuming the emergence of a consensus on a liberal conception of justice or a vaguely 
defined set of political values. The ideal of the person as citizen provides a shared basis 
for public reasoning that both liberal and non-liberal individuals can endorse. An 
individual’s role as a citizen can serve as an independent source of rich and weighty 
obligations. Finally, this role is centrally connected to (in fact produced by) the 
institutional protections typically enshrined in the constitutions of liberal democracies, 
which I argued above, liberal and non-liberal individuals have compelling historical 
reason to endorse. 
But if the shared basis of public reason is characterized in this way, public 
reasoning need not be limited by a single conception of justice. This does not imply that 
public reasoning imposes no constraints on the claims citizens may raise with regard to 
the basic structure. In fact, Rawls suggests that a citizen reasons publicly as long as she 
justifies her political claims on the basis of a conception of justice that contains two sets 
of principles: one set that specifies and orders the basic “rights, liberties, and 
opportunities” that define citizenship, and another affirming that public responsibility for 
ensuring that each citizen has “adequate” means to exercise and take advantage of the 
liberties and opportunities afforded to her as a citizen. 188 I called this form of a public 
                                                
188 Rawls 2005 pp 223; See also pp 375 and xlviii; “Public Reason Revisited” in Rawls 
1999b p 141; and Rawls 1999b pp 14 and 49.  
In the introduction to the paperback edition, the third condition is modified to read “it 
affirms measures assuring all citizens, whatever their social position, adequate all-
purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities.” 
Close examination of these three conditions in the critical literature has been relatively 
sparse. One explanation might be that the manner in which Rawls specifies the content of 
the family of liberal conceptions may seem less important than his claim that liberal 
conceptions only articulate political values. Another explanation might be that the 
common features of liberal freestanding conceptions are not all that significant if one 
holds that the idea of an overlapping consensus requires agreement on a single 
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reason “generalized liberalism”. Each of these conditions can be derived in a relatively 
straightforward way from the constitutional protections (a) – (c) that define the central 
institutional meaning of citizenship.189  
However, generalized liberalism does not obviously distinguish between high 
liberal and classical liberal views of private property and fair distribution. In other words, 
typical features of classical liberal conceptions of justice met the threshold of minimal 
reasonability that is required for public reasoning. As a consequence, political liberalism 
appears to represent a dramatic retreat from the high liberal egalitarianism that marked 
Rawls’ early writing. Public reasons may be cited in support of both the highly 
redistributive and regulative economic structures implied by justice as fairness and the 
minimally redistributive and regulative economic institutions preferred by typical of 
classical liberals. Citizens would not violate the duty of civility by proposing, enacting, or 
continuing to support measures that protect broad private authority in property and 
contractual relations, and minimize the public’s responsibility for insuring material 
security to all citizens above a sufficientarian baseline. A basic structure that permitted 
extreme material and social inequality above some baseline of material well-being would 
                                                                                                                                            
conception. The common content of freestanding conceptions of justice becomes 
relatively more interesting if, following Rawls suggestion, an overlapping consensus does 
not require that citizens agree on the most reasonable conception of justice, but only that 
they agree on a family of reasonable conceptions of justice. Consequently, “Citizens will 
differ as to which of these conceptions they think the most reasonable, but they should be 
able to agree that all are reasonable even if barely so.” Rawls 1999b p 14.  
I argue in another chapter that this is a more defensible understanding of the idea of 
overlapping consensus and better expresses his last presentations of the basis of social 
unity that can be expected in liberal constitutional democracies. 
189 This assumes that social insurance is functionally a necessary condition of citizenship 
in a contemporary constitutional democracy.  
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have a justified claim to the moral allegiance of all citizens, just as more egalitarian high 
liberal conceptions. 
 At least some prominent Rawlsians have accepted this apparent consequence of 
Rawls’ later descriptions of public reason. In several articles, Samuel Freeman has 
worked to distinguish classical liberalism from natural rights libertarianism in part to 
show that the constraints of public reasoning can accommodate the views of a diverse 
group of liberals.190 I find Freeman’s argument unconvincing, in part, because it does not 
adequately appreciate the way in which broad private ownership allows the social status 
of some citizens to be held hostage to the good will of other citizens. If an individual’s 
institutional identity as a free and equal citizen is contingent on the benevolence of other 
citizens, then she is, to that extent, neither free nor equal. 
 
3.  Disability and the Value of Citizenship  
 
 In Rawls’ later work, the shared basis of public reasoning appears to imply that 
classical liberalism and high liberalism have equal standing with respect to the conditions 
of public reasoning. Both conceptions deserve to be regarded by those who reject them as 
unjust, but minimally reasonable. This implies that social inequality of various kinds may 
give rise to claims of injustice, but not to justified claims of illegitimacy. In other words, 
even if classical liberal conceptions of property were unjust, as long as they belong to 
public reason, they would provide a morally proper basis for enacting and enforcing 
legally binding rules. 
                                                
190 See Freeman 2001 and 2011 
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The kind of basic structure preferred by classical liberals would grant broad 
private authority over property, which over time generates significant material and social 
inequalities. Generally, the operation of unfettered markets and private property tends to 
reproduce inequality across generations. This ultimately tends to produce a class system 
in which citizens who are born into the worst off classes develop dramatically different 
expectations of the opportunities, positions, and levels of satisfaction they are rationally 
able to pursue or expect to achieve, despite their talents or efforts. Rawls’ early 
reflections on justice express his conviction that the basic unfairness of such a class 
system proved that the institutions typically supported by classical liberals are deeply 
unjust and should be rejected on those grounds. Nevertheless, Rawls’ description of 
public reason and legitimacy seems to accept some forms of classical liberalism as a 
reasonable basis for legitimate, if not fully, just legal rules. 
 The apparent reversal of Rawls’ views about classical liberalism can be further 
explained by connecting my analysis of the family of conceptions with the related idea of 
pro tanto justification. In the “Reply to Habermas”, Rawls argues that the idea of an 
overlapping consensus requires that a “political conception of justice [be] worked out 
first as a freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without looking to, or trying to 
fit, or even knowing what are, the existing comprehensive doctrines [in a society].”191 
Fundamentally, pro tanto justification of a conception of justice establishes that it 
specifies shared political values, but also, that its principles provide reasonable answers 
to a sufficiently broad range of questions about basic justice.192 A conception that is 
                                                
191 Rawls 2005 p 389 
192 He describes this kind of justification in the following way: “the political values 
specified by [the conception] can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that those values 
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justified pro tanto is sufficiently reasonable to propose as a basis of fair social 
cooperation because it is freestanding and complete.  
The passages in Political Liberalism and elsewhere in which Rawls discusses the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable conceptions of justice 
provide a strong reason to draw a connection between the idea of pro tanto justification 
and the threshold of reasonability that establishes the boundary of the family of 
reasonable conceptions. On my view, a conception is justified pro tanto only if it 
specifies the principles of generalized liberalism, and therefore, belongs, or could belong, 
to a family of reasonable conceptions. Such a formal explanation of the pro tanto 
justification of a conception of justice is likely to be satisfied by at least some classical 
liberal conceptions. Thus the charge that Rawls intentionally or inadvertently abandoned 
his early normative criticism of classical liberalism may seem justified.  
 Something like this view seems to underlie a series of articles by Samuel 
Freeman.193 He defends a fundamental distinction between classical liberalism and 
libertarianism. Further, he argues that classical liberalism is a minimally reasonable 
conception, and implies that it could be justified pro tanto and belong to a possible 
overlapping consensus. Such a formal view of public reasoning overlooks the normative 
implications of who is owed public reasons. A fundamental condition of what counts as a 
public reason is that the consideration could be reasonably acceptable to other citizens. 
The core meaning of ‘reasonably acceptable’ is that the consideration could be accepted 
by someone in light of her identity as a free and equal citizen. In chapter 3, I argue that 
                                                                                                                                            
alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all or nearly all questions concerning 
constitutional essentials and basic justice.” Rawls 2005  p 386 
193 Freeman 2001 and 2011  
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individuals with physical disabilities are equally capable of the core functions of 
citizenship, and therefore, their unique perspective must be accounted for in establishing 
whether a consideration is ‘reasonably acceptable’ to persons as citizens. My analysis 
shows that individuals with physical disabilities require unique social protections and 
material conditions in order to successfully develop the basic moral and attitudinal 
requirements of citizenship. Further, I explained why the typical features of classical 
liberalism are unlikely to provide principled reasons for ensuring that individuals with 
disabilities are provided with these protections and conditions. It follows that individuals 
with disabilities could not reasonably accept classical liberal conceptions in their capacity 
as citizens. Citizens with disabilities would likely reject the most central features of 
classical liberalism on the grounds that they grant other individuals broad authority to 
determine the shape the physical and economic environment in ways that exclude and 
alienate citizens with disabilities from their civic identity. Such private authority over the 
conditions of citizenship is inconsistent with a principled protection of the social and 
institutional conditions of citizenship for individuals with disabilities. 
 
4.  Public Reason and Democratic Equality 
 
 I have argued that typical features of classical liberalism are unable to sufficiently 
guarantee core social and material conditions that individuals with disabilities minimally 
require to develop as citizens. Classical liberal conceptions of the scope and weight of 
private authority to make decisions about property implies that equal inclusion of citizens 
with disabilities in public buildings and spaces is a question that is properly left to the 
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discretion of the owner. Perhaps other citizens generally recognize the needs and interests 
of citizens with disabilities, and spontaneously work to include citizens with disabilities 
in various ways. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that citizens with disabilities could 
accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens a principle that held that 
their ability to access publicly accessible spaces is contingent on the good-will of other 
citizens. Similarly, classical liberalism’s support for broad private authority over 
contractual employment relations leaves citizens with disabilities no recourse if the 
prevailing terms of employment offered by employers functionally excludes them from 
the labor market. One need not think that employers’ have an unlimited duty to provide 
accommodations for employees with disabilities. It is sufficient for the claim I wish to 
make to show that granting employers complete (or nearly complete) authority to 
determine the terms of employment conflicts with the equal status of citizens with 
disabilities. Finally, most contemporary forms of classical liberalism do support the idea 
of social insurance, generally through a commitment to sufficientarianism. The 
institutional mechanism that best balances classical liberalism’s competing demands of 
private ownership and sufficientarian social insurance is a universal basic income. But 
the form most consistent with classical liberalism’s commitments to private property is a 
universal basic income in which all citizens are provided with an income sufficient to 
keep the average citizen from falling into poverty. Given several assumptions about 
social insurance forms that would likely be supported by classical liberals (specifically 
the rejection of means-testing and maximal privatization of the health care industry), a 
level of income sufficient to keep an average person from falling into poverty would not 
be sufficient to keep someone with complex medical needs from falling into poverty. 
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Citizens with physical disabilities may reasonably accept sufficientarianism expressed in 
some other institutional form that is more responsive to their unique needs and interests. 
However, the institutional form that best balances classical liberalism’s competing 
commitments to private ownership and sufficientarianism is a universal basic income 
providing for the needs of an average citizen. This form of social insurance is not 
reasonably acceptable to citizens with disabilities because it does not provide them with 
an equal guarantee of freedom from material poverty 
 My analysis of Rawls’ account of public reason has a number of similarities to the 
relational egalitarianism Elizabeth Anderson has developed in a number of articles and 
books over the last twenty years. While there are several points on which her views and 
mine overlap, there is an important sense in which our views emphasize different 
implications of the central ideas of relational egalitarianism.  
 Anderson develops her view of relational equality largely as a response to luck-
egalitarian views, such as those of G.A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and Ronald Dworkin. 
They each hold versions of the thesis that only undeserved material inequalities are 
unjust. Typically, these views hold that inequalities of income and wealth (and other 
scarce goods) are unjust if they are entirely (or primarily) due to natural talents and 
abilities that are unequally distributed, rather than to deliberate choices.  
Anderson criticizes this type of view for misunderstanding the “point of equality” 
and for distorting the normative ground of existing egalitarian social movements.194 
Luck-egalitarians fail to adequately grasp that the “point of equality” is to reject the 
“justice or necessity of basing social order on a hierarchy of human beings, ranked 
                                                




according to intrinsic worth.”195 According to Anderson, unjust material inequalities 
reflect or are caused by conceptually prior inequalities of “authority, status, or standing”, 
rather than in facts about what material goods one deserves. By defining unjust material 
inequalities in terms of undeserved material inequalities, luck-egalitarians are forced to 
construct counter-intuitive and misleading theories to explain the injustice done to the 
poor surfer who refuses to work for a living, or the aesthete with extravagantly expensive 
tastes. An exclusive focus on moral desert and responsibility obscures the true ground of 
actual political claims to unjust treatment, which lies in relations between individuals that 
fail to express equal authority and respect. 
Anderson’s criticism of luck-egalitarianism rests largely on the claim that luck-
egalitarian principles cannot serve as “principles for adjudicating the claims of free, 
equal, reasonable, and mutually accountable persons make on each other, with respect to 
what they owe to each other.”196 This is a requirement for any intersubjectively justified 
principle of justice. She accuses luck-egalitarians (rightly, I think) of proposing that 
everyone has a duty of justice to correct inequalities that no one hand a hand in producing 
and for which no one bears responsibility. Such a principle cannot provide the basis for 
intersubjective claim making since that requires that someone is responsible for an injury 
or wrong to another.  Luck-egalitarianism does not satisfy the basic requirements of 
contractualist justification, and for that reason cannot be the ground of intersubjectively 
justified claims of justice. In the terminology I have used, luck-egalitarianism falls 
outside the boundaries of public reason because it is not a member of the family of 
reasonable conceptions. 
                                                
195 Anderson 1999 pp 312 
196 Anderson 2010 p 5 
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But while Anderson goes on to argue that her preferred conception of justice 
“democratic equality” is the most reasonable basis for citizens to make claims on each 
other through the basic structure, I have pursued a slightly different question. I agree with 
Anderson that luck-egalitarianism cannot be intersubjectively justified, and so is not a 
part of public reason. However, luck egalitarianism is not the only, or even the most 
plausible, alternative to democratic equality. Over the last decade, a number of classical 
liberals have argued that the demands of contractualist justification are better met by 
principles of justice that support widespread private ownership of property, a strong 
presumption in favor of the private production of goods and services, and minimal 
commitments to redistribute property.  
My dissertation draws on the Rawls later work on public reason in order to assess 
the merits of these recent forms of classical liberalism. Anderson does not explicitly 
address the question of whether other conceptions of justice deeply opposed her view of 
relational equality might also satisfy the formal requirements of intersubjective 
justification, or to use slightly different terminology, whether such views might belong to 
public reason. My argument provides reason to think that the simplest and most logically 
consistent forms of classical liberalism are excluded from the “family of conceptions”. 
This conclusion supplements “democratic equality” by showing that if public reasoning is 
responsive to the perspective of citizens with disabilities, that classical liberalism in its 
simplest and most logically consistent form fails to be intersubjectively justified, and for 
that reason is excluded from public reason. By contrast, Anderson shows that 
“democratic equality” protects the unique interests of citizens with disabilities in way that 





 I argue that the idea of public reason in the work of John Rawls is underpinned by 
a widely overlooked historical thesis about liberal institutions. The “realism” of an 
overlapping consensus, and therefore, the possibility of public reasoning, rests on the 
empirical possibility that society’s competing moral and religious doctrines have the 
moral resources to justify basic liberal constitutional institutions. These institutions give 
rise to a particular social role, that of free and equal citizen. In the reflections above, I 
have indicated how this historical thesis about the pragmatic value of liberal institutions 
could be the source of a morally significant commitment to treating others as citizens. 
This commitment need not draw on any particular moral or religious viewpoints or 
principles, but can nevertheless serve as a ground for the contractualist principle at the 
heart of public reason, namely the principle of reciprocity. Further, a commitment to a 
historically conditioned ideal of citizenship will entail a commitment to the basic liberal 
institutions that give reality to the ideal. Finally despite some initial concern that this 
historically informed account of public reasoning might provide an extremely permissive 
view about the content of public reason, I argue that the obligation to protect and support 
the status of others as free and equal citizens is inconsistent with granting broad private 
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